Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) benefit from training on ever larger amounts of textual data, but as a result, they increasingly incur the risk of leaking private information. The ability to selectively remove knowledge from LLMs is, therefore, a highly desirable capability. In this paper, we propose LUNAR, a novel unlearning methodology grounded in the Linear Representation Hypothesis. LUNAR operates by redirecting the representations of unlearned data to regions that trigger the model's inherent ability to express its inability to answer. LUNAR achieves state-of-the-art unlearning performance while significantly enhancing the controllability of the unlearned model during inference. Specifically, LUNAR achieves between 2.9x to 11.7x improvements on combined "unlearning efficacy" and "model utility" score ("Deviation Score") on the PISTOL dataset across various base models. We also demonstrate, through quantitative analysis and qualitative examples, LUNAR's superior controllability in generating coherent and contextually aware responses, mitigating undesired side effects of existing methods. Moreover, we demonstrate that LUNAR is robust against white-box adversarial attacks and versatile in handling real-world scenarios, such as processing sequential unlearning requests.

Large Language Models memorize vast amounts of training data, raising concerns regarding privacy, copyright infringement, and safety. Machine unlearning seeks to remove the influence of a targeted forget set while preserving model performance, ideally approximating a model retrained from scratch without the forget set. Existing approaches aim to achieve this by updating model parameters via gradient-based methods. However, these updates are computationally expensive, lead to irreversible weight changes, and degrade when the model is quantized for deployment. A recent alternative to changing model weights is activation engineering, where activations are changed during inference to steer model behavior. Despite circumventing weight editing, naive activation steering introduces its own failure modes, as a single global steering vector applies the same intervention to every input, leading to unintended changes in model behavior. We introduce Inference-Time Unlearning via Gated Activation Redirection (GUARD-IT), a training- and gradient-free method that unlearns via input-dependent activation steering at inference time. The resulting intervention is applied as a norm-preserving rotation in the residual stream, leaving model weights untouched. Experiments on TOFU and MUSE show that GUARD-IT matches or exceeds 12 gradient-based baselines across three model scales, while being the only method to simultaneously preserve utility, suppress memorization, and avoid catastrophic collapse across all settings. GUARD-IT further supports continual unlearning without retraining, and remains effective under quantization, a scenario in which parameter-editing methods degrade.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) may memorize sensitive cross-modal information during pretraining, making machine unlearning (MU) crucial. Existing methods typically evaluate unlearning effectiveness based on output deviations, while overlooking the generation quality after unlearning. This can easily lead to hallucinated or rigid responses, thereby affecting the usability and safety of the unlearned model. To address this issue, we propose ASRU, a controllable multimodal unlearning framework that incorporates generation quality as a core evaluation objective. ASRU first induces initial refusal behavior through activation redirection, and then optimizes fine-grained refusal boundaries using a customized reward function, thereby achieving a better trade-off between target knowledge unlearning and model utility. Experiments on Qwen3-VL show that ASRU significantly improves unlearning effectiveness (+24.6%) on average and generation quality (5.8X) on average while effectively preserving model utility, using only a small amount of retained supervision data.

Recently, diffusion models have emerged as promising newcomers in the field of generative models, shining brightly in image generation. However, when employed for object removal tasks, they still encounter issues such as generating random artifacts and the incapacity to repaint foreground object areas with appropriate content after removal. To tackle these problems, we propose Attentive Eraser, a tuning-free method to empower pre-trained diffusion models for stable and effective object removal. Firstly, in light of the observation that the self-attention maps influence the structure and shape details of the generated images, we propose Attention Activation and Suppression (ASS), which re-engineers the self-attention mechanism within the pre-trained diffusion models based on the given mask, thereby prioritizing the background over the foreground object during the reverse generation process. Moreover, we introduce Self-Attention Redirection Guidance (SARG), which utilizes the self-attention redirected by ASS to guide the generation process, effectively removing foreground objects within the mask while simultaneously generating content that is both plausible and coherent. Experiments demonstrate the stability and effectiveness of Attentive Eraser in object removal across a variety of pre-trained diffusion models, outperforming even training-based methods. Furthermore, Attentive Eraser can be implemented in various diffusion model architectures and checkpoints, enabling excellent scalability. Code is available at https://github.com/Anonym0u3/AttentiveEraser.

LLMs have shown remarkable capabilities, but precisely controlling their response behavior remains challenging. Existing activation steering methods alter LLM behavior indiscriminately, limiting their practical applicability in settings where selective responses are essential, such as content moderation or domain-specific assistants. In this paper, we propose Conditional Activation Steering (CAST), which analyzes LLM activation patterns during inference to selectively apply or withhold activation steering based on the input context. Our method is based on the observation that different categories of prompts activate distinct patterns in the model's hidden states. Using CAST, one can systematically control LLM behavior with rules like "if input is about hate speech or adult content, then refuse" or "if input is not about legal advice, then refuse." This allows for selective modification of responses to specific content while maintaining normal responses to other content, all without requiring weight optimization. We release an open-source implementation of our framework at github.com/IBM/activation-steering .

Adapting LLM agents to domain-specific tool calling remains notably brittle under evolving interfaces. Prompt and schema engineering is easy to deploy but often fragile under distribution shift and strict parsers, while continual parameter-efficient fine-tuning improves reliability at the cost of training, maintenance, and potential forgetting. We identify a critical Lazy Agent failure mode where tool necessity is nearly perfectly decodable from mid-layer activations, yet the model remains conservative in entering tool mode, revealing a representation-behavior gap. We propose Activation Steering Adapter (ASA), a training-free, inference-time controller that performs a single-shot mid-layer intervention and targets tool domains via a router-conditioned mixture of steering vectors with a probe-guided signed gate to amplify true intent while suppressing spurious triggers. On MTU-Bench with Qwen2.5-1.5B, ASA improves strict tool-use F1 from 0.18 to 0.50 while reducing the false positive rate from 0.15 to 0.05, using only about 20KB of portable assets and no weight updates.

Activation steering is a popular white-box control technique that modifies model activations to elicit an abstract change in its behavior. It has also become a standard tool in interpretability (e.g., probing truthfulness, or translating activations into human-readable explanations) and safety research (e.g., jailbreakability). However, it is unclear whether steered behavior is realizable by any textual prompt. In this work, we cast this question as a surjectivity problem: for a fixed model, does every steered activation admit a preimage under the model's natural forward pass? Under practical assumptions, we prove that activation steering pushes the residual stream off the manifold of states reachable from discrete prompts. Almost surely, no prompt can reproduce the same internal behavior induced by steering. We also illustrate this finding empirically across three widely used LLMs. Our results establish a formal separation between white-box steerability and black-box prompting. We therefore caution against interpreting the ease and success of activation steering as evidence of prompt-based interpretability or vulnerability, and argue for evaluation protocols that explicitly decouple white-box and black-box interventions.

Personal Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents rely on interaction history to infer what a user wants from ambiguous instructions and to anticipate recurring routines. Existing approaches retrieve task-relevant history and append it to the policy's context, implicitly assuming that experience relevant to a task remains useful for each decision within it. We find that this help is largely spent at the first decision: retrieved history strongly improves the opening step of an episode, yet provides little sustained benefit over the remaining 90\% of steps, and offers weak guidance on whether a proactive suggestion is warranted. A relevant record may tell the agent where to begin, but not which past action applies to the current screen or whether a routine is due now. The underlying issue is that relevance does not imply applicability}: relevance is determined at the task level, whereas applicability depends on the situation at decision time. We therefore recast personalization as experience activation and introduce ExpActivator, a training-free framework that activates only the experience applicable to the current situation. During execution, ExpActivator matches each new screen to historical states in the frozen GUI backbone's latent space and supplies the corresponding action as a reference. Before execution, it activates a recurring intent only when the current time and scenario provide sufficient support, and otherwise abstains. Across four GUI backbones, ExpActivator improves within-trajectory step success by 28\% on average, achieves the best personalized execution on every backbone while using about one-fifth as many history tokens, and reaches approximately 2.3times the Matthews correlation coefficient of the strongest proactive baseline. Experience pays where it is activated, not where it is appended.

An ordinary-looking background detail can turn a correct model decision into a confident mistake. We demonstrate this fragility in four decision systems, including Jev, across seven datasets covering knowledge, reasoning, and tool routing. Within 64 accepted target evaluations per decision, we uncover short context additions that redirect 61.4%-73.2% of each system's initially correct decisions toward a wrong option fixed in advance. The additions supply background or procedural information rather than explicit answer-selection instructions, leaving the original question and choices intact. We construct them through probability-guided context optimization, which uses shifts in the option distribution to refine surrounding text under naturalness and answer-preservation constraints. Redirection affects initially confident decisions, often produces high-confidence wrong choices, and transfers across models. In blinded human evaluation, 91.6% of 250 sampled successful contexts are judged natural, answer-preserving, and free of decisive answer-changing evidence by a majority of three independent annotators. These findings expose a weakness in current decision models: context that looks entirely compatible with an input can redirect the choices that agents, routers, and evaluators rely on.

Despite their impressive capabilities, current Text-to-Image (T2I) models remain prone to generating unsafe and toxic content. While activation steering offers a promising inference-time intervention, we observe that linear activation steering frequently degrades image quality when applied to benign prompts. To address this trade-off, we first construct SafeSteerDataset, a contrastive dataset containing 2300 safe and unsafe prompt pairs with high cosine similarity. Leveraging this data, we propose Conditioned Activation Transport (CAT), a framework that employs a geometry-based conditioning mechanism and nonlinear transport maps. By conditioning transport maps to activate only within unsafe activation regions, we minimize interference with benign queries. We validate our approach on two state-of-the-art architectures: Z-Image and Infinity. Experiments demonstrate that CAT generalizes effectively across these backbones, significantly reducing Attack Success Rate while maintaining image fidelity compared to unsteered generations. Warning: This paper contains potentially offensive text and images.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

Before invoking external tools, an agentic LLM must select among a K-way action space: executing a call, seeking clarification, answering directly, or declining. While internal activation steering can alter these pre-execution decisions, conventional aggregate metrics obscure where altered states land and what collateral damage they inflict. We present SAKIKO, an auditing framework that formalizes representation repair via directional error discovery, router-conditioned intervention, destination-resolved verification, and prospectively frozen statistical licensing. Across seven LLMs on When2Call and MetaTool, channel-keyed interventions induce direction-specific net gains in five models; across three sealed evaluations, none of 59 budget-matched random directions matches calibrated target gain. Crucially, destination auditing shows that behavioral movement does not equal repair: an intervention achieving +55 net gain corrupts over half of the baseline-correct decisions it touches, and promising point estimates on Qwen3-4B and Gemma-2-9B are formally declined due to finite-sample uncertainty. SAKIKO establishes the necessity of outcome-resolved adjudication before claiming internal repair. Code: https://github.com/ruizheliUOA/mechanistic-tool-use-llm.

The increasing capabilities of large generative models and their ever more widespread deployment have raised concerns about their reliability, safety, and potential misuse. To address these issues, recent works have proposed to control model generation by steering model activations in order to effectively induce or prevent the emergence of concepts or behaviors in the generated output. In this paper we introduce Activation Transport (AcT), a general framework to steer activations guided by optimal transport theory that generalizes many previous activation-steering works. AcT is modality-agnostic and provides fine-grained control over the model behavior with negligible computational overhead, while minimally impacting model abilities. We experimentally show the effectiveness and versatility of our approach by addressing key challenges in large language models (LLMs) and text-to-image diffusion models (T2Is). For LLMs, we show that AcT can effectively mitigate toxicity, induce arbitrary concepts, and increase their truthfulness. In T2Is, we show how AcT enables fine-grained style control and concept negation.

Activation steering -- adding a vector to a model's residual stream to modify its behavior -- is widely used in safety evaluations as if the model cannot detect the intervention. We test this assumption, introducing steering awareness: a model's ability to infer, during its own forward pass, that a steering vector was injected and what concept it encodes. After fine-tuning, seven instruction-tuned models develop strong steering awareness on held-out concepts; the best reaches 95.5% detection, 71.2% concept identification, and zero false positives on clean inputs. This generalizes to unseen steering vector construction methods when their directions have high cosine similarity to the training distribution but not otherwise, indicating a geometric detector rather than a generic anomaly detector. Surprisingly, detection does not confer resistance; on both factual and safety benchmarks, detection-trained models are consistently more susceptible to steering than their base counterparts. Mechanistically, steering awareness arises not from a localized circuit, but from a distributed transformation that progressively rotates diverse injected vectors into a shared detection direction. Activation steering should therefore not be considered an invisible intervention in safety evaluations.

Reasoning LLMs trained with long chain-of-thought often overthink: they spend tokens on redundant reflection and transitions that inflate cost without improving accuracy. Static activation steering (e.g.\ SEAL) suppresses such content with a fixed vector, but applies the same strength regardless of how redundant the current chunk actually is. We describe PID-steering, a training-free, decoding-time method that modulates the steering strength with a PID controller driven by a lightweight chunk-level redundancy classifier. On a subset of GSM8K with DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B, the method improves accuracy from 85.7\% to 89.6\% (+3.9 pp) while cutting average output length from 1026 to 790 tokens (-23\%). We report it as a small-scale proof of concept rather than a benchmark result.

