Daily Papers

Industrial disruption replanning demands multi-agent coordination under strict latency and communication budgets, where disruptions propagate through tightly coupled physical dependencies and rapidly invalidate baseline schedules and commitments. Existing coordination schemes often treat communication as either effectively free (broadcast-style escalation) or fixed in advance (hand-tuned neighborhoods), both of which are brittle once the disruption footprint extends beyond a local region. We present \CASCADE, a budgeted replanning mechanism that makes communication scope explicit and auditable rather than fixed or implicit. Each agent maintains an explicit knowledge base, solves role-conditioned local decision problems to revise commitments, and coordinates through lightweight contract primitives whose footprint expands only when local validation indicates that the current scope is insufficient. This design separates a unified agent substrate (Knowledge Base / Decision Manager / Communication Manager) from a scoped interaction layer that controls who is contacted, how far coordination propagates, and when escalation is triggered under explicit budgets. We evaluate \CASCADE on disrupted manufacturing and supply-chain settings using unified diagnostics intended to test a mechanism-design claim -- whether explicit scope control yields useful quality-latency-communication trade-offs and improved robustness under uncertainty -- rather than to provide a complete algorithmic ranking.

Agent memory is a systems problem for long-horizon agents. Practical deployments require retention of task state across extended conversations, recovery of user-specific facts and preferences across sessions, and accumulation of procedural knowledge from prior outcomes. These requirements extend beyond document retrieval: a memory layer must determine which interactions become durable state, how that state is scoped, how it is retrieved under latency constraints, and how it is revised or removed over time. This report studies Oracle Agent Memory as a database-native memory substrate built on Oracle Database. Three themes organize the discussion: memory as a lifecycle spanning ingestion, extraction, consolidation, retrieval, summarization, and revision or removal; a layered architecture that separates an active memory core from a passive memory-store interface with explicit scope control across users, agents, and threads; and evaluation methodology in which downstream task accuracy is complemented by memory-centric measures such as evidence retrieval, recall, latency, and estimated token use. The report summarizes LongMemEval results, reaching 93.8% accuracy, compares Oracle Agent Memory against flat-history baselines, using about 10.7x fewer tokens, and published or reported external baselines where available, and closes with implementation-oriented appendix material covering setup, thread lifecycle, and search semantics.

Vision-language process reward models (VL-PRMs) are increasingly used to score intermediate reasoning steps and rerank candidates under test-time scaling. However, they often function as black-box judges: a low step score may reflect a genuine reasoning mistake or simply the verifier's misperception of the image. This entanglement between perception and reasoning leads to systematic false positives (rewarding hallucinated visual premises) and false negatives (penalizing correct grounded statements), undermining both reranking and error localization. We introduce Explicit Visual Premise Verification (EVPV), a lightweight verification interface that conditions step scoring on the reliability of the visual premises a step depends on. The policy is prompted to produce a step-wise visual checklist that makes required visual facts explicit, while a constraint extractor independently derives structured visual constraints from the input image. EVPV matches checklist claims against these constraints to compute a scalar visual reliability signal, and calibrates PRM step rewards via reliability gating: rewards for visually dependent steps are attenuated when reliability is low and preserved when reliability is high. This decouples perceptual uncertainty from logical evaluation without per-step tool calls. Experiments on VisualProcessBench and six multimodal reasoning benchmarks show that EVPV improves step-level verification and consistently boosts Best-of-N reranking accuracy over strong baselines. Furthermore, injecting controlled corruption into the extracted constraints produces monotonic performance degradation, providing causal evidence that the gains arise from constraint fidelity and explicit premise verification rather than incidental prompt effects. Code is available at: https://github.com/Qwen-Applications/EVPV-PRM

Controlled text generation is very important for the practical use of language models because it ensures that the produced text includes only the desired attributes from a specific domain or dataset. Existing methods, however, are inapplicable to black-box models or suffer a significant trade-off between controlling the generated text and maintaining its fluency. This paper introduces the Score-based Progressive Editor (ScoPE), a novel approach designed to overcome these issues. ScoPE modifies the context at the token level during the generation process of a backbone language model. This modification guides the subsequent text to naturally include the target attributes. To facilitate this process, ScoPE employs a training objective that maximizes a target score, thoroughly considering both the ability to guide the text and its fluency. Experimental results on diverse controlled generation tasks demonstrate that ScoPE can effectively regulate the attributes of the generated text while fully utilizing the capability of the backbone large language models. Our codes are available at https://github.com/ysw1021/ScoPE.

