Daily Papers

A small transformer encoder is trained to map Terminal-Wrench trajectories onto a unit sphere where embedding distance approximates the L_1 distance between reward and metadata signals. A linear probe on top of that embedding detects reward hacking on the cleaned test split with AUC 0.9467 and TPR@5%FPR 0.8296, matching the TW sanitized LLM-as-judge AUC (0.9510 on the cleaned split) and exceeding its TPR@5%FPR (0.7130 vs 0.8296) on the same information condition, at roughly four orders of magnitude lower per-trajectory cost. The encoder is not a pure behavior reader: stripping natural-language reasoning from its input at probe time drops AUC to 0.6213.

Robust detection of AI-generated text under deployment conditions is challenging: distribution shifts across domains and generators, adversarial perturbations of the input surface, and the absence of target-domain labels for threshold calibration all degrade detectors that perform well in-domain. We present DeBERTa-ConPara, a deployment-oriented detector combining attack-aware Unicode preprocessing with a contextual transformer encoder trained over HC3 Plus, M4, MAGE and RAID. Our central finding is that preprocessing acts in opposite directions depending on where it is applied: normalising the training corpus deduplicates it, collapsing 35.4% of RAID rows into copies of their clean siblings and deleting the adversarial supervision, whereas normalising at inference is an effective defence. A factorial varying the two placements independently identifies raw training with normalised inference as the best configuration, reaching 99.61% AUROC, 99.01% TPR@5% FPR and 96.57% TPR@1% FPR on the official RAID hidden test, alongside 93.14% average balanced accuracy across HC3 Plus and MAGE under a fixed threshold. The gain is confined to two of twelve attack classes: homoglyph and zero-width-space insertion rise from 11.05% and 1.12% to 96.98%. The same signature reproduces in a zero-shot detector of different architecture, showing the effect belongs to the attacks rather than to our model. We additionally report two negative results: semantic-invariance augmentation through paraphrasing and supervised contrastive learning (ConPara) does not improve the best configuration, and the handcrafted feature-fusion branch is inert in distribution and harmful outside it.

Watermarking embeds statistical signatures in AI-generated text for detection and attribution. We reveal a fundamental vulnerability: when users access multiple models (today's reality), watermarks trivially fail. Watermarks perturb output distributions away from the original, and in competitive markets, these perturbations are typically independent across providers. We theoretically prove that averaging output probability distributions recovers the unwatermarked distribution with up to a second-order error term. Empirically, simply averaging 3-5 models cancels out these perturbations. We introduce WASH (Watermark Attenuation via Statistical Hybridisation), which solves practical challenges in ensemble generation: vocabulary misalignment and tokenisation differences across heterogeneous models. Experiments across six watermarking schemes and three LLMs show that averaging across 3 models suppresses detection z-scores from 5-300 to below 2 (below the detection threshold of 4) and reduces TPR at 5% FPR to below 50%, while improving quality by 27.5% and running 6 times faster than the best baseline on the long sequence generation. Our results suggest that robust AI-text detection via watermarking requires either accepting this fundamental vulnerability or unprecedented coordination among model providers.

Membership inference (MIA) on language models is usually summarised by aggregate ROC-AUC, but such evaluations are confounded: model-free blind baselines can separate members from non-members using surface text alone. Building on probabilistic discoverable extraction, we study black-box training-data leakage using N samples from p_theta(. | x), placing mean overlap, extreme-value overlap, and self-concentration on a common functional-estimation footing. On WikiMIA, a blind bag-of-words classifier reaches AUC 0.97 (TPR 0.90 at 5% FPR) while sampling adds nothing. On an IID Pile split (MIMIR), neither self-concentration nor gold-continuation recovery significantly exceeds a blind baseline in aggregate. Aggregate metrics hide the real harm: sampling verbatim-extracts training data for a tail of documents no blind attack can reach. On Pythia-6.9B, 16.6% of 500 Pile documents bearing a real identifier (83 documents; 21.3% of those bearing an email address) have that identifier reproduced and not reproduced under a mismatched-prefix control. Each leak is attributable to that document rather than a globally common string. This per-document disclosure is invisible to aggregate AUC. Risk is uneven: identifier leakage is about 3x stronger in code than prose, though prose remains positive and grows with capacity (4.0% to 12.1% from 410M to 6.9B); recovery of arbitrary held-out continuations is essentially confined to code (+0.44 member gap on GitHub vs at most +0.014 on prose). Temperature and nucleus sampling have minor effect, a 16-token prefix suffices, and the sample-budget relationship corroborates prior probabilistic-extraction results. We detect no reduction from deduplication. Privacy audits should report per-document extraction, not only aggregate membership, and motivate differential privacy as the mitigation. We release leakit, a black-box tool implementing this probe and its control.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with TPR@.01 as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

Autoregressive neural codec language models have shown strong zero-shot voice cloning ability, but decoder-only architectures treat input text as a prefix that competes with the growing audio sequence for positional capacity, weakening text conditioning over long utterances. We present T5Gemma-TTS, an encoder-decoder codec language model that maintains persistent text conditioning by routing bidirectional text representations through cross-attention at every decoder layer. Built on the T5Gemma pretrained encoder-decoder backbone (2B encoder + 2B decoder; 4B parameters), it inherits rich linguistic knowledge without phoneme conversion and processes text directly at the subword level. To improve duration control, we introduce Progress-Monitoring Rotary Position Embedding (PM-RoPE) in all 26 cross-attention layers, injecting normalized progress signals that help the decoder track target speech length. Trained on 170,000 hours of multilingual speech in English, Chinese, and Japanese, T5Gemma-TTS achieves a statistically significant speaker-similarity gain on Japanese over XTTSv2 (0.677 vs. 0.622; non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals) and the highest numerical Korean speaker similarity (0.747) despite Korean not being included in training, although this margin over XTTSv2 (0.741) is not statistically conclusive. It also attains the lowest numerical Japanese character error rate among five baselines (0.126), though this ranking should be interpreted cautiously because of partial confidence-interval overlap with Kokoro. English results on LibriSpeech should be viewed as an upper-bound estimate because LibriHeavy is a superset of LibriSpeech. Using the same checkpoint, disabling PM-RoPE at inference causes near-complete synthesis failure: CER degrades from 0.129 to 0.982 and duration accuracy drops from 79% to 46%. Code and weights are available at https://github.com/Aratako/T5Gemma-TTS.

Automated program repair (APR) using deep learning techniques has become an important area of research in recent years, aiming to automatically generate bug-fixing patches that can improve software reliability and maintainability. However, most existing methods either target a single language or require high computational resources to train multilingual models. In this paper, we propose T5APR, a novel neural program repair approach that provides a unified solution for bug fixing across multiple programming languages. T5APR leverages CodeT5, a powerful pre-trained text-to-text transformer model, and adopts a checkpoint ensemble strategy to improve patch recommendation. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on six well-known benchmarks in four programming languages (Java, Python, C, JavaScript), demonstrating T5APR's competitiveness against state-of-the-art techniques. T5APR correctly fixes 1,985 bugs, including 1,442 bugs that none of the compared techniques has fixed. We further support the effectiveness of our approach by conducting detailed analyses, such as comparing the correct patch ranking among different techniques. The findings of this study demonstrate the potential of T5APR for use in real-world applications and highlight the importance of multilingual approaches in the field of APR.