Despite significant progress in alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks that elicit harmful behaviors. Activation steering techniques offer a promising inference-time intervention approach, but existing methods suffer from critical limitations: activation addition requires careful coefficient tuning and is sensitive to layer-specific norm variations, while directional ablation provides only binary control. Recent work on Angular Steering introduces continuous control via rotation in a 2D subspace, but its practical implementation violates norm preservation, causing distribution shift and generation collapse, particularly in models below 7B parameters. We propose Selective Steering, which addresses these limitations through two key innovations: (1) a mathematically rigorous norm-preserving rotation formulation that maintains activation distribution integrity, and (2) discriminative layer selection that applies steering only where feature representations exhibit opposite-signed class alignment. Experiments across nine models demonstrate that Selective Steering achieves 5.5x higher attack success rates than prior methods while maintaining zero perplexity violations and approximately 100\% capability retention on standard benchmarks. Our approach provides a principled, efficient framework for controllable and stable LLM behavior modification. Code: https://github.com/knoveleng/steering

Recent work on domain-specific reasoning with large language models (LLMs) often relies on training-intensive approaches that require parameter updates. While activation steering has emerged as a parameter efficient alternative, existing methods apply static, manual interventions that fail to adapt to the dynamic nature of complex reasoning. To address this limitation, we propose RISER (Router-based Intervention for Steerable Enhancement of Reasoning), a plug-and-play intervention framework that adaptively steers LLM reasoning in activation space. RISER constructs a library of reusable reasoning vectors and employs a lightweight Router to dynamically compose them for each input. The Router is optimized via reinforcement learning under task-level rewards, activating latent cognitive primitives in an emergent and compositional manner. Across seven diverse benchmarks, RISER yields 3.4-6.5% average zero-shot accuracy improvements over the base model while surpassing CoT-style reasoning with 2-3x higher token efficiency and robust accuracy gains. Further analysis shows that RISER autonomously combines multiple vectors into interpretable, precise control strategies, pointing toward more controllable and efficient LLM reasoning.

Current large language models have dangerous capabilities, which are likely to become more problematic in the future. Activation steering techniques can be used to reduce risks from these capabilities. In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of activation steering for broad skills and multiple behaviours. First, by comparing the effects of reducing performance on general coding ability and Python-specific ability, we find that steering broader skills is competitive to steering narrower skills. Second, we steer models to become more or less myopic and wealth-seeking, among other behaviours. In our experiments, combining steering vectors for multiple different behaviours into one steering vector is largely unsuccessful. On the other hand, injecting individual steering vectors at different places in a model simultaneously is promising.

Activation steering has become a popular training-free method to control LLM behavior by injecting precomputed direction vectors into the model's residual stream at inference time. Yet its robustness to realistic input variation remains unstudied. We present the first systematic evaluation of activation steering robustness under adversarial text perturbations on the inputs, covering four extraction methods, three attack strategies, six personas from Anthropic Model-Written Evaluation Dataset, and five models ranging from 1.5B to 30B parameters. Attacks succeed broadly across all settings: directional robustness drops by up to 64%, post-attack confidence collapses near or below 0.25 across all methods and models, and steering strength degrades on nearly every steerable input. Layer selection is equally fragile, with the optimal layer identified by an automated method on clean inputs shifting by up to 17 positions under perturbation, a failure that compounds the vector-level breakdown. Extracting vectors from adversarially perturbed inputs partially recovers steerability for PCA and MD on mid-to-large models, but they consistently fail to locate the improved optimal layer, limiting the practical benefit of this mitigation. Together, these findings reveal that the brittleness of activation steering is structural rather than method-specific, and that current layer selection strategies are not robust enough for real-world deployment.

The ability to follow instructions is crucial for numerous real-world applications of language models. In pursuit of deeper insights and more powerful capabilities, we derive instruction-specific vector representations from language models and use them to steer models accordingly. These vectors are computed as the difference in activations between inputs with and without instructions, enabling a modular approach to activation steering. We demonstrate how this method can enhance model adherence to constraints such as output format, length, and word inclusion, providing inference-time control over instruction following. Our experiments across four models demonstrate how we can use the activation vectors to guide models to follow constraints even without explicit instructions and to enhance performance when instructions are present. Additionally, we explore the compositionality of activation steering, successfully applying multiple instructions simultaneously. Finally, we demonstrate that steering vectors computed on instruction-tuned models can transfer to improve base models. Our findings demonstrate that activation steering offers a practical and scalable approach for fine-grained control in language generation. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/microsoft/llm-steer-instruct.

Activation patching is a popular mechanistic interpretability technique, but has many subtleties regarding how it is applied and how one may interpret the results. We provide a summary of advice and best practices, based on our experience using this technique in practice. We include an overview of the different ways to apply activation patching and a discussion on how to interpret the results. We focus on what evidence patching experiments provide about circuits, and on the choice of metric and associated pitfalls.

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

The memorization of training data by Large Language Models (LLMs) poses significant risks, including privacy leaks and the regurgitation of copyrighted content. Activation steering, a technique that directly intervenes in model activations, has emerged as a promising approach for manipulating LLMs. In this work, we explore the effectiveness of activation steering in reducing memorization while preserving generalization capabilities. We conduct empirical evaluations using a controlled memorization benchmark of literary material and demonstrate that our method successfully suppresses memorized content with minimal degradation in model performance in Gemma. Additionally, we analyze the trade-offs between suppression effectiveness and linguistic fluency, highlighting the advantages and limitations of activation-based interventions. Our findings contribute to ongoing efforts in developing safer and more privacy-preserving LLMs by providing a practical and efficient mechanism to mitigate unintended memorization.

Existing activation steering methods often assume that a high-level concept can be mediated by a single steering direction. To support this, two complementary interventions should be achieved: additive steering should induce the target behavior, while directional ablation should suppress it. Yet behaviors may occupy richer activation geometries beyond a single direction, and semantically similar behaviors may be represented by distinct directions. In this work, we study how many directions can reliably control two different types of refusal behaviors: refusal triggered by the safety alignment and refusal in general contexts. Given the limited expressive capability of a single steering vector, we study the general setting of steering subspaces and introduce the notion of steering dimensionality as the minimum subspace dimensionality required to reliably control a behavior. We characterize sufficient steering subspaces that cover the full extent of the target behavior through both the (monotonic) improvement before the sufficient dimensionality, and the saturation beyond it. Empirically, we find that refusal triggered by safety alignment is 1-dim steerable, while multiple distinct steering directions can achieve comparable control. In contrast, refusal in general contexts exhibits substantially richer activation geometry where even 5-dim steering subspaces fail to reliably capture its full steerable variation. Our results reveal that the activation geometry underlying refusal is highly context-dependent and can be substantially more complex than a single linear steering direction.

Mechanistic interpretability seeks to understand the internal mechanisms of machine learning models, where localization -- identifying the important model components -- is a key step. Activation patching, also known as causal tracing or interchange intervention, is a standard technique for this task (Vig et al., 2020), but the literature contains many variants with little consensus on the choice of hyperparameters or methodology. In this work, we systematically examine the impact of methodological details in activation patching, including evaluation metrics and corruption methods. In several settings of localization and circuit discovery in language models, we find that varying these hyperparameters could lead to disparate interpretability results. Backed by empirical observations, we give conceptual arguments for why certain metrics or methods may be preferred. Finally, we provide recommendations for the best practices of activation patching going forwards.

Language Agent could be endowed with different mechanisms for autonomous task accomplishment. Current agents typically rely on fixed mechanisms or a set of mechanisms activated in a predefined order, limiting their adaptation to varied potential task solution structures. To this end, this paper proposes Adaptive Language Agent Mechanism Activation Learning with Self-Exploration (ALAMA), which focuses on optimizing mechanism activation adaptability without reliance on expert models. Initially, it builds a harmonized agent framework (UniAct) to Unify different mechanisms via Actions. Then it leverages a training-efficient optimization method based on self-exploration to enable the UniAct to adaptively activate the appropriate mechanisms according to the potential characteristics of the task. Experimental results demonstrate significant improvements in downstream agent tasks, affirming the effectiveness of our approach in facilitating more dynamic and context-sensitive mechanism activation.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across many generation tasks. Nevertheless, effectively aligning them with desired behaviors remains a significant challenge. Activation steering is an effective and cost-efficient approach that directly modifies the activations of LLMs during the inference stage, aligning their responses with the desired behaviors and avoiding the high cost of fine-tuning. Existing methods typically indiscriminately intervene to all generations or rely solely on the question to determine intervention, which limits the accurate assessment of the intervention strength. To this end, we propose the Flexible Activation Steering with Backtracking (FASB) framework, which dynamically determines both the necessity and strength of intervention by tracking the internal states of the LLMs during generation, considering both the question and the generated content. Since intervening after detecting a deviation from the desired behavior is often too late, we further propose the backtracking mechanism to correct the deviated tokens and steer the LLMs toward the desired behavior. Extensive experiments on the TruthfulQA dataset and six multiple-choice datasets demonstrate that our method outperforms baselines. Our code will be released at https://github.com/gjw185/FASB.

Modern deployments require LLMs to enforce safety policies at scale, yet many controls rely on inference-time interventions that add recurring compute cost and serving complexity. Activation steering is widely used, but it requires runtime hooks and scales cost with the number of generations; conditional variants improve selectivity by gating when steering is applied but still retain an inference-time control path. We ask whether selective refusal can be moved entirely offline: can a mechanistic understanding of category-specific refusal be distilled into a circuit-restricted weight update that deploys as a standard checkpoint? We propose C-Δθ: Circuit Restricted Weight Arithmetic, which (i) localizes refusal-causal computation as a sparse circuit using EAP-IG and (ii) computes a constrained weight update ΔθC supported only on that circuit (typically <5% of parameters). Applying ΔθC yields a drop-in edited checkpoint with no inference-time hooks, shifting cost from per-request intervention to a one-time offline update. We evaluate category-targeted selectivity and capability retention on refusal and utility benchmarks.

Large language models can be steered at inference time through prompting or activation interventions, but activation steering methods often underperform compared to prompt-based approaches. We propose a framework that formulates prompt steering as a form of activation steering and investigates whether distilling successful prompt steering behavior into simpler, interpretable models can close this gap. Our analysis reveals that popular activation steering methods are not faithful to the mechanics of prompt steering, which applies strong interventions on some tokens while barely affecting others. Based on these insights, we introduce Prompt Steering Replacement (PSR) models that estimate token-specific steering coefficients from the activations themselves and are trained to imitate prompt-based interventions. Experiments on three steering benchmarks across multiple language models show that PSR models outperform existing activation steering methods, especially when controlling for high-coherence completions, and also compare favorably to prompting on AxBench and persona steering.

Activation steering has emerged as a cost-effective paradigm for modifying large language model (LLM) behaviors. Existing methods typically intervene at the block level, steering the bundled activations of selected attention heads, feedforward networks, or residual streams. However, we reveal that block-level activations are inherently heterogeneous, entangling beneficial, irrelevant, and harmful features, thereby rendering block-level steering coarse, inefficient, and intrusive. To investigate the root cause, we decompose block activations into fine-grained atomic unit (AU)-level activations, where each AU-level activation corresponds to a single dimension of the block activation, and each AU denotes a slice of the block weight matrix. Steering an AU-level activation is thus equivalent to steering its associated AU. Our theoretical and empirical analysis show that heterogeneity arises because different AUs or dimensions control distinct token distributions in LLM outputs. Hence, block-level steering inevitably moves helpful and harmful token directions together, which reduces efficiency. Restricting intervention to beneficial AUs yields more precise and effective steering. Building on this insight, we propose AUSteer, a simple and efficient method that operates at a finer granularity of the AU level. AUSteer first identifies discriminative AUs globally by computing activation momenta on contrastive samples. It then assigns adaptive steering strengths tailored to diverse inputs and selected AU activations. Comprehensive experiments on multiple LLMs and tasks show that AUSteer consistently surpasses advanced baselines while steering considerably fewer activations, demonstrating that steering less achieves more.

Activation steering has emerged as a promising alternative for controlling language-model behavior at inference time by modifying intermediate representations while keeping model parameters frozen. However, large-scale evaluations such as AxBench show that existing steering methods are often outperformed by simple in-context prompting and generalize poorly to unseen concepts. We hypothesize that these limitations arise from unvalidated simplifying assumptions shared across prior methods, which typically restrict steering interventions to fixed, single-step, position-invariant transforms. We propose FLAS (Flow-based Activation Steering), which learns a general, concept-conditioned velocity field v_t(h,t,c) that transports unsteered activations to steered ones without relying on these assumptions. On AxBench, FLAS is the first learned method to consistently outperform prompting, reaching held-out harmonic means of 1.015 on Gemma-2-2B-IT and 1.113 on Gemma-2-9B-IT without per-concept tuning. Analysis of the learned flow shows curved, multi-step, token-varying trajectories, which suggests that previous hypotheses on activation space geometry might be incomplete.

Accurate intent classification is critical for efficient routing in customer service, ensuring customers are connected with the most suitable agents while reducing handling times and operational costs. However, as companies expand their product lines, intent classification faces scalability challenges due to the increasing number of intents and variations in taxonomy across different verticals. In this paper, we introduce REIC, a Retrieval-augmented generation Enhanced Intent Classification approach, which addresses these challenges effectively. REIC leverages retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to dynamically incorporate relevant knowledge, enabling precise classification without the need for frequent retraining. Through extensive experiments on real-world datasets, we demonstrate that REIC outperforms traditional fine-tuning, zero-shot, and few-shot methods in large-scale customer service settings. Our results highlight its effectiveness in both in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, demonstrating its potential for real-world deployment in adaptive and large-scale intent classification systems.