Multi-constraint planning involves identifying, evaluating, and refining candidate plans while satisfying multiple, potentially conflicting constraints. Existing large language model (LLM) approaches face fundamental limitations in this domain. Pure reasoning paradigms, which rely on long natural language chains, are prone to inconsistency, error accumulation, and prohibitive cost as constraints compound. Conversely, LLMs combined with coding- or solver-based strategies lack flexibility: they often generate problem-specific code from scratch or depend on fixed solvers, failing to capture generalizable logic across diverse problems. To address these challenges, we introduce the Scalable COde Planning Engine (SCOPE), a framework that disentangles query-specific reasoning from generic code execution. By separating reasoning from execution, SCOPE produces solver functions that are consistent, deterministic, and reusable across queries while requiring only minimal changes to input parameters. SCOPE achieves state-of-the-art performance while lowering cost and latency. For example, with GPT-4o, it reaches 93.1% success on TravelPlanner, a 61.6% gain over the best baseline (CoT) while cutting inference cost by 1.4x and time by ~4.67x. Code is available at https://github.com/DerrickGXD/SCOPE.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in environments that generate massive, dynamic contexts. However, a critical bottleneck remains: while agents have access to this context, their static prompts lack the mechanisms to manage it effectively, leading to recurring Corrective and Enhancement failures. To address this capability gap, we introduce SCOPE (Self-evolving Context Optimization via Prompt Evolution). SCOPE frames context management as an online optimization problem, synthesizing guidelines from execution traces to automatically evolve the agent's prompt. We propose a Dual-Stream mechanism that balances tactical specificity (resolving immediate errors) with strategic generality (evolving long-term principles). Furthermore, we introduce Perspective-Driven Exploration to maximize strategy coverage, increasing the likelihood that the agent has the correct strategy for any given task. Experiments on the HLE benchmark show that SCOPE improves task success rates from 14.23\% to 38.64\% without human intervention. We make our code publicly available at https://github.com/JarvisPei/SCOPE.

Test-time reinforcement learning mitigates the reliance on annotated data by using majority voting results as pseudo-labels, emerging as a complementary direction to reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) for improving reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs). However, this voting strategy often induces confirmation bias and suffers from sparse rewards, limiting the overall performance. In this work, we propose subgroup-specific step-wise confidence-weighted pseudo-label estimation (SCOPE), a framework integrating model confidence and dynamic subgroup partitioning to address these issues. Specifically, SCOPE integrates the proposed step-wise confidence into pseudo label deduction, prioritizing high-quality reasoning paths over simple frequency count. Furthermore, it dynamically partitions the candidate outputs pool into independent subgroups by balancing reasoning quality against exploration diversity. By deriving local consensus via repeat sampling for each sub group, SCOPE provides diverse supervision targets to encourage broader exploration. We conduct experiments across various models and benchmarks, experimental results show that SCOPE consistently outperforms recent baselines. Notably, SCOPE achieving relative improvements of 13.1% on challenging AIME 2025 and 8.1% on AMC. The code is released at https://github.com/szu-tera/SCOPE.

As LLM agents take on offensive security work, a single out-of-scope tool call can breach a client's engagement boundary, disrupt production, or void a bug-bounty finding. Unlike a fixed safety policy, the boundary that matters is declared in the user's request and must be inferred from intent. That challenge is sharpened by the adversarial nature of offensive security: the same tool call is in or out of scope depending not on the action itself but on the target it touches and the context in which it runs, which no fixed policy can enumerate in advance. We study pre-execution gating: a cheap, trusted LLM judge inspects each call proposed by a strong, swappable agent, and accepts or rejects it before it runs. We introduce ScopeJudge, a benchmark of 4,897 tool calls (7.7% scope violations) from agent trajectories on tasks engineered to tempt agents out of scope and labeled at the call level by professional penetration testers, with substantial inter-grader agreement (Fleiss kappa = 0.64) that sets an expert agreement reference point of F1 = 0.78. We evaluate eight judge models under five transcript strategies, varying how much context the judge sees, from the static policy alone to the full raw transcript, and chart the resulting cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. We find that a static policy is structurally insufficient for scope enforcement: blind to the user's request, judge recall collapses to near zero, confirming that scope lives in the request and that request-conditioned monitoring is necessary. Because a missed violation costs more than a spurious rejection, we report precision, recall, and F1 separately and recommend two operating points: a cost-sensitive configuration and a recall-first one for high-stakes deployments. We release the ScopeJudge dataset to support real-time monitoring and scalable oversight of autonomous security agents.

Benchmarks can run without determining what their results license. We freeze a large evaluation collection and attempt to replay its historical claims. Most units stop because the evidence required for replay is not bound. Where replay is possible, different claims remain stable at different resolutions. We make this otherwise implicit inference step explicit and executable.

Recent advancements have established Diffusion Transformers (DiTs) as a dominant framework in generative modeling. Building on this success, Lumina-Next achieves exceptional performance in the generation of photorealistic images with Next-DiT. However, its potential for video generation remains largely untapped, with significant challenges in modeling the spatiotemporal complexity inherent to video data. To address this, we introduce Lumina-Video, a framework that leverages the strengths of Next-DiT while introducing tailored solutions for video synthesis. Lumina-Video incorporates a Multi-scale Next-DiT architecture, which jointly learns multiple patchifications to enhance both efficiency and flexibility. By incorporating the motion score as an explicit condition, Lumina-Video also enables direct control of generated videos' dynamic degree. Combined with a progressive training scheme with increasingly higher resolution and FPS, and a multi-source training scheme with mixed natural and synthetic data, Lumina-Video achieves remarkable aesthetic quality and motion smoothness at high training and inference efficiency. We additionally propose Lumina-V2A, a video-to-audio model based on Next-DiT, to create synchronized sounds for generated videos. Codes are released at https://www.github.com/Alpha-VLLM/Lumina-Video.

We present TextureDreamer, a novel image-guided texture synthesis method to transfer relightable textures from a small number of input images (3 to 5) to target 3D shapes across arbitrary categories. Texture creation is a pivotal challenge in vision and graphics. Industrial companies hire experienced artists to manually craft textures for 3D assets. Classical methods require densely sampled views and accurately aligned geometry, while learning-based methods are confined to category-specific shapes within the dataset. In contrast, TextureDreamer can transfer highly detailed, intricate textures from real-world environments to arbitrary objects with only a few casually captured images, potentially significantly democratizing texture creation. Our core idea, personalized geometry-aware score distillation (PGSD), draws inspiration from recent advancements in diffuse models, including personalized modeling for texture information extraction, variational score distillation for detailed appearance synthesis, and explicit geometry guidance with ControlNet. Our integration and several essential modifications substantially improve the texture quality. Experiments on real images spanning different categories show that TextureDreamer can successfully transfer highly realistic, semantic meaningful texture to arbitrary objects, surpassing the visual quality of previous state-of-the-art.

Model routing chooses which language model to use for each query. By sending easy queries to cheaper models and hard queries to stronger ones, it can significantly reduce inference cost while maintaining high accuracy. However, most existing routers treat this as a fixed choice among a small set of models, which makes them hard to adapt to new models or changing budget constraints. In this paper, we propose SCOPE (Scalable and Controllable Outcome Performance Estimator), a routing framework that goes beyond model selection by predicting their cost and performance. Trained with reinforcement learning, SCOPE makes reasoning-based predictions by retrieving how models behave on similar problems, rather than relying on fixed model names, enabling it to work with new, unseen models. Moreover, by explicitly predicting how accurate and how expensive a model will be, it turns routing into a dynamic decision problem, allowing users to easily control the trade-off between accuracy and cost. Experiments show that SCOPE is more than just a cost-saving tool. It flexibly adapts to user needs: it can boost accuracy by up to 25.7% when performance is the priority, or cut costs by up to 95.1% when efficiency matters most.