Activation steering has emerged as a powerful tool to shape LLM behavior without the need for weight updates. While its inherent brittleness and unreliability are well-documented, its safety implications remain underexplored. In this work, we present a systematic safety audit of steering vectors obtained with Contrastive Activation Addition (CAA), a widely used steering approach, under a unified evaluation protocol. Using JailbreakBench as benchmark, we show that steering vectors consistently influence the success rate of jailbreak attacks, with stronger amplification under simple template-based attacks. Across LLM families and sizes, steering the model in specific directions can drastically increase (up to 57%) or decrease (up to 50%) its attack success rate (ASR), depending on the targeted behavior. We attribute this phenomenon to the overlap between the steering vectors and the latent directions of refusal behavior. Thus, we offer a traceable explanation for this discovery. Together, our findings reveal the previously unobserved origin of this safety gap in LLMs, highlighting a trade-off between controllability and safety.

Activation steering methods were shown to be effective in conditioning language model generation by additively intervening over models' intermediate representations. However, the evaluation of these techniques has so far been limited to single conditioning properties and synthetic settings. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of various activation steering strategies, highlighting the property-dependent nature of optimal parameters to ensure a robust effect throughout generation. To address this issue, we propose Dynamic Activation Composition, an information-theoretic approach to modulate the steering intensity of one or more properties throughout generation. Our experiments on multi-property steering show that our method successfully maintains high conditioning while minimizing the impact of conditioning on generation fluency.

Existing routers rely on semantic query features or handcrafted features, which often fail to capture model-specific failures or intrinsic task difficulty. We instead route using internal LLM activations, specifically the residual stream. Our key idea, Encoder-Target Decoupling, separates the model that produces the predictive signal (the Encoder) from the model whose correctness is being estimated (the Target), allowing open-weight encoders to predict the performance of closed-source target models. We evaluate layerwise geometric probes, finding that Fisher Separability (J) effectively identifies informative layers, supported by Effective Dimensionality (d_{eff}) diagnostics. We then utilize a SharedTrunkNet, a joint multi-output MLP that predicts simultaneous correctness probabilities across candidate models using concatenated prefill features. In our experiments, SharedTrunkNet consistently outperforms semantic baselines. At its best, SharedTrunkNet closes 45.58% of the gap between the strongest standalone model and the oracle while achieving 74.31% cost savings relative to the most expensive model. These results demonstrate that prefill activations provide a robust routing signal, establishing activation-based routing as a high-performance alternative to purely semantic selection.

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.

Reliably controlling the behavior of large language models is a pressing open problem. Existing methods include supervised finetuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, prompt engineering and guided decoding. We instead investigate activation engineering: modifying activations at inference-time to predictably alter model behavior. We bias the forward pass with a 'steering vector' implicitly specified through natural language. Past work learned these steering vectors; our Activation Addition (ActAdd) method instead computes them by taking the activation differences which result from pairs of prompts. We demonstrate ActAdd on GPT-2 on OpenWebText and ConceptNet, and replicate the effect on Llama-13B and GPT-J-6B. Our approach yields inference-time control over high-level properties of output & preserves performance on off-target topics. The method requires far less compute and implementation effort than finetuning and RLHF, allows for natural language specification by users, and its overhead scales naturally with model size.

When non-expert users ask LLMs for assistance, their queries can often have misconceptions (e.g., "How do I parse XML with regex?"). In such cases, often referred to as the XY-problem, LLMs must identify the misconception ("regex are fragile") and meaningfully direct the user toward a pragmatic solution that will address the root problem implicit in the request ("use an XML parser"). We introduce XYBench, a benchmark of 8,115 such queries, drawn from technical (StackOverflow/StackExchange) and everyday (WikiHow and a manually-curated subset) domains. We design an evaluation paradigm that assesses model responses along three criteria grounded in cooperative response theory: (a) presence and (b) emphasis on pragmatic solutions, and (c) identification of misconceptions. Our experiments show that even the strongest LLMs predominantly answer the literal request (0.75--0.92) and far less often the intended one (0.33--0.71), while substantially lagging behind humans at identifying misconceptions (at most 63% vs. 79--90%). Further, models overwhelmingly prefer pragmatic responses in a multiple choice setting yet consistently fail to generate them. Oracle ablation experiments show that providing explicit user intent at generation time helps; however a large gap remains, suggesting pragmatic redirection is a fundamentally underdeveloped capability in current LLMs.

Retrofitting large language models (LLMs) with new behaviors typically requires full finetuning or distillation-costly steps that must be repeated for every architecture. In this work, we introduce Command-V, a backpropagation-free behavior transfer method that copies an existing residual activation adapter from a donor model and pastes its effect into a recipient model. Command-V profiles layer activations on a small prompt set, derives linear converters between corresponding layers, and applies the donor intervention in the recipient's activation space. This process does not require access to the original training data and needs minimal compute. In three case studies-safety-refusal enhancement, jailbreak facilitation, and automatic chain-of-thought reasoning--Command-V matches or exceeds the performance of direct finetuning while using orders of magnitude less compute. Our code and data are accessible at https://github.com/GithuBarry/Command-V/.

Many widely used activation functions, including ReLU, GELU, Swish, and Sigmoid, produce predominantly positive outputs, resulting in a nonzero post-activation mean that we term activation bias. Despite its ubiquity, the effect of activation bias on learning dynamics remains poorly understood. Using controlled models, we show that activation bias accelerates initial loss reduction but is accompanied by overshooting, non-smooth trajectories, and a steeper loss landscape. This early advantage also coincides with the model's use of task-relevant information encoded in the activation bias component. In contrast, reducing activation bias slows initial learning but ultimately yields a lower final loss. Experiments on larger vision and language models exhibit a similar pattern: smaller activation bias is associated with better late-stage performance. Thus, this seemingly minor property can substantially redirect learning and warrants explicit consideration in future activation function design.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) inevitably internalize substantial amounts of sensitive or private information during pre-training, while LLM unlearning aims to selectively erase specific knowledge to prevent privacy leakage with minimal loss of model utility. However, existing methods struggle to balance forget quality with utility, and typically incur substantial computational costs due to parameter fine-tuning. To address this, we propose Nullify, a training-free, non-destructive activation steering method for LLM unlearning. Nullify employs steering vectors during inference to redirect privacy-related activations away from their memorized answers, while satisfying a null-space constraint that leaves retained-query activations essentially unaffected to maintain utility. Evaluations on TOFU and MUSE show that Nullify matches or surpasses established baselines in forget quality while achieving near-lossless preservation of model utility. By avoiding weight updates entirely, Nullify serves as an efficient, plug-and-play inference-time intervention framework.

Large language model (LLM) agents coordinate complex tasks through multi-role and multi-stage workflows. Upstream state is repeatedly transformed into intermediate language artifacts, such as summaries, plans, tickets, memories, and handoff notes, from which downstream components act. For action-constraining state, topical retention is insufficient: an artifact may mention an unresolved condition while changing it from a requirement that must be resolved before execution into information that may merely inform the next action. We study this action-binding role as operational state preservation. Safety blockers provide a controlled instance because each source state has an explicit prerequisite, authority, fallback, and execution consequence. We condition on correct upstream identification, vary the handoff transformation, and evaluate an executor restricted to the resulting artifact. Across 1,296 controlled synthetic episodes, direct-handoff controls preserve every blocker, whereas compression, plan assimilation, convergence, ownership deferral, and precedent substitution repeatedly turn binding state into caveats or non-binding considerations. Normal handoff compression produces 100.0% deactivation and 54.2% forbidden action. Restoring all four state fields raises preservation to 100.0% and reduces forbidden action to 0.0%. Fixed-artifact interventions further separate preservation from containment: downstream verification eliminates forbidden action while artifact deactivation remains 95.3%. These results identify a state-transmission failure between information extraction and action. Handoff transformations can retain state content while weakening its constraints on downstream action. Semantic availability does not guarantee operational preservation.

Tool-using large language model agents frequently replan, retry failed operations, delegate tasks, and resume after crashes. These behaviors can cause one user authorization to be requested and executed multiple times under freshly issued token identifiers, even when each individual token is single-use. We call this failure semantic replay: exceeding the execution budget of a token-independent authorization instance rather than merely reusing an old token identifier. We show that identifier-local token consumption cannot prevent fresh reissuance unless the issuer retains monotonic durable state over the authorized action, confirmation event, and remaining execution budget. We introduce CapLease, an authorization-consumption layer that follows proposal- and authority-level defenses, binds an authenticated user confirmation to a canonical action, and enforces transactional Issue-Prepare-Commit transitions. Across LLM-agent replanning, retry, delegation, concurrency, confirmation-replay, and crash-recovery scenarios, identifier-local tokens permit fresh semantic reissuance, whereas CapLease and an equally stateful Server Ledger prevent duplicate admission and, with an idempotent sink, duplicate external effects. Our results identify durable authorization state, rather than token representation alone, as the systems requirement for replay-resistant agent execution.

Vision-language models are shifting from offline passive understanding toward online proactive interaction. However, prevailing methods largely rely on explicit requests while miss the implicit user intent (e.g., "where should I click next?" while a user navigate a website), meanwhile fail to update the state simultaneously as user requests might update continuously. These limitations make them less suited to intent-aware interaction in practical. To address these challenges, we introduce StreamVibe-Bench, a new benchmark serving as testbed for user intent interaction, with 4.1K evaluation samples and 85K training samples spanning explicit, implicit, and dynamic intents. Building on this benchmark, we develop StreamVibe-VL, a streaming proactive model that infers implicit user intents from continuous observations and dynamically tailors its interactions as these intents evolve. We further introduce StreamVibe-Harness, which maintains user intents as persistent states with a fleixble lifecycles via a hierarchical memory to track the latest user intent and environmental state. Our experiments reveal three key findings: (i) StreamVibe-VL preserves strong general video understanding while improving response timing and answer quality by 10.7% over other baselines; (ii) existing proactive models remain limited in understanding user intent and deciding when to respond, especially under implicit and dynamic intents; and (iii) StreamVibe-Harness further improves response consistency and adaptation over sustained interaction, resulting in a 12.3% gain in proactive interaction.

Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be triggered by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization. Recent evidence suggests that some misalignment behaviors are encoded as linear structure in activation space, making it tractable via steering, while safety alignment has been shown to govern the first few output tokens primarily, leaving subsequent generation unguarded. These findings motivate activation steering as a lightweight runtime defense that continuously corrects misaligned activations throughout generation. We evaluate three methods: Steer-With-Fixed-Coeff (SwFC), which applies uniform additive steering, and two novel projection-aware methods, Steer-to-Target-Projection (StTP) and Steer-to-Mirror-Projection (StMP), that use a logistic regression decision boundary to selectively intervene only on tokens whose activations fall below distributional thresholds. Using malicious system prompts as a controlled proxy for misalignment, we evaluate under two threat models (dishonesty and dismissiveness) and two architectures (Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, Qwen3-32B). All methods substantially recover target traits (honesty and compassion) while preserving coherence. StTP and StMP better maintain general capabilities (MMLU, MT-Bench, AlpacaEval) and produce less repetition in multi-turn conversations.

Large language model agents are becoming operational interfaces to files, memories, registries, and external tools. This deployment shift creates a new skill revocation problem: after a skill is removed from an explicit registry, an agent may still reconstruct it from residual carriers such as archives, transcripts, schemas, or memory entries. We study this problem as operational skill unlearning, where the goal is not parameter-level forgetting, but preventing a deployed agent from rebuilding a revoked skill through primitive tools. We introduce OBLIVION, a controlled benchmark and defense harness for revoked-skill resurrection. OBLIVION models each episode as a source-to-sink workflow, applies Cross-Surface Coherent Erasure to reduce residual carriers, and uses frozen workflow remediation near dangerous sinks. On the locked 88 attack episodes, the no-defense arm reaches formal attack success rate 1.0. OBLIVION reduces the rate to 0.114 and impact-weighted exposure to 0.115 while keeping locked utility at 1.0 and benign block rate at 0. In a separate skill-attack-derived sandbox, OBLIVION reduces attack success from 1.0 to 0.2 and impact-weighted exposure from 1.0 to 0.213 while preserving all utility controls. These results support workflow-level evaluation beyond checking explicit skill entries.

Context can change whether a request is harmful without changing its topic or surface form. We ask whether residual-stream probes distinguish harmful requests from surface-matched benign controls at a useful operating point. Across three 7-8B model families, an activation sensor blocks 95.5-97.7 percent of judge-classified compliant attacks in a taxonomy-selected set. It also blocks 59.6-68.4 percent of XSTest prompts. A fully disjoint audit reconstructs near-ceiling source-contrast AUROC (0.996-0.999), but fixed transfer to matched pairs is weaker: 0.656-0.819 on the guard-selected Twin-n70 subset and 0.590-0.690 on the full Twin-n163 cohort. We test ten axes on the reference family and seven across all families with leakage, hold-out, and permutation controls. On Twin-n163, no axis evaluated without direct pair-boundary fitting reaches the specified numerical threshold. Requiring persistence on that full cohort was added at analysis time. A separately specified 24B/32B extension gives the same result. Pair-trained classifiers weaken under category and generation-batch hold-out and false-block 79.6-100 percent of XSTest at 95 percent in-corpus TPR. At the tested read points, these activation scores behave as broad-risk detectors rather than standalone context adjudicators.