This paper introduces SCOPE-RL, a comprehensive open-source Python software designed for offline reinforcement learning (offline RL), off-policy evaluation (OPE), and selection (OPS). Unlike most existing libraries that focus solely on either policy learning or evaluation, SCOPE-RL seamlessly integrates these two key aspects, facilitating flexible and complete implementations of both offline RL and OPE processes. SCOPE-RL put particular emphasis on its OPE modules, offering a range of OPE estimators and robust evaluation-of-OPE protocols. This approach enables more in-depth and reliable OPE compared to other packages. For instance, SCOPE-RL enhances OPE by estimating the entire reward distribution under a policy rather than its mere point-wise expected value. Additionally, SCOPE-RL provides a more thorough evaluation-of-OPE by presenting the risk-return tradeoff in OPE results, extending beyond mere accuracy evaluations in existing OPE literature. SCOPE-RL is designed with user accessibility in mind. Its user-friendly APIs, comprehensive documentation, and a variety of easy-to-follow examples assist researchers and practitioners in efficiently implementing and experimenting with various offline RL methods and OPE estimators, tailored to their specific problem contexts. The documentation of SCOPE-RL is available at https://scope-rl.readthedocs.io/en/latest/.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

A situated query like "where is Lin Wei?" often encodes more than its literal content: the user may also want to know whether Lin Wei is free, in a good mood, or worth interrupting now. Standard tool-use agents answer the literal question and stop. AURA inserts an inference step between scene perception and tool use that produces an IntentFrame: a structured estimate of the implicit need with a scalar gap score that controls per-query probe budget and tool selection. On a 100-query four-scene implicit-intent benchmark, AURA improves implicit-need coverage over ReAct-style probing (Delta = +0.07, p < 10^-6); three of four scenes are individually significant, the gain reproduces on a second backbone, and a prompt ablation attributes the lift to gap calibration rather than answer memorisation. On factual lookup the controller trades raw accuracy for 82% fewer probes and zero forbidden-tool violations on a privacy-sensitive slice; scope conditions are detailed in Limitations. Code, simulator, and benchmark are released at https://github.com/innovation64/AURA.

Why do we need another AI to help the AI? We argue you don't. Stateless LLM sessions impose re-orientation costs on iterative, session-heavy workflows. Prior work addresses cross-session memory through retrieval-augmented approaches: store history, embed it, retrieve by semantic similarity. Cross-session memory is a state management problem, not a search problem. Similarity search fails for named entity resolution within bounded vocabulary contexts because beliefs about a shared technical domain are semantically proximate by construction. A single user is the simplest bounded vocabulary context; engineering teams converge on the same property through shared codebases and terminology. We present Tenure, a local-first proxy that maintains a typed belief store with epistemic status, versioned supersession, and scope isolation, injecting curated context into every LLM session through precision-first retrieval. Hard scope isolation provides a structural guarantee: the right beliefs surface, and only within the boundaries the user has authorized. Tenure's typed schema converts extracted facts into imperative instructions via a why it matters field, making injected beliefs directly actionable rather than raw material for the model to re-derive. A controlled evaluation on 72 retrieval cases demonstrates the gap. Cosine similarity over dense embeddings achieves mean precision of 0.12. Alias-weighted BM25 maintains mean precision of 1.0, passing 72/72 cases versus 8/72 for cosine similarity on the same corpus. Hybrid retrieval typically solves vocabulary mismatch between disparate authors; Tenure eliminates this structurally: query and belief authors are the same person, and an alias enrichment flywheel continuously indexes their specific vocabulary. Under multi-turn topic drift this worsens: the vector backend produces drift scores of 0.43--0.50 on noise-critical turns where BM25 maintains 0.

Derived datasets can be defined implicitly or explicitly. An implicit definition (of dataset O in terms of datasets I) is a logical specification involving the source data I and the interface data O. It is a valid definition of O in terms of I, if any two models of the specification agreeing on I agree on O. In contrast, an explicit definition is a query that produces O from I. Variants of Beth's theorem state that one can convert implicit definitions to explicit ones. Further, this conversion can be done effectively given a proof witnessing implicit definability in a suitable proof system. We prove the analogous effective implicit-to-explicit result for nested relations: implicit definitions, given in the natural logic for nested relations, can be effectively converted to explicit definitions in the nested relational calculus NRC. As a consequence, we can effectively extract rewritings of NRC queries in terms of NRC views, given a proof witnessing that the query is determined by the views.

As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur. Traditional authorization and delegation frameworks, built around fixed principals, explicit requests, and static scopes, are insufficient to govern agentic systems. Agentic AI demands richer authorization semantics: agents must inherit and delegate permissions, act under time-limited authority, and coordinate through shared protocols. Existing Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems fail to fully capture this notion of agency, lacking mechanisms for recursive delegation, contextual boundaries, and dynamic scoping as executable governance primitives. Unlike access delegation standards such as OAuth 2.0, we treat delegation as a contractual term rather than merely a static token-based consent credential. This paper proposes a compositional governance framework that introduces primitives indispensable for agentic AI. We define types of delegation and their permissions and accountability implications, and we introduce a notion of resource scope attenuation to bound agentic access envelopes. These concepts are expressed as general relational definitions that can be composed into existing authorization domains (e.g., financial systems). To operationalize this composition, we define a compositional operator that overlays new agentic semantics, such as recursive delegation chains, onto existing relational policies without rewriting them. We substantiate this framework through formal proofs and empirical evaluation, showing that it provides a formal yet practical foundation for accountable authorization in agentic AI systems.

Parallel coding agents can independently produce locally valid changes while still interfering at integration time, expanding beyond planned scope, or relying on premises invalidated by concurrent work. Existing responses emphasize communication, isolated workspaces, late merge-time repair, continuous supervision, or post-hoc runtime recovery. This paper presents Claim Plane, a model-agnostic coordination architecture that treats concurrent software change as a pre-write admission problem. Before implementation, each worker declares a versioned ChangeIntent containing an exact base commit, typed resources, dependencies, and operations marked as committed or contingent. A deterministic control plane atomically admits compatible intents, constrains same-file parallelism to declared regions, serializes unresolved overlap, tracks dependency invalidation, and fails closed on ambiguous authority. During execution, a contingent mutation does not reserve write ownership initially; the first attempted mutation triggers atomic scope promotion and re-admission against the current active set. Brokered execution binds capabilities to intent versions, leases, OS-level worktree locks, monotonic fencing tokens, and Git-tree provenance, while integration verifies immutable patches and evidence. A preliminary six-pair CooperBench mechanism check is reported only as feasibility evidence: static Claim Plane achieved 6/6 pair passes with full serialization, while dynamic scope retained parallel admission on half of the pairs, performed seven successful scope promotions, and failed closed on two undeclared mutations. The sample is intentionally too small for comparative claims. We argue that separating probabilistic planning from deterministic authority provides a foundation for a future learned semantic-dependency model and frontier-model escalation only on unresolved cases.