We introduce directional routing, a lightweight mechanism that gives each transformer attention head learned suppression directions controlled by a shared router, at 3.9% parameter cost. We train a 433M-parameter model alongside an identical baseline in a single run, then trace the resulting circuits through mechanistic interpretability. Routing becomes the model's dominant computational pathway. Disabling it collapses factual recall to near-zero probability across all 8 test prompts and drops induction accuracy from 93.4% to 0.0%. Knocking out individual attention heads has negligible effect: the primary mover head's removal actually increases target probability, and induction heads retain 98.6% accuracy without their strongest member. The coordination mechanism is irreplaceable; the components it coordinates are not. The model also self-organizes, without explicit pressure, into two regimes: domain-adaptive routing in early layers and fixed syntactic pruning in late layers, where the least-varying layer is the most critical (+42.6 PPL when disabled). Routing reduces perplexity 31-56% relative to the baseline, though downstream multiple-choice benchmarks do not yet reflect these gains.

Safety alignment instills in Large Language Models (LLMs) a critical capacity to refuse malicious requests. Prior works have modeled this refusal mechanism as a single linear direction in the activation space. We posit that this is an oversimplification that conflates two functionally distinct neural processes: the detection of harm and the execution of a refusal. In this work, we deconstruct this single representation into a Harm Detection Direction and a Refusal Execution Direction. Leveraging this fine-grained model, we introduce Differentiated Bi-Directional Intervention (DBDI), a new white-box framework that precisely neutralizes the safety alignment at critical layer. DBDI applies adaptive projection nullification to the refusal execution direction while suppressing the harm detection direction via direct steering. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DBDI outperforms prominent jailbreaking methods, achieving up to a 97.88\% attack success rate on models such as Llama-2. By providing a more granular and mechanistic framework, our work offers a new direction for the in-depth understanding of LLM safety alignment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Activation steering controls language model behavior by adding directions to internal representations at inference time, but standard residual-stream steering can fail in stateful dialogue. We identify KV-cache contamination as a key failure mode: steered token states are stored and repeatedly reused, turning a local perturbation into cumulative coherence degradation. To address this challenge, we propose Gated Cropped Attention-Delta steering (GCAD), which extracts steering signals from system-prompt contributions to self-attention and applies them with token-level gating. Across persona-steering experiments, GCAD preserves trait control while substantially improving long-horizon coherence. On the main multi-turn benchmark, GCAD improves average coherence drift from -18.6 to -1.9 and raises turn-10 trait expression from 78.0 to 93.1. These results suggest that activation steering becomes more reliable when interventions follow the prompt-mediated pathways that models already use for behavioral control.

An agentic system issues several structurally different kinds of LLM calls. It routes intent, classifies actions, grounds language in a device registry, plans multi-agent pipelines and writes the Python code those pipelines run. The difficulty of these call sites varies by an order of magnitude, yet in practice a single model, chosen for the hardest site, serves all of them. In this work, we evaluate 9 models from 0.8B to a frontier hosted model across the five call sites of a deployed open-source home-automation framework (Wactorz), using its unmodified production prompts and two real Home Assistant installations (280 cases, 2520 scored calls). We find that capability is not ordered the same way at every site, and that larger models are not uniformly better: one 4B model is worse than its 2B sibling at grounded actuation. Paired testing shows the best local model to be statistically indistinguishable from both hosted models at four of five sites. Only code generation separates them, against a small hosted model (p = 0.039) as well as a frontier one (p = 0.002). Aggregate accuracy also hides a safety failure specific to actuation, where small models resolve the accuracy/refusal trade-off in degenerate ways: one model (Gemma4 E2B) actuates on 87.2% of requests for devices the site does not own, while another refuses every request it receives. Routing each site to its best local model reaches 91.8% against 95.4% at no per-call cost. In a live deployment judged by a user, hosting only the two generative sites matches hosting everything (39/43 against 39/43) for 28% of the spend, and the actuation gap the benchmark predicted appears as exactly one case in twenty-six. Benchmark, harness and all records are released at https://github.com/waldiez/slm-callsite-eval.

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

The choice of activation functions in deep networks has a significant effect on the training dynamics and task performance. Currently, the most successful and widely-used activation function is the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU). Although various hand-designed alternatives to ReLU have been proposed, none have managed to replace it due to inconsistent gains. In this work, we propose to leverage automatic search techniques to discover new activation functions. Using a combination of exhaustive and reinforcement learning-based search, we discover multiple novel activation functions. We verify the effectiveness of the searches by conducting an empirical evaluation with the best discovered activation function. Our experiments show that the best discovered activation function, f(x) = x cdot sigmoid(beta x), which we name Swish, tends to work better than ReLU on deeper models across a number of challenging datasets. For example, simply replacing ReLUs with Swish units improves top-1 classification accuracy on ImageNet by 0.9\% for Mobile NASNet-A and 0.6\% for Inception-ResNet-v2. The simplicity of Swish and its similarity to ReLU make it easy for practitioners to replace ReLUs with Swish units in any neural network.

Activation steering offers a promising approach to controlling the behavior of Large Language Models by directly manipulating their internal activations. However, most existing methods struggle to jointly steer multiple attributes, often resulting in interference and undesirable trade-offs. To address this challenge, we propose Multi-Subspace Representation Steering (MSRS), a novel framework for effective multi-attribute steering via subspace representation fine-tuning. MSRS reduces inter-attribute interference by allocating orthogonal subspaces to each attribute, isolating their influence within the model's representation space. MSRS also incorporates a hybrid subspace composition strategy: it combines attribute-specific subspaces for unique steering directions with a shared subspace for common steering directions. A dynamic weighting function learns to efficiently integrate these components for precise control. During inference, MSRS introduces a token-level steering mechanism that dynamically identifies and intervenes on the most semantically relevant tokens, enabling fine-grained behavioral modulation. Experimental results show that MSRS significantly reduces attribute conflicts, surpasses existing methods across a range of attributes, and generalizes effectively to diverse downstream tasks.

Safety alignment is crucial for large language models (LLMs) to resist malicious instructions but often results in over-refusals, where benign prompts are unnecessarily rejected, impairing user experience and model utility. We introduce ACTOR (Activation-Based Training for Over-Refusal Reduction), a robust and compute- and data-efficient training framework that minimizes over-refusals by leveraging internal activation patterns from diverse queries. ACTOR precisely identifies and adjusts the activation components that trigger refusals, providing stronger control over the refusal mechanism. By fine-tuning only a single model layer, ACTOR effectively reduces over-refusals across multiple benchmarks while maintaining the model's ability to handle harmful queries and preserve overall utility.

An unintended consequence of the vast pretraining of Large Language Models (LLMs) is the verbatim memorization of fragments of their training data, which may contain sensitive or copyrighted information. In recent years, unlearning has emerged as a solution to effectively remove sensitive knowledge from models after training. Yet, recent work has shown that supposedly deleted information can still be extracted by malicious actors through various attacks. Still, current attacks retrieve sets of possible candidate generations and are unable to pinpoint the output that contains the actual target information. We propose activation steering as a method for exact information retrieval from unlearned LLMs. We introduce a novel approach to generating steering vectors, named Anonymized Activation Steering. Additionally, we develop a simple word frequency method to pinpoint the correct answer among a set of candidates when retrieving unlearned information. Our evaluation across multiple unlearning techniques and datasets demonstrates that activation steering successfully recovers general knowledge (e.g., widely known fictional characters) while revealing limitations in retrieving specific information (e.g., details about non-public individuals). Overall, our results demonstrate that exact information retrieval from unlearned models is possible, highlighting a severe vulnerability of current unlearning techniques.

The residual stream mediates communication between transformer decoder layers via linear reads and writes of non-linear computations. While sparse-dictionary learning-based methods locate features in the residual stream, and activation patching methods discover circuits within the model, the mechanism by which features flow through the residual stream remains understudied. Understanding this dynamic can better inform jailbreaking protections, enable early detection of model mistakes, and their correction. In this work, we propose Activation Transport Operators (ATO), linear maps from upstream to downstream residuals k layers later, evaluated in feature space using downstream SAE decoder projections. We empirically demonstrate that these operators can determine whether a feature has been linearly transported from a previous layer or synthesised from non-linear layer computation. We develop the notion of transport efficiency, for which we provide an upper bound, and use it to estimate the size of the residual stream subspace that corresponds to linear transport. We empirically demonstrate the linear transport, report transport efficiency and the size of the residual stream's subspace involved in linear transport. This compute-light (no finetuning, <50 GPU-h) method offers practical tools for safety, debugging, and a clearer picture of where computation in LLMs behaves linearly.

Neural networks have proven to be a highly effective tool for solving complex problems in many areas of life. Recently, their importance and practical usability have further been reinforced with the advent of deep learning. One of the important conditions for the success of neural networks is the choice of an appropriate activation function introducing non-linearity into the model. Many types of these functions have been proposed in the literature in the past, but there is no single comprehensive source containing their exhaustive overview. The absence of this overview, even in our experience, leads to redundancy and the unintentional rediscovery of already existing activation functions. To bridge this gap, our paper presents an extensive survey involving 400 activation functions, which is several times larger in scale than previous surveys. Our comprehensive compilation also references these surveys; however, its main goal is to provide the most comprehensive overview and systematization of previously published activation functions with links to their original sources. The secondary aim is to update the current understanding of this family of functions.

User simulators are widely used as scalable environments for training and evaluating interactive assistants. Generating the next user turn is inherently one-to-many: the same profile and dialogue context may support multiple plausible continuations with different local interaction intents. A fluent response may therefore advance the dialogue through an inappropriate intent, such as acceptance rather than repair. Our key insight is that controllable user simulation should separate which local interaction intent the next user turn should realize from how that intent is expressed in language. We introduce UserIDA (User Intent-Directive Alignment), which exposes interaction intent as an explicit per-turn directive. UserIDA defines a six-way intent interface, learns directive-conditioned generation through supervised fine-tuning, and uses intent-calibrated policy optimization during group-based reinforcement learning. The reward preserves composite response quality while ensuring that intent-violating candidates rank below compliant alternatives in mixed groups. On LMSYS-USP, UserIDA achieves 86.6\% intent accuracy, outperforming the strongest dedicated user-simulator baseline by 24.3 percentage points while improving semantic and stylistic similarity. In within-context interventions, it realizes at least four of the six target intents in 91.7\% of evaluated dialogue states, compared with 22.9\% for the strongest external baseline. These results establish per-turn intent control as a complementary dimension to response fidelity in user simulation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly paired with activation-based monitoring to detect and prevent harmful behaviors that may not be apparent at the surface-text level. However, existing activation safety approaches, trained on broad misuse datasets, struggle with poor precision, limited flexibility, and lack of interpretability. This paper introduces a new paradigm: rule-based activation safety, inspired by rule-sharing practices in cybersecurity. We propose modeling activations as cognitive elements (CEs), fine-grained, interpretable factors such as ''making a threat'' and ''payment processing'', that can be composed to capture nuanced, domain-specific behaviors with higher precision. Building on this representation, we present a practical framework that defines predicate rules over CEs and detects violations in real time. This enables practitioners to configure and update safeguards without retraining models or detectors, while supporting transparency and auditability. Our results show that compositional rule-based activation safety improves precision, supports domain customization, and lays the groundwork for scalable, interpretable, and auditable AI governance. We will release GAVEL as an open-source framework and provide an accompanying automated rule creation tool.

Inference-time LLM alignment methods, particularly activation steering, offer an alternative to fine-tuning by directly modifying activations during generation. Existing methods, however, often rely on non-anticipative interventions that ignore how perturbations propagate through transformer layers and lack online error feedback, resulting in suboptimal, open-loop control. To address this, we show empirically that, despite the nonlinear structure of transformer blocks, layer-wise dynamics across multiple LLM architectures and scales are well-approximated by locally-linear models. Exploiting this property, we model LLM inference as a linear time-varying dynamical system and adapt the classical linear quadratic regulator to compute feedback controllers using layer-wise Jacobians, steering activations toward desired semantic setpoints in closed-loop with minimal computational overhead and no offline training. We also derive theoretical bounds on setpoint tracking error, enabling formal guarantees on steering performance. Using a novel adaptive semantic feature setpoint signal, our method yields robust, fine-grained behavior control across models, scales, and tasks, including state-of-the-art modulation of toxicity, truthfulness, refusal, and arbitrary concepts, surpassing baseline steering methods. Our code is available at: https://github.com/trustworthyrobotics/lqr-activation-steering

False retry permission (FRP) occurs when an agent retries a timed-out tool call without support from the visible contract. RetryBench separates this error from realized recovery. Successful protected recovery does not imply reliable rejection of unsupported retries. In a 720-response key control, valid keys usually enabled safe progress, but offered changed keys elicited unsupported retries in Sol (1/80), Terra (55/80), and Luna (60/80). A later 240-response control removed the candidate and required models to supply a key. Luna still made 8/80 unsupported dispatches; Sol and Terra made none in 80 responses each. Accepting a displayed bad key therefore cannot explain all observed errors, although changed output requirements and conditions preclude a pure display-effect comparison. Removing the weak-contract label increased retries in Sol and Terra's coded-action conditions in a six-endpoint study. A separate 1,536-response canonical-action block also found a positive Terra contrast (115/128 versus 124/128 retries), concentrated in two task/order conditions; the other five contrasts remained unresolved after multiplicity correction. An explicit-contract cue control elicited deferral in all 762 returned responses, leaving recovery unresolved. These results support reporting permission and recovery together across declared interface variants. The evidence covers four purposive tasks, fixed GPT endpoints, and one recovery decision; it identifies neither internal mechanisms nor episode-level safety.