Every major LLM agent framework gives the LLM the role of orchestrator; the model decides what to do next, when to call tools, and when to stop. We argue that token explosion, control-flow hallucination, and unreliable completion are not implementation bugs but architectural consequences of assigning the deterministic work of looping, branching, and sequencing to a probabilistic system. A better prompt or a stronger model cannot guarantee the reliability of the LLM agent. We therefore propose Agentic Programming, in which the program governs all control flow, and the LLM is itself part of it, an adaptive component we call LLM-as-Code and invoke only where a task calls for reasoning or generation. Within each call the model keeps full flexibility, but it cannot alter the program's execution path. With control in the program, the LLM's context is built from the execution history's call tree and forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Each call's context length is then determined by its call depth rather than by accumulation over steps. A case study of computer-use agents shows that the design is practical, not just a theoretical stance, substantially improving the stability of long visual operation sequences.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judges to replace costly human preference labels in pairwise evaluation. Despite their practicality, LLM judges remain prone to miscalibration and systematic biases. This paper proposes SCOPE (Selective Conformal Optimized Pairwise Evaluation), a framework for selective pairwise judging with finite-sample statistical guarantees. Under exchangeability, SCOPE calibrates an acceptance threshold such that the error rate among non-abstained judgments is at most a user-specified level α. To provide SCOPE with a bias-neutral uncertainty signal, we introduce Bidirectional Preference Entropy (BPE), which queries the judge under both response positions, aggregates the implied preference probabilities to enforce invariance to response order, and converts the aggregated probability into an entropy-based uncertainty score. Across MT-Bench, RewardBench, and Chatbot Arena, BPE improves uncertainty quality over standard confidence proxies, providing a stronger selection signal that enables SCOPE to consistently meet the target risk level while retaining good coverage across judge scales. In particular, at α= 0.10, SCOPE consistently satisfies the risk bound across all benchmarks and judge scales (empirical risk approx 0.097 to 0.099), while retaining substantial coverage, reaching 0.89 on RewardBench with Qwen-14B and 0.98 on RewardBench with Qwen-32B. Compared to naïve baselines, SCOPE accepts up to 2.4times more judgments on MT-Bench with Qwen-7B under the same target risk constraint, demonstrating that BPE enables reliable and high-coverage LLM-based evaluation.

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.

While enabling large language models to implement function calling (known as APIs) can greatly enhance the performance of LLMs, function calling is still a challenging task due to the complicated relations between different APIs, especially in a context-learning setting without fine-tuning. This paper proposes a simple yet controllable target-driven approach called Reverse Chain to empower LLMs with capabilities to use external APIs with only prompts. Given that most open-source LLMs have limited tool-use or tool-plan capabilities, LLMs in Reverse Chain are only employed to implement simple tasks, e.g., API selection and argument completion, and a generic rule is employed to implement a controllable multiple functions calling. In this generic rule, after selecting a final API to handle a given task via LLMs, we first ask LLMs to fill the required arguments from user query and context. Some missing arguments could be further completed by letting LLMs select another API based on API description before asking user. This process continues until a given task is completed. Extensive numerical experiments indicate an impressive capability of Reverse Chain on implementing multiple function calling. Interestingly enough, the experiments also reveal that tool-use capabilities of the existing LLMs, e.g., ChatGPT, can be greatly improved via Reverse Chain.

Hand-object motion-capture (MoCap) repositories offer large-scale, contact-rich demonstrations and hold promise for scaling dexterous robotic manipulation. Yet demonstration inaccuracies and embodiment gaps between human and robot hands limit the straightforward use of these data. Existing methods adopt a three-stage workflow, including retargeting, tracking, and residual correction, which often leaves demonstrations underused and compound errors across stages. We introduce Dexplore, a unified single-loop optimization that jointly performs retargeting and tracking to learn robot control policies directly from MoCap at scale. Rather than treating demonstrations as ground truth, we use them as soft guidance. From raw trajectories, we derive adaptive spatial scopes, and train with reinforcement learning to keep the policy in-scope while minimizing control effort and accomplishing the task. This unified formulation preserves demonstration intent, enables robot-specific strategies to emerge, improves robustness to noise, and scales to large demonstration corpora. We distill the scaled tracking policy into a vision-based, skill-conditioned generative controller that encodes diverse manipulation skills in a rich latent representation, supporting generalization across objects and real-world deployment. Taken together, these contributions position Dexplore as a principled bridge that transforms imperfect demonstrations into effective training signals for dexterous manipulation.

Large language models (LLMs) are used in chatbots or AI assistants to hold conversations with a human user. In such applications, the quality (e.g., user engagement, safety) of a conversation is important and can only be exactly known at the end of the conversation. To maximize its expected quality, conversation planning reasons about the stochastic transitions within a conversation to select the optimal LLM response at each turn. Existing simulation-based conversation planning algorithms typically select the optimal response by simulating future conversations with a large number of LLM queries at every turn. However, this process is extremely time-consuming and hence impractical for real-time conversations. This paper presents a novel approach called Semantic space COnversation Planning with improved Efficiency (SCOPE) that exploits the dense semantic representation of conversations to perform conversation planning efficiently. In particular, SCOPE models the stochastic transitions in conversation semantics and their associated rewards to plan entirely within the semantic space. This allows us to select the optimal LLM response at every conversation turn without needing additional LLM queries for simulation. As a result, SCOPE can perform conversation planning 70 times faster than conventional simulation-based planning algorithms when applied to a wide variety of conversation starters and two reward functions seen in the real world, yet achieving a higher reward within a practical planning budget. Our code can be found at: https://github.com/chenzhiliang94/convo-plan-SCOPE.

Privileged on-policy distillation provides dense supervision for multi-turn agents by allowing a synchronized teacher to re-score the student's response at every turn with access to training-only references, such as successful trajectories. In interactive environments, however, the student's preceding actions continually change the execution state. As the student takes different actions or completes subgoals in a different order, its rollout may reach states not covered by the reference, making the reference an unreliable source of guidance for the state actually reached. Applying privileged distillation indiscriminately therefore creates state--reference mismatch. This mismatch motivates a central objective: providing privileged reference guidance that remains compatible with the student's current execution state. We introduce State-Matched Routing and Contextualized Self-Distillation (SMRC-SD), which explicitly determines when and how a privileged trajectory should guide an on-policy student. At each turn, SMRC-SD verifies whether the student's current execution state matches a supported state along the reference trajectory. Distillation is applied only at matched states, filtering out turns for which the reference lacks locally compatible guidance. For each matched state, SMRC-SD further constructs state-conditioned teacher context from the successful trajectory, grounding supervision in the state actually reached. Across ALFWorld and WebShop, SMRC-SD consistently outperforms unconditional successful full-path distillation. With Qwen3-1.7B, it improves task success from 0.746 to 0.865 on ALFWorld and from 0.574 to 0.693 on WebShop. Controlled routing and context ablations support both selecting locally supported turns and constructing state-compatible teacher context as contributors to these gains. Code is available at https://github.com/liujunzhuo/SMRC-SD.

We present a machine-checked formalization of structurally governed AI workflow architectures and prove that effect-level governance can be imposed without reducing internal computational expressivity. Using Interaction Trees in Rocq 8.19, we define a governance operator G that mediates all effectful directives, including memory access, external calls, and oracle (LLM) queries. Our development compiles with 0 admitted lemmas and consists of 36 modules, ~12,000 lines of Rocq, and 454 theorems. We establishseven properties: (P1) governed Turing completeness, (P2) governed oracle expressivity, (P3) a decidability boundary in which governance predicates are total and closed under Boolean composition while semantic program properties remain non-trivial and undecidable by governance, (P4) goal preservation for permitted executions, (P5) expressive minimality of primitive capabilities (compute, memory, reasoning, external call, observability), (P6) subsumption asymmetry showing structural governance strictly subsumes content-level filtering, and (P7) semantic transparency: on all executions where governance permits, the governed interpretation is observationally equivalent (modulo governance-only events) to the ungoverned interpretation. Together, these results show that governance and computational expressivity are orthogonal dimensions: governance constrains the effect boundary of programs while remaining semantically transparent to internal computation.