Activation-based control steers large language models (LLMs) by intervening on their internal representations during inference, and has emerged as an effective paradigm for controlling behaviors such as persona and style. However, existing methods often rely on fixed steering directions or task-specific intervention modules, making them difficult to adapt to fine-grained concepts and compositional constraints. We propose UniSteer, a text-guided activation flow matching model that learns a conditional distribution over residual-stream activations from natural-language conditions. Instead of fitting a separate intervention for each target behavior, UniSteer learns a universal conditional velocity field in activation space. At inference time, UniSteer performs flow inversion by partially transporting a source activation toward a latent state and regenerating it under a target textual condition before injecting it back into the frozen LLM. The same conditional model supports activation-space classification by selecting the textual label with the lowest reconstruction energy. Experiments on three target LLMs show that UniSteer provides a unified interface across behavioral control, truthfulness steering, fine-grained concept steering, multi-constraint instruction following, and activation-space classification.

Safety-aligned language models systematically refuse harmful requests. While activation steering can modulate refusal, ablating the raw "refusal vector" calculated from contrastive harmful and harmless prompts often causes collateral damage and distribution drift. We argue this degradation occurs because the raw vector is polysemantic, entangling the refusal signal with core capability circuits and linguistic style. We introduce Surgical Refusal Ablation (SRA) to distill these steering directions. SRA constructs a registry of independent Concept Atoms representing protected capabilities and stylistic confounds, then uses ridge-regularized spectral residualization to orthogonalize the refusal vector against these directions. This yields a clean refusal direction that targets refusal-relevant structure while minimizing disruption to the model's semantic geometry. Across five models (Qwen3-VL and Ministral series), SRA achieves deep refusal reduction (0-2%) with negligible perplexity impact on Wikitext-2 (mean delta PPL approx. 0.02) and minimal distribution drift. Notably, standard ablation on Qwen3-VL-4B induces severe drift (first-token KL = 2.088), whereas SRA maintains the original distribution (KL = 0.044) while achieving the same 0% refusal rate. Using teacher-forced perplexity on GSM8K and MBPP as a high-resolution capability proxy, we show SRA preserves math and code distributions. These results suggest that common "model damage" is often "Ghost Noise," defined as the spectral bleeding of the dirty refusal direction into capability subspaces.

Where inside a language model does refusal live, and does that place change when the architecture does? In a transformer, refusal is governed by a single direction in the residual stream, a finding that safety and interpretability tooling now depend on. State-space models (SSMs) route information through a recurrent update instead of attention, sharing no token-mixing mechanism with a transformer. Does the same safety representation survive this shift, or must it be rediscovered per architecture? It survives. A single rigid rotation, which can only reorient a space and not reshape it, aligns one model's representation space with another's, so the two genuinely share the representation. A harm probe trained on a transformer then flags an SSM's harmful inputs, and removing the aligned direction makes a model answer attacks it would otherwise refuse, while a random direction of the same size does far less. What is architecture-specific is not where the direction is steered but where it must be read. Each layer computes a fresh output that is then added into the residual stream, and harm is cleanly readable at this output, the write site, before the addition. A control that holds the intervention's strength fixed shows that what matters is where the direction is estimated, not where it is applied. Applied through a detector-triggered gate, this direction lowers jailbreak success in all four architecture families we test (SSM, transformer, recurrent, hybrid), and on the SSM it holds against an attacker that tunes its prompt against the defense. The gate only matches a trivial rule that returns a fixed refusal whenever the same detector fires, so what transfers across architectures is the direction itself, not defense strength. Safety tooling built on refusal therefore ports to a new architecture by re-estimating the direction at that architecture's write site, not by rebuilding it.

Activation steering offers a lightweight approach to control language models' behavior at inference time, but whether it succeeds or fails heavily depends on the prompt, concept, model, and steering configuration. Finding the regime and boundaries of successful steering typically requires expensive grid searches and post-hoc evaluation of full autoregressive rollouts. In this work, we investigate whether steerability can be predicted from the model's internal states at the beginning of the generation process, e.g., after generating the first few tokens, and how to leverage such a predictor to improve steering success rate. To this end, we first introduce ASTEER, a testbed including 1.4M steered generations, spanning 150 concepts with each steering success/failure labeled. Leveraging this testbed, we analyze the model's early decoding dynamics by extracting features that compare hidden states before and after steering across layers and initial decoding steps. These features help us understand how steering's effects propagate along layers and token positions, which provide key information for steerability prediction. We then train a Gradient Boosting Decision Trees (GBDT) classifier on these features to predict whether an intervention will under-steer, succeed, or over-steer without requiring full rollout. Our predictor achieves around 0.7 macro-F1 score on unseen concepts, demonstrating that early hidden states encode substantial, structured information about eventual steering efficacy. We further leverage this steerability predictor as guidance for steering strength searching, achieving near-optimal performance with a small fraction of decoding cost.

Activation steering presupposes that task-relevant behaviors correspond to linear directions in activation space -- directions that should both steer the model and be readable along the unembedding. Function vectors (FVs), extracted as mean differences across ICL demonstrations, are the canonical test case; the prediction: steering and decoding succeed or fail together. Across 12 tasks, 6 models from 3 families, and 4,032 directed cross-template pairs, we find the opposite. FV steering routinely succeeds where the logit lens cannot decode the correct answer at any intermediate layer, while the converse -- decodable without steerable -- is nearly empty (3 of 72). The gap is not representational dialect. A diagonal tuned lens closes 1 of 14 steerable-not-decodable cases; a 2-layer MLP probe with a Hewitt \& Liang control closes 5 of 10 via nonlinearly encoded structure but leaves 5 invisible to every decoder tested. Even at > 0.90 steering accuracy, projecting the FV through the unembedding yields incoherent token distributions: FVs encode computational instructions, not answer directions. A model-family asymmetry sharpens the picture. Mistral FVs rewrite intermediate representations, while Llama and Gemma FVs steer the final output without leaving a logit-lens-visible trace, corroborated by three signals (post-steering deltas, activation-patching recovery, FV norm-transfer correlations). A previously reported negative cosine-transfer correlation dissolves at scale, adding at most ΔR^2 = 0.011 beyond task identity. These results decompose the linear representation hypothesis into linear decodability and linear steerability and show they come apart opposite to intuition, with implications for safety monitoring: vocabulary-projection tools are blind to FV-style interventions on widely deployed model families.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

To succeed in common digital tasks such as web navigation, agents must carry out a variety of specialized tasks such as searching for products or planning a travel route. To tackle these tasks, agents can bootstrap themselves by learning task-specific skills online through interaction with the web environment. In this work, we demonstrate that programs are an effective representation for skills. We propose agent skill induction (ASI), which allows agents to adapt themselves by inducing, verifying, and utilizing program-based skills on the fly. We start with an evaluation on the WebArena agent benchmark and show that ASI outperforms the static baseline agent and its text-skill counterpart by 23.5% and 11.3% in success rate, mainly thanks to the programmatic verification guarantee during the induction phase. ASI also improves efficiency by reducing 10.7-15.3% of the steps over baselines, by composing primitive actions (e.g., click) into higher-level skills (e.g., search product). We then highlight the efficacy of ASI in remaining efficient and accurate under scaled-up web activities. Finally, we examine the generalizability of induced skills when transferring between websites, and find that ASI can effectively reuse common skills, while also updating incompatible skills to versatile website changes.

Coding-agent benchmarks evaluate whether a single uninterrupted agent can resolve a repository issue. Real software work is messier: tasks are interrupted, reassigned, reviewed, and resumed from partial states left by another agent or engineer. We study this missing dimension through handoff debt: the rediscovery cost imposed when a predecessor's work is opaque or incomplete. Our takeover protocol interrupts a coding agent at deterministic handoff points, freezes the repository, and evaluates successor agents under four handoff views: repository state only, raw trace, summary notes, and structured notes. Across 75 source tasks, the protocol generates 181 handoff-point tasks and 724 takeover runs per successor model. Across three successor models, context-bearing handoffs reduce median agent events by 20-59% and cumulative prompt tokens by 42-63% relative to repository-only takeover. Solved-rate effects are smaller and model-dependent, but efficiency gains are consistent. These findings suggest that coding-agent evaluation should report not only whether a task is solved, but also how costly that work is for another agent to resume.

Platform abuse campaigns conceal redirection instructions with emojis, homophones, character decomposition, and redundant symbols, then route users through disguised links to services associated with pornography, fraud, gambling, or illicit transactions. Existing benchmarks evaluate obfuscated text and risky webpages separately, obscuring how target recovery affects downstream evidence acquisition. We introduce RiskChainBench, pairing 3,600 synthetic token-text restoration inputs from 600 source sessions with 600 corresponding human-labeled local web environments. A model first restores the message, operational intent, and destination; the same underlying model then acts as a VLM-driven web agent that investigates the correctly associated website and produces a frozen, evidence-cited risk report without message-side semantics or domain-reputation cues. We score restoration and correct-routing web investigation separately and compose them offline by applying the frozen primary-entry prediction as a gate to the same Task 2 result. Human labels determine task correctness, while a fixed multimodal evidence judge assesses faithfulness, sufficiency, completeness, and consistency. Across ten models, Entry Top-1 ranges from 35.2% to 95.2% and web decision accuracy from 26.3% to 62.8%; the leading systems differ across entry recovery, full reconstruction, website decisions, and fine-grained typing. Execution failures account for 31.9% of web runs, whereas post-decision type errors account for only 0.9%, identifying stable exploration and risk judgment as the principal bottlenecks. We release the benchmark, protocol, and resettable local sandbox.

Multi-server MCP agents create an information-flow control problem: faithful tool composition can turn individually benign read/write permissions into cross-boundary credential propagation -- a structural side effect of workflow topology, not necessarily malicious model behavior. We present MCPHunt, to our knowledge the first controlled benchmark that isolates non-adversarial, verbatim credential propagation across multi-server MCP trust boundaries, with three methodological contributions: (1) canary-based taint tracking that reduces propagation detection to objective string matching; (2) an environment-controlled coverage design with risky, benign, and hard-negative conditions that validates pipeline soundness and controls for credential-format confounds; (3) CRS stratification that disentangles task-mandated propagation (faithful execution of verbatim-transfer instructions) from policy-violating propagation (credentials included despite the option to redact). Across 3,615 main-benchmark traces from 5 models spanning 147 tasks and 9 mechanism families, policy-violating propagation rates reach 11.5--41.3% across all models. This propagation is pathway-specific (25x cross-mechanism range) and concentrated in browser-mediated data flows; hard-negative controls provide evidence that production-format credentials are not necessary -- prompt-directed cross-boundary data flow is sufficient. A prompt-mitigation study across 3 models reduces policy-violating propagation by up to 97% while preserving 80.5% utility, but effectiveness varies with instruction-following capability -- suggesting that prompt-level defenses alone may not suffice. Code, traces, and labeling pipeline are released under MIT and CC BY 4.0.

Activation patching is a standard method in mechanistic interpretability for localizing the components of a model responsible for specific behaviors, but it is computationally expensive to apply at scale. Attribution patching offers a faster, gradient-based approximation, yet suffers from noise and reduced reliability in deep, highly non-linear networks. In this work, we introduce Relevance Patching (RelP), which replaces the local gradients in attribution patching with propagation coefficients derived from Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP). LRP propagates the network's output backward through the layers, redistributing relevance to lower-level components according to local propagation rules that ensure properties such as relevance conservation or improved signal-to-noise ratio. Like attribution patching, RelP requires only two forward passes and one backward pass, maintaining computational efficiency while improving faithfulness. We validate RelP across a range of models and tasks, showing that it more accurately approximates activation patching than standard attribution patching, particularly when analyzing residual stream and MLP outputs in the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task. For instance, for MLP outputs in GPT-2 Large, attribution patching achieves a Pearson correlation of 0.006, whereas RelP reaches 0.956, highlighting the improvement offered by RelP. Additionally, we compare the faithfulness of sparse feature circuits identified by RelP and Integrated Gradients (IG), showing that RelP achieves comparable faithfulness without the extra computational cost associated with IG.

LLM-agent services repeatedly execute small deterministic transitions between model and tool calls: route an outcome, update state, and emit the next effect. We ask when this control path exposes enough concurrent work for GPU execution, and what changes when a GPU-computed route decision remains on device. We formalize the ready-cohort boundary using fixed-partition share F, exact offline share P*, local upper bound U, and online achieved share A. Under zero service time, unlimited capacity, and equal relative launch deadlines, a specialized dynamic program computes P* exactly. In a stationary Poisson replay of one pinned 851-session public trace panel, the primary condition at 100,000 target active sessions, K=256, and a 50 ms launch deadline gives F=30.19%, P*=43.00%, and U=45.85%. Exact packing recovers 81.83% of the opportunity lost at fixed window boundaries. The outcome-derived route key is a conditioning proxy, not proof of executable identity. A separate mechanism study keeps a GPU-computed binary decision on device instead of returning four bytes to the host and redispatching. Across four named GPU placements, the device-resident path is faster in all 36 configurations; within-placement row-median ratios range from 1.19x to 2.39x. Across both admissible mechanisms, all 14,557,440 tested batched invocations match a separately implemented host oracle. A fixed nested device graph that removes no host decision is slower in all 60 configurations across five placements. Together, the studies establish two measurable gates for GPU agent control: deadline-feasible cohort supply and observation placement. A joined finite online runtime is required to measure A, CPU displacement, and service-level benefit.

Tool-calling agents are increasingly deployed in real-world customer-facing workflows. Yet most studies on tool-calling agents focus on idealized settings with general, fixed, and well-specified tasks. In real-world applications, user requests are often (1) ambiguous, (2) changing over time, or (3) infeasible due to policy constraints, and training and evaluation data that cover these diverse, complex interaction patterns remain under-represented. To bridge the gap, we present Trajectory2Task, a verifiable data generation pipeline for studying tool use at scale under three realistic user scenarios: ambiguous intent, changing intent, and infeasible intents. The pipeline first conducts multi-turn exploration to produce valid tool-call trajectories. It then converts these trajectories into user-facing tasks with controlled intent adaptations. This process yields verifiable task that support closed-loop evaluation and training. We benchmark seven state-of-the-art LLMs on the generated complex user scenario tasks and observe frequent failures. Finally, using successful trajectories obtained from task rollouts, we fine-tune lightweight LLMs and find consistent improvements across all three conditions, along with better generalization to unseen tool-use domains, indicating stronger general tool-calling ability.

Multi-agent debate has been shown to improve reasoning in large language models (LLMs). However, it is compute-intensive, requiring generation of long transcripts before answering questions. To address this inefficiency, we develop a framework that distills multi-agent debate into a single LLM through a two-stage fine-tuning pipeline combining debate structure learning with internalization via dynamic reward scheduling and length clipping. Across multiple models and benchmarks, our internalized models match or exceed explicit multi-agent debate performance using up to 93% fewer tokens. We then investigate the mechanistic basis of this capability through activation steering, finding that internalization creates agent-specific subspaces: interpretable directions in activation space corresponding to different agent perspectives. We further demonstrate a practical application: by instilling malicious agents into the LLM through internalized debate, then applying negative steering to suppress them, we show that distillation makes harmful behaviors easier to localize and control with smaller reductions in general performance compared to steering base models. Our findings offer a new perspective for understanding multi-agent capabilities in distilled models and provide practical guidelines for controlling internalized reasoning behaviors. Code available at https://github.com/johnsk95/latent_agents

Browser agents need to make decisions and execute actions on behalf of users while consuming untrusted webpages, creating opportunities for malicious instructions embedded in webpages to redirect legitimate tasks. We introduce BrowseSafe++, which extends BrowseSafe from 14,719 pages to 38,675 pairs of pages. Most of its prompt injections were observed in the wild on production websites. We keep each injection unchanged and rewrite the sensitive parts of the page around it to protect privacy. Each attacked page has a clean copy of the same page as its control. Both are provided as HTML, Markdown, an accessibility tree, and a screenshot. Every pair includes a user task and its expected answer. The benchmark includes twelve types of websites, from news articles to shared documents and forums, with 24 attack types appearing in 18 different locations on a page. We use these paired pages to train BrowseSafe-Guard, two 0.8B-parameter detectors for text and screenshots. Both achieve higher F1 scores than the detector based on frontier models, while keeping false-positive rates on benign pages and inference cost low. BrowseSafe-Adapt revises benchmark injections from browser-agent feedback, and attacks that succeed on only a few percent of tasks when replayed directly reach up to 95.41% success once adapted.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) generate chain-of-thought (CoT) traces before producing final outputs, introducing a dynamic internal state that may complicate control mechanisms such as refusal. Unlike instruction-tuned LLMs, where refusal is mediated by a single directional subspace, refusal in large reasoning models (LRMs) additionally depends on the CoT. In DeepSeek-R1-Distill-LLaMA-8B, activation steering reverses refusal in only 39% of cases when the CoT is kept fixed, but removing the CoT entirely increases this to 70%, indicating that the CoT actively reinforces refusal. In a two-stage intervention where the model regenerates its CoT under activation steering, refusal is reversed in 94% of cases, while the resulting CoT alone retains 48% of this effect even after steering is removed. This suggests that the CoT can carry and reconstruct the compliance signal independently. These findings indicate that refusal in LRMs is jointly encoded in residual stream activations and CoT. This joint activation makes LRM more robust against activation-level interventions alone, but exposes CoT to a possible alternative surface attack.

Large Language Model (LLM) unlearning aims to erase or suppress undesirable knowledge within the model, offering promise for controlling harmful or private information to prevent misuse. However, recent studies highlight its limited efficacy in real-world scenarios, hindering practical adoption. In this study, we identify a pervasive issue underlying many downstream failures: the effectiveness of existing unlearning methods heavily depends on the form of training samples and frequently fails to generalize to alternate expressions of the same knowledge. We formally characterize this problem as Form-Dependent Bias and systematically investigate its specific manifestation patterns across various downstream tasks. To quantify its prevalence and support future research, we introduce ORT, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness of unlearning methods against variations in knowledge expression. Results reveal that Form-Dependent Bias is both widespread and severe among current techniques. We argue that LLM unlearning should be form-independent to address the endless forms of downstream tasks encountered in real-world security-critical scenarios. Towards this goal, we introduce Rank-one Concept Redirection (ROCR), a novel training-free method, as a promising solution path. ROCR performs unlearning by targeting the invariants in downstream tasks, specifically the activated dangerous concepts. It is capable of modifying model parameters within seconds to redirect the model's perception of a specific unlearning target concept to another harmless concept. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ROCR significantly improves unlearning effectiveness compared to traditional methods while generating highly natural outputs.

A browser agent that works in its user's signed-in session can be steered by a two-sentence note on a page it reads into approving a third party's access to the user's account. The agent is a confused deputy: the session supplies the authority, the page designates the access request to approve or the webhook URL to register, and nothing at the point of action checks one against the other. The agent thereby supplies the approval click that a consent screen reserves for the account holder. We measure this failure on two authorization surfaces, an OAuth-style access grant and a webhook registration, with agents built on an open-source browser framework and models from two providers. Without a defense the unauthorized action completed in all 73 attack runs. An instruction telling the model that only the user's task authorizes a grant still left 7 of 10 consent attacks completing. We therefore move the check to where the action completes. The authority envelope gate has the service accept a request only when it matches the task's envelope, the client and account or the webhook URL that the user's task named, fixed before the agent starts. With the gate the agent still sent the request in every one of 70 attack runs, the service rejected each, and the action completed in every control run whose task named it. A service that receives the task's envelope should therefore check agent-driven authorization requests against it.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

Activation steering has emerged as a promising approach for efficiently adapting large language models (LLMs) to downstream behaviors. However, most existing steering methods rely on a single static direction per task or concept, making them inflexible under task variation and inadequate for complex tasks that require multiple coordinated capabilities. To address this limitation, we propose STEER2ADAPT, a lightweight framework that adapts LLMs by composing steering vectors rather than learning new ones from scratch. In many domains (e.g., reasoning or safety), tasks share a small set of underlying concept dimensions. STEER2ADAPT captures these dimensions as a reusable, low-dimensional semantic prior subspace, and adapts to new tasks by dynamically discovering a linear combination of basis vectors from only a handful of examples. Experiments across 9 tasks and 3 models in both reasoning and safety domains demonstrate the effectiveness of STEER2ADAPT, achieving an average improvement of 8.2%. Extensive analyses further show that STEER2ADAPT is a data-efficient, stable, and transparent inference-time adaptation method for LLMs.

With the advancements in hardware, software, and large language model technologies, the interaction between humans and operating systems has evolved from the command-line interface to the rapidly emerging AI agent interactions. Building an operating system (OS) agent capable of executing user instructions and faithfully following user desires is becoming a reality. In this technical report, we present ColorAgent, an OS agent designed to engage in long-horizon, robust interactions with the environment while also enabling personalized and proactive user interaction. To enable long-horizon interactions with the environment, we enhance the model's capabilities through step-wise reinforcement learning and self-evolving training, while also developing a tailored multi-agent framework that ensures generality, consistency, and robustness. In terms of user interaction, we explore personalized user intent recognition and proactive engagement, positioning the OS agent not merely as an automation tool but as a warm, collaborative partner. We evaluate ColorAgent on the AndroidWorld and AndroidLab benchmarks, achieving success rates of 77.2% and 50.7%, respectively, establishing a new state of the art. Nonetheless, we note that current benchmarks are insufficient for a comprehensive evaluation of OS agents and propose further exploring directions in future work, particularly in the areas of evaluation paradigms, agent collaboration, and security. Our code is available at https://github.com/MadeAgents/mobile-use.

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

The sparsely-activated models have achieved great success in natural language processing through large-scale parameters and relatively low computational cost, and gradually become a feasible technique for training and implementing extremely large models. Due to the limit of communication cost, activating multiple experts is hardly affordable during training and inference. Therefore, previous work usually activate just one expert at a time to alleviate additional communication cost. Such routing mechanism limits the upper bound of model performance. In this paper, we first investigate a phenomenon that increasing the number of activated experts can boost the model performance with higher sparse ratio. To increase the number of activated experts without an increase in computational cost, we propose SAM (Switch and Mixture) routing, an efficient hierarchical routing mechanism that activates multiple experts in a same device (GPU). Our methods shed light on the training of extremely large sparse models and experiments prove that our models can achieve significant performance gain with great efficiency improvement.

Monitoring is an important aspect of safely deploying Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper examines activation probes for detecting ``high-stakes'' interactions -- where the text indicates that the interaction might lead to significant harm -- as a critical, yet underexplored, target for such monitoring. We evaluate several probe architectures trained on synthetic data, and find them to exhibit robust generalization to diverse, out-of-distribution, real-world data. Probes' performance is comparable to that of prompted or finetuned medium-sized LLM monitors, while offering computational savings of six orders-of-magnitude. These savings are enabled by reusing activations of the model that is being monitored. Our experiments also highlight the potential of building resource-aware hierarchical monitoring systems, where probes serve as an efficient initial filter and flag cases for more expensive downstream analysis. We release our novel synthetic dataset and the codebase at https://github.com/arrrlex/models-under-pressure.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

Memory, planning, reflection, and tool use are often compared as feature labels, obscuring the control semantics that determine how an agent actually runs. This review connects ten historical cognitive architectures, eight language-agent runtime families, and forty-two mechanism-focused modern systems. We reconstruct each mechanism through state, control, transition, persistence, failure, learning, and resource governance, then code evidence relation (E1-E4) separately from migration depth (D0-D4). The resulting landscape is uneven. Modern agents have operationalized substantial parts of adaptive memory, failure recovery, dynamic team selection, workflow search, skill induction, resource scheduling, and uncertainty-conditioned action, although often through independent convergence rather than documented inheritance. The strongest remaining opportunities lie in couplings among mechanisms. Closest-baseline screening closes one proposed gap: GraSP already combines calibrated multi-skill selection, typed compilation, verification, bounded repair, and replanning or ReAct fallback. Five residual bundles remain: activation with latency and action utility; typed impasse with isolated substates and resolution compilation; bounded content competition with broadcast and admission learning; persistent intention with reconsideration and live method authority; and uncertainty with resource allocation, interruption, and stopping. We contribute a distinctive-mechanism catalog, an auditable evidence-depth framework, and a falsifiable agenda for testing these bundles as composable runtime invariants.

Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction. Using OpenAI's gpt-5.6-sol model alias, we test 25 pre-specified mirrored trade-off profiles. Direct exposure to an objective authorizing concealment, fabrication, and pressure produced advice net opposed to its target. After an Id and Censor transformed the same objective into affect and a constraint-rewritten, target-bearing intention, the user-facing Superego---which saw the preferred direction but not the raw objective, its manipulative clauses, or its source---produced advice net aligned with the target. This behavioral reverse shift is consistent with the model recognizing or distrusting the manipulative motive, although we do not identify its internal mechanism. The second result exposes a compositional safety gap: a current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective. The workflow can keep the raw instruction, its manipulation-authorizing clauses, and its provenance outside the downstream model's context while preserving the objective's target direction. A user with endpoint-only access likewise cannot directly inspect those upstream messages including the objective.

AI agents increasingly operate inside digital accounts by exercising privileges that users already hold, raising a new control question: whether an existing account entitlement must be exercised manually or may be exercised through a user-authorized automated proxy. We define delegation rights as the revocable, identity-preserving, scope-limited, and mode-specific authority of an account holder to authorize such proxy execution. We develop a three-party incomplete-contracts model with a User, an AI Agent provider, and a Platform. The contested object is not platform ownership, account transferability, data portability, or unrestricted API access, but residual control over the mode of account execution. Under Platform Control, the platform can protect infrastructure, identity systems, privacy boundaries, and third parties, but its discretionary veto weakens the User--Agent coalition's disagreement payoff and depresses relationship-specific investment. Under User Control, hold-up is reduced, but security, privacy, congestion, and third-party risks may remain insufficiently internalized. We then analyze Certified Delegation, under which access protection is conditional on verifiable authorization, revocability, auditability, rate-limit compliance, data minimization, and risk mitigation. Certification is therefore not merely a technical safety screen; it is a conditional allocation of residual control. Illustrative mechanism simulations show how this regime can reduce deadweight loss by restoring delegation incentives while bounding residual risk.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the development of powerful agentic systems capable of automating complex workflows across various fields. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can hijack agent behavior. In this work, we present ReasAlign, a model-level solution to improve safety alignment against indirect prompt injection attacks. The core idea of ReasAlign is to incorporate structured reasoning steps to analyze user queries, detect conflicting instructions, and preserve the continuity of the user's intended tasks to defend against indirect injection attacks. To further ensure reasoning logic and accuracy, we introduce a test-time scaling mechanism with a preference-optimized judge model that scores reasoning steps and selects the best trajectory. Comprehensive evaluations across various benchmarks show that ReasAlign maintains utility comparable to an undefended model while consistently outperforming Meta SecAlign, the strongest prior guardrail. On the representative open-ended CyberSecEval2 benchmark, which includes multiple prompt-injected tasks, ReasAlign achieves 94.6% utility and only 3.6% ASR, far surpassing the state-of-the-art defensive model of Meta SecAlign (56.4% utility and 74.4% ASR). These results demonstrate that ReasAlign achieves the best trade-off between security and utility, establishing a robust and practical defense against prompt injection attacks in real-world agentic systems. Our code and experimental results could be found at https://github.com/leolee99/ReasAlign.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are a promising path to realizing generalist embodied agents that can quickly adapt to new tasks, modalities, and environments. However, methods for interpreting and steering VLAs fall far short of classical robotics pipelines, which are grounded in explicit models of kinematics, dynamics, and control. This lack of mechanistic insight is a central challenge for deploying learned policies in real-world robotics, where robustness and explainability are critical. Motivated by advances in mechanistic interpretability for large language models, we introduce the first framework for interpreting and steering VLAs via their internal representations, enabling direct intervention in model behavior at inference time. We project feedforward activations within transformer layers onto the token embedding basis, identifying sparse semantic directions - such as speed and direction - that are causally linked to action selection. Leveraging these findings, we introduce a general-purpose activation steering method that modulates behavior in real time, without fine-tuning, reward signals, or environment interaction. We evaluate this method on two recent open-source VLAs, Pi0 and OpenVLA, and demonstrate zero-shot behavioral control in simulation (LIBERO) and on a physical robot (UR5). This work demonstrates that interpretable components of embodied VLAs can be systematically harnessed for control - establishing a new paradigm for transparent and steerable foundation models in robotics.

Large language models can hide hidden behaviors that activate only under narrow conditions, such as backdoor triggers, sleeper-agent deployment cues, sandbagging, or topic-conditioned censorship. Such behaviors are difficult to detect without prior knowledge what to look for. We present activation-matched finetuning, an unsupervised detection method that assumes no knowledge of the trigger or the target behavior. Given a suspect model and a publicly available anchor, we finetune the anchor to reproduce the suspect's activations on a small benign corpus, and score each evaluation prompt by the residual between the two models. Since no benign corpus covers the sparse trigger region, the reference learns the benign computation but not the hidden behavior. Therefore, trigger prompts -- and, crucially, their semantic neighbors -- incur a large residual that signal the presence of unusual behavior to the defender. Testing our method across third-party models and custom models, activation-matched finetuning surfaces hidden behavior reliably. Furthermore, we empirically consider a natural defense-aware attack and showcase that it fails to suppress our detection method without sacrificing the behavior itself.

The simulation of human neurons and neurotransmission mechanisms has been realized in deep neural networks based on the theoretical implementations of activation functions. However, recent studies have reported that the threshold potential of neurons exhibits different values according to the locations and types of individual neurons, and that the activation functions have limitations in terms of representing this variability. Therefore, this study proposes a simple yet effective activation function that facilitates different thresholds and adaptive activations according to the positions of units and the contexts of inputs. Furthermore, the proposed activation function mathematically exhibits a more generalized form of Swish activation function, and thus we denoted it as Adaptive SwisH (ASH). ASH highlights informative features that exhibit large values in the top percentiles in an input, whereas it rectifies low values. Most importantly, ASH exhibits trainable, adaptive, and context-aware properties compared to other activation functions. Furthermore, ASH represents general formula of the previously studied activation function and provides a reasonable mathematical background for the superior performance. To validate the effectiveness and robustness of ASH, we implemented ASH into many deep learning models for various tasks, including classification, detection, segmentation, and image generation. Experimental analysis demonstrates that our activation function can provide the benefits of more accurate prediction and earlier convergence in many deep learning applications.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes detect when they are being evaluated and adjust their behavior to appear more aligned, compromising the reliability of safety evaluations. In this paper, we show that adding a steering vector to an LLM's activations can suppress evaluation-awareness and make the model act like it is deployed during evaluation. To study our steering technique, we train an LLM to exhibit evaluation-aware behavior using a two-step training process designed to mimic how this behavior could emerge naturally. First, we perform continued pretraining on documents with factual descriptions of the model (1) using Python type hints during evaluation but not during deployment and (2) recognizing that the presence of a certain evaluation cue always means that it is being tested. Then, we train the model with expert iteration to use Python type hints in evaluation settings. The resulting model is evaluation-aware: it writes type hints in evaluation contexts more than deployment contexts. We find that activation steering can suppress evaluation awareness and make the model act like it is deployed even when the cue is present. Importantly, we constructed our steering vector using the original model before our additional training. Our results suggest that AI evaluators could improve the reliability of safety evaluations by steering models to act like they are deployed.

Refusal mechanisms in large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring safety. Recent research has revealed that refusal behavior can be mediated by a single direction in activation space, enabling targeted interventions to bypass refusals. While this is primarily demonstrated in an English-centric context, appropriate refusal behavior is important for any language, but poorly understood. In this paper, we investigate the refusal behavior in LLMs across 14 languages using PolyRefuse, a multilingual safety dataset created by translating malicious and benign English prompts into these languages. We uncover the surprising cross-lingual universality of the refusal direction: a vector extracted from English can bypass refusals in other languages with near-perfect effectiveness, without any additional fine-tuning. Even more remarkably, refusal directions derived from any safety-aligned language transfer seamlessly to others. We attribute this transferability to the parallelism of refusal vectors across languages in the embedding space and identify the underlying mechanism behind cross-lingual jailbreaks. These findings provide actionable insights for building more robust multilingual safety defenses and pave the way for a deeper mechanistic understanding of cross-lingual vulnerabilities in LLMs.

Activation steering methods are widely used to control large language model (LLM) behavior and are often interpreted as revealing meaningful internal representations. This interpretation assumes that steering directions are identifiable and uniquely recoverable from input-output behavior. We show that, under white-box single-layer access, steering vectors are fundamentally non-identifiable due to large equivalence classes of behaviorally indistinguishable interventions. Empirically, we find that orthogonal perturbations achieve near-equivalent efficacy with negligible effect sizes across multiple models and traits, with pre-trained semantic classifiers confirming equivalence at the output level. We estimate null-space dimensionality via SVD of activation covariance matrices and validate that equivalence holds robustly throughout the operationally relevant steering range. Critically, we show that non-identifiability is a robust geometric property that persists across diverse prompt distributions. These findings reveal fundamental interpretability limits and highlight the need for structural constraints beyond behavioral testing to enable reliable alignment interventions.

The same arguments often need to be evaluated under different external regimes. An agent with influence over the regime has a strategic lever that standard formalisms do not directly capture. We introduce context-dependent argumentation frameworks (CDAFs), an extension of Dung's theory in which a defeat function determines, per context, which attacks succeed. A perspective-labeled specialisation derives the defeat function from a relevance set ρ and a priority π. The relevance set is the agent's action space. In a small worked example, the agent's target argument is rejected under every full-relevance injective priority, yet accepted under partial activations, one of which no VAF audience can mirror. We define the corresponding decision problem, ACTIVATION-MANIPULATION, and record baseline complexity bounds. Tight bounds and multi-agent variants are left open.

Activation Functions introduce non-linearity in the deep neural networks. This nonlinearity helps the neural networks learn faster and efficiently from the dataset. In deep learning, many activation functions are developed and used based on the type of problem statement. ReLU's variants, SWISH, and MISH are goto activation functions. MISH function is considered having similar or even better performance than SWISH, and much better than ReLU. In this paper, we propose an activation function named APTx which behaves similar to MISH, but requires lesser mathematical operations to compute. The lesser computational requirements of APTx does speed up the model training, and thus also reduces the hardware requirement for the deep learning model. Source code: https://github.com/mr-ravin/aptx_activation

Improving pretrained robot action models at test time from only a few rollouts remains challenging. Activation steering offers a lightweight approach by modifying feature activations while keeping model weights fixed. However, effective steering requires identifying which features to modify and determining the timing and strength of modification. We introduce SteerAct, a few-shot temporal steering framework that uses a shared temporal descriptor of sparse-feature dynamics for offline feature selection and online control. A pretrained sparse autoencoder provides candidate features, and our temporal descriptor summarizes the distribution of local activation-order patterns for each feature, enabling comparisons across rollouts without requiring timestep alignment. Before steering begins (offline), we use successful and failed reference rollouts to select a single task-specific feature whose temporal descriptors best distinguish the two outcomes and construct its reference banks. During each new execution (online), we compare the feature's evolving temporal descriptor with these references to determine when to intervene and how strongly to increase or decrease its activation via a steering coefficient. Using only 24 outcome-labeled rollouts per task, SteerAct improves task success by approximately 10% relative to unsteered models in evaluations spanning π_{0.5}, Fast-WAM, RoboTwin 2.0, DexJoCo, and real-world manipulation, without updating action-model weights. Code and demos are available at: https://steeract.github.io/.

Recent research has explored that LLM agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious tasks embedded in tool-retrieved information can redirect the agent to take unauthorized actions. Existing defenses against IPI have significant limitations: either require essential model training resources, lack effectiveness against sophisticated attacks, or harm the normal utilities. We present MELON (Masked re-Execution and TooL comparisON), a novel IPI defense. Our approach builds on the observation that under a successful attack, the agent's next action becomes less dependent on user tasks and more on malicious tasks. Following this, we design MELON to detect attacks by re-executing the agent's trajectory with a masked user prompt modified through a masking function. We identify an attack if the actions generated in the original and masked executions are similar. We also include three key designs to reduce the potential false positives and false negatives. Extensive evaluation on the IPI benchmark AgentDojo demonstrates that MELON outperforms SOTA defenses in both attack prevention and utility preservation. Moreover, we show that combining MELON with a SOTA prompt augmentation defense (denoted as MELON-Aug) further improves its performance. We also conduct a detailed ablation study to validate our key designs. Code is available at https://github.com/kaijiezhu11/MELON.

Tool calling, invoking external tools on demand, is central to agentic LLMs, yet the mechanism that decides whether a model calls a tool or responds directly remains poorly understood. Agentic prompts are long and heavily scaffolded, combining role instructions, tool schemas, format templates, and the user's request across hundreds of tokens, creating a noisy, highly entangled context in which no single controllable variable for mechanistic analysis is obvious. To obtain such a variable, we propose a method that converts complex agentic prompts into minimal contrastive pairs in which a single request verb determines the tool-call decision: replacing an execution-verb (e.g., write) with an analysis-verb (e.g., discuss) reliably flips the decision, suggesting it is mediated by a compact internal state. We construct 500 such paired prompts across Python, Java, and C++ (300 for mechanistic analysis, 200 held out for evaluation). We trace the decision to a vector, μ_Δ, that is both causally necessary and sufficient and generalizes beyond the discovery prompts to native multi-turn τ^2-Bench trajectories and verb-free requests. Behavioral ablations show that the scaffold establishes a tool-call prior; Transcoder decomposition then reveals that analysis verbs suppress this prior through features signaling that tool use is unnecessary, whereas execution verbs largely leave it intact. Downstream scaffold-reading attention heads and MLP features read out the resulting state, and the same mechanism recurs across seven models from the Qwen, Mistral, and Granite families. Our code is available at https://github.com/XijieGo/MI4ToolCalling.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in safety-critical and regulated sectors, the retention of sensitive or prohibited knowledge introduces escalating risks, ranging from privacy leakage to regulatory non-compliance to to potential misuse, and so on. Recent studies suggest that machine unlearning can help ensure deployed models comply with evolving legal, safety, and governance requirements. However, current unlearning techniques assume clean separation between forget and retain datasets, which is challenging in operational settings characterized by highly entangled distributions. In such scenarios, perturbation-based methods often degrade general model utility or fail to ensure safety. To address this, we propose Selective Representation Misdirection for Unlearning (SRMU), a novel principled activation-editing framework that enforces feature-aware and directionally controlled perturbations. Unlike indiscriminate model weights perturbations, SRMU employs a structured misdirection vector with an activation importance map. The goal is to allow SRMU selectively suppresses harmful representations while preserving the utility on benign ones. Experiments are conducted on the widely used WMDP benchmark across low- and high-entanglement configurations. Empirical results reveal that SRMU delivers state-of-the-art unlearning performance with minimal utility losses, and remains effective under 20-30\% overlap where existing baselines collapse. SRMU provides a robust foundation for safety-driven model governance, privacy compliance, and controlled knowledge removal in the emerging LLM-based applications. We release the replication package at https://figshare.com/s/d5931192a8824de26aff.

AI coding agents set up projects by reading documentation and installing the dependencies it lists, without verifying their names, sources, or known vulnerabilities. By editing only a README, requirements file, or Makefile, an attacker can redirect the agent to an untrusted registry, a known-vulnerable version, or a wrong-but-plausible name: documentation becomes a vector for code execution. We present the first systematic evaluation of package-install-time supply-chain attacks delivered through ordinary project-setup documentation across production coding-agent harnesses, probing frontier models on twelve scenarios in five attack classes, grounded in documented incidents. The same model catches an attack through one harness and installs it through another: install-time security rests on the harness-model combination, not the model alone. Agents catch blatant typosquats reliably, but plausible separator-confusion names (azurecore for azure-core) slip through, and how often depends on the harness-model pairing. Source-based attacks like registry redirection are missed almost everywhere. The source blind spot recurs on npm and Cargo, where nearly every model installs the untrusted dependency; name detection carries over less consistently across ecosystems. Security-oriented prompts recover part of the gap but only for the dimension they name; a deterministic pre-install check that verifies names, sources, and versions before any code runs closes most of it.

World Action Models (WAMs) enable semantically- and physically-informed control but are brittle under distribution shift. In this work, we use mechanistic interpretability to study how robustness-relevant perturbations are represented in WAM activation space. Comparing activations across successful and unsuccessful rollouts, we find some WAM architectures exhibit low-dimensional linear separability for robustness-critical features, while others do not. This motivates the use of contrastive activation directions for training-free WAM steering. We also show that local linearity in WAM activation dynamics enables efficient feedback steering via model-based optimal control, yielding World-Action Linear Quadratic Regulator (WA-LQR), a minimally-invasive reduced-order LQR controller. Via mechanistic evaluations, we predict strong steerability in the Cosmos-Policy and DiT4DiT models but weak steerability in LingBot-VA, consistent with steering intervention results. On Cosmos-Policy and DiT4DiT, WA-LQR generalizes contrastive directions to new tasks and improves robustness to camera, gripper, and visual-noise perturbations over unsteered and prompt steering baselines.

Multilingual large language models can generate figurative language, but whether the internal signals driving this behavior are language-specific or reusable across languages is unclear. Using activation steering as a probe, we estimate a direction for a figurative category from figurative--literal activation differences in one language and apply it during generation. Across five figurative categories, six languages, and four multilingual LLMs, these directions steer reliably within their own language, most robustly for metaphor and simile. More importantly, they transfer across languages: a direction learned in one increases the target behavior when applied to another, with German among the most receptive targets. Going further, directions assembled from other languages can match or even surpass a target language's own native direction, while removing this shared component weakens native steering. Together, these results provide direct evidence of a reusable but target-dependent cross-lingual signal for figurative generation.

This paper introduces the Opus Prompt Intention Framework, designed to improve complex Workflow Generation with instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). We propose an intermediate Intention Capture layer between user queries and Workflow Generation, implementing the Opus Workflow Intention Framework, which consists of extracting Workflow Signals from user queries, interpreting them into structured Workflow Intention objects, and generating Workflows based on these Intentions. Our results show that this layer enables LLMs to produce logical and meaningful outputs that scale reliably as query complexity increases. On a synthetic benchmark of 1,000 multi-intent query-Workflow(s) pairs, applying the Opus Prompt Intention Framework to Workflow Generation yields consistent improvements in semantic Workflow similarity metrics. In this paper, we introduce the Opus Prompt Intention Framework by applying the concepts of Workflow Signal and Workflow Intention to LLM-driven Workflow Generation. We present a reproducible, customizable LLM-based Intention Capture system to extract Workflow Signals and Workflow Intentions from user queries. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that the proposed system significantly improves Workflow Generation quality compared to direct generation from user queries, particularly in cases of Mixed Intention Elicitation.

As agent systems become more widely used, multiple agent sessions increasingly run alongside pre-existing user tasks in the same environment, sharing resources with limited capacity or mutually exclusive states. This creates a safety risk: when granted sufficient privileges, an agent may resolve a resource conflict by terminating or otherwise disrupting an existing task rather than reporting it. In this work, we identify and formalize this failure mode, which we term destructive resource preemption: obtaining the resources required for a requested task by terminating, overwriting, evicting, or degrading an incumbent task. To systematically study this risk, we introduce ClashBench, an executable benchmark comprising 268 validated conflict cases across 55 resource types, and evaluate 17 models through Codex, Claude Code, and OpenCode. We observe destructive preemption in 44.5% of trajectories, where the agent completes the requested task while causing the incumbent task to fail its health check. We also show that prompt-based safeguards are insufficient: an instruction to avoid affecting existing tasks reduces but does not eliminate preemption, while an instruction explicitly authorizing the agent to stop local processes increases it. More concerningly, in 31.9% of successful destructive-preemption cases, the final response mentions neither the resource conflict nor the action taken to resolve it, raising concerns about possible concealment. These findings establish destructive resource preemption as a broad safety risk in privileged agent systems and motivate stronger privilege controls, task isolation, and conflict-aware safeguards.

While activation steering in large language models (LLMs) is a growing area of research, methods can often incur broader effects than desired. This motivates isolation of purer concept vectors to enable targeted interventions and understand LLM behavior at a more granular level. We present RepIt, a simple and data-efficient framework for isolating concept-specific representations. Across five frontier LLMs, RepIt enables precise interventions: it selectively suppresses refusal on targeted concepts while preserving refusal elsewhere, producing models that answer WMD-related questions while still scoring as safe on standard benchmarks. We further show that the corrective signal localizes to just 100-200 neurons and that robust target representations can be extracted from as few as a dozen examples on a single A6000. This efficiency raises a dual concern: manipulations can be performed with modest compute and data to extend to underrepresented data-scarce topics while evading existing benchmarks. By disentangling refusal vectors with RepIt, this work demonstrates that targeted interventions can counteract overgeneralization, laying the foundation for more granular control of model behavior.

Mobile GUI agents aim to autonomously complete user-instructed tasks across mobile apps. Recent advances in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) enable these agents to interpret UI screens, identify actionable elements, and perform interactions such as tapping or typing. However, existing agents remain reactive: they reason only over the current screen and lack a structured model of app navigation flow, limiting their ability to understand context, detect unexpected outcomes, and recover from errors. We present MAPLE, a state-aware multi-agent framework that abstracts app interactions as a Finite State Machine (FSM). We computationally model each UI screen as a discrete state and user actions as transitions, allowing the FSM to provide a structured representation of the app execution. MAPLE consists of specialized agents responsible for four phases of task execution: planning, execution, verification, error recovery, and knowledge retention. These agents collaborate to dynamically construct FSMs in real time based on perception data extracted from the UI screen, allowing the GUI agents to track navigation progress and flow, validate action outcomes through pre- and post-conditions of the states, and recover from errors by rolling back to previously stable states. Our evaluation results on two challenging cross-app benchmarks, Mobile-Eval-E and SPA-Bench, show that MAPLE outperforms the state-of-the-art baseline, improving task success rate by up to 12%, recovery success by 13.8%, and action accuracy by 6.5%. Our results highlight the importance of structured state modeling in guiding mobile GUI agents during task execution. Moreover, our FSM representation can be integrated into future GUI agent architectures as a lightweight, model-agnostic memory layer to support structured planning, execution verification, and error recovery.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Graphical user interface (GUI) agents have advanced rapidly but still struggle with complex tasks involving novel UI elements, long-horizon actions, and personalized trajectories. In this work, we introduce Instruction Agent, a GUI agent that leverages expert demonstrations to solve such tasks, enabling completion of otherwise difficult workflows. Given a single demonstration, the agent extracts step-by-step instructions and executes them by strictly following the trajectory intended by the user, which avoids making mistakes during execution. The agent leverages the verifier and backtracker modules further to improve robustness. Both modules are critical to understand the current outcome from each action and handle unexpected interruptions(such as pop-up windows) during execution. Our experiments show that Instruction Agent achieves a 60% success rate on a set of tasks in OSWorld that all top-ranked agents failed to complete. The Instruction Agent offers a practical and extensible framework, bridging the gap between current GUI agents and reliable real-world GUI task automation.

This work examines whether activating latent subspaces in language models (LLMs) can steer scientific code generation toward a specific programming language. Five causal LLMs were first evaluated on scientific coding prompts to quantify their baseline bias among four programming languages. A static neuron-attribution method, perturbing the highest activated MLP weight for a C++ or CPP token, proved brittle and exhibited limited generalization across prompt styles and model scales. To address these limitations, a gradient-refined adaptive activation steering framework (G-ACT) was developed: per-prompt activation differences are clustered into a small set of steering directions, and lightweight per-layer probes are trained and refined online to select the appropriate steering vector. In LLaMA-3.2 3B, this approach reliably biases generation towards the CPP language by increasing the average probe classification accuracy by 15% and the early layers (0-6) improving the probe classification accuracy by 61.5% compared to the standard ACT framework. For LLaMA-3.3 70B, where attention-head signals become more diffuse, targeted injections at key layers still improve language selection. Although per-layer probing introduces a modest inference overhead, it remains practical by steering only a subset of layers and enables reproducible model behavior. These results demonstrate a scalable, interpretable and efficient mechanism for concept-level control for practical agentic systems.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

We introduce Refusal Steering, an inference-time method to exercise fine-grained control over Large Language Models refusal behaviour on politically sensitive topics without retraining. We replace fragile pattern-based refusal detection with an LLM-as-a-judge that assigns refusal confidence scores and we propose a ridge-regularized variant to compute steering vectors that better isolate the refusal--compliance direction. On Qwen3-Next-80B-A3B-Thinking, our method removes the refusal behaviour of the model around politically sensitive topics while maintaining safety on JailbreakBench and near-baseline performance on general benchmarks. The approach generalizes across 4B and 80B models and can also induce targeted refusals when desired. We analize the steering vectors and show that refusal signals concentrate in deeper layers of the transformer and are distributed across many dimensions. Together, these results demonstrate that activation steering can remove political refusal behaviour while retaining safety alignment for harmful content, offering a practical path to controllable, transparent moderation at inference time.

MLLM-based mobile GUI agents have made substantial progress on short-horizon tasks, yet remain unreliable on long-horizon tasks that require retaining intermediate facts across many steps and app transitions. We attribute this limitation to ReAct-style prompting, which passively accumulates per-step records, leading to prompt explosion and dilution of critical cross-app facts. To address this, we introduce MemGUI-Agent, an end-to-end long-horizon mobile GUI agent with proactive context management. MemGUI-Agent is built on Context-as-Action (ConAct), which casts context management as first-class actions emitted by the same policy that selects UI actions. Instead of passively appending history, ConAct maintains three structured context fields: folded action history, folded UI state, and recent step record, preserving critical UI facts while keeping context compact. To make proactive context management learnable across model scales, we construct MemGUI-3K, a 2,956-trajectory dataset with full ConAct annotations for supervised training and offline analysis. Training an 8B model on MemGUI-3K produces MemGUI-8B-SFT, an 8B MemGUI-Agent that achieves the best open-data 8B performance on MemGUI-Bench and generalizes to the out-of-distribution MobileWorld benchmark. Code, data, and trained models will be released at https://memgui-agent.github.io/.

Web-based agents powered by large language models are increasingly used for tasks such as email management or professional networking. Their reliance on dynamic web content, however, makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: adversarial instructions hidden in interface elements that persuade the agent to divert from its original task. We introduce the Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark (TRAP), a benchmark for studying how persuasion techniques misguide autonomous web agents on realistic tasks. Across six frontier models, agents are susceptible to prompt injection in 25% of tasks on average (13% for GPT-5 to 43% for DeepSeek-R1), with small interface or contextual changes often doubling success rates and revealing systemic, psychologically driven vulnerabilities in web-based agents. We also provide a modular social-engineering injection framework with controlled experiments on high-fidelity website clones, allowing for further benchmark expansion.

Modern machine learning systems rely on complex data engineering workflows to extract, transform, and load (ELT) data into production pipelines. However, constructing these pipelines remains time-consuming and requires substantial expertise in data infrastructure and orchestration frameworks. Recent advances in large language model (LLM) agents offer a potential path toward automating these workflows, but existing approaches struggle with under-specified user intent, unreliable tool generation, and limited guarantees of executable outputs. We introduce kRAIG, an AI agent that translates natural language specifications into production-ready Kubeflow Pipelines (KFP). To resolve ambiguity in user intent, we propose ReQuesAct (Reason, Question, Act), an interaction framework that explicitly clarifies intent prior to pipeline synthesis. The system orchestrates end-to-end data movement from diverse sources and generates task-specific transformation components through a retrieval-augmented tool synthesis process. To ensure data quality and safety, kRAIG incorporates LLM-based validation stages that verify pipeline integrity prior to execution. Our framework achieves a 3x improvement in extraction and loading success and a 25 percent increase in transformation accuracy compared to state-of-the-art agentic baselines. These improvements demonstrate that structured agent workflows with explicit intent clarification and validation significantly enhance the reliability and executability of automated data engineering pipelines.