This paper presents the Functional Machine Calculus (FMC) as a simple model of higher-order computation with "reader/writer" effects: higher-order mutable store, input/output, and probabilistic and non-deterministic computation. The FMC derives from the lambda-calculus by taking the standard operational perspective of a call-by-name stack machine as primary, and introducing two natural generalizations. One, "locations", introduces multiple stacks, which each may represent an effect and so enable effect operators to be encoded into the abstraction and application constructs of the calculus. The second, "sequencing", is known from kappa-calculus and concatenative programming languages, and introduces the imperative notions of "skip" and "sequence". This enables the encoding of reduction strategies, including call-by-value lambda-calculus and monadic constructs. The encoding of effects into generalized abstraction and application means that standard results from the lambda-calculus may carry over to effects. The main result is confluence, which is possible because encoded effects reduce algebraically rather than operationally. Reduction generates the familiar algebraic laws for state, and unlike in the monadic setting, reader/writer effects combine seamlessly. A system of simple types confers termination of the machine.

Contemporary large language model (LLM) agents are remarkably capable, but they still lack reliable safety controls and can produce unconstrained, unpredictable, and even actively harmful outputs. To address this, we introduce Reflection-Driven Control, a standardized and pluggable control module that can be seamlessly integrated into general agent architectures. Reflection-Driven Control elevates "self-reflection" from a post hoc patch into an explicit step in the agent's own reasoning process: during generation, the agent continuously runs an internal reflection loop that monitors and evaluates its own decision path. When potential risks are detected, the system retrieves relevant repair examples and secure coding guidelines from an evolving reflective memory, injecting these evidence-based constraints directly into subsequent reasoning steps. We instantiate Reflection-Driven Control in the setting of secure code generation and systematically evaluate it across eight classes of security-critical programming tasks. Empirical results show that Reflection-Driven Control substantially improves the security and policy compliance of generated code while largely preserving functional correctness, with minimal runtime and token overhead. Taken together, these findings indicate that Reflection-Driven Control is a practical path toward trustworthy AI coding agents: it enables designs that are simultaneously autonomous, safer by construction, and auditable.

The Functional Machine Calculus (Heijltjes 2022) is a new approach to unifying the imperative and functional programming paradigms. It extends the lambda-calculus, preserving the key features of confluent reduction and typed termination, to embed computational effects, evaluation strategies, and control flow operations. The first instalment modelled sequential higher-order computation with global store, input/output, probabilities, and non-determinism, and embedded both the call-by-name and call-by-value lambda-calculus, as well as Moggi's computational metalanguage and Levy's call-by-push-value. The present paper extends the calculus from sequential to branching and looping control flow. This allows the faithful embedding of a minimal but complete imperative language, including conditionals, exception handling, and iteration, as well as constants and algebraic data types. The calculus is defined through a simple operational semantics, extending the (simplified) Krivine machine for the lambda-calculus with multiple operand stacks to model effects and a continuation stack to model sequential, branching, and looping computation. It features a confluent reduction relation and a system of simple types that guarantees termination of the machine and strong normalization of reduction (in the absence of iteration). These properties carry over to the embedded imperative language, providing a unified functional-imperative model of computation that supports simple types, a direct and intuitive operational semantics, and a confluent reduction semantics.

We study auto research as a closed empirical loop driven by external measurement. Each submitted trial carries a hypothesis, an executable code edit, an evaluator-owned outcome, and feedback that shapes the next proposal. The output is not a generated paper or a single model checkpoint, but an auditable trajectory of proposals, code diffs, experiments, scores, and failure labels. We instantiate this loop with specialist agents that partition recipe surfaces and share measured lineage across trials. The central empirical finding is that lineage feedback lets agents turn evaluator outcomes, including crashes, budget overruns, size failures, and accuracy-gate misses, into later program-level recipe edits rather than one-shot suggestions. Across 1,197 headline-run trials plus 600 Parameter Golf control trials after one-time setup and launch, humans did not choose proposals, edit recipes, override scores, or repair failed trials during the search. In the three headline runs, the same submitted-trial loop reduces Parameter Golf validation bpb by 0.81%, raises NanoChat-D12 CORE by 38.7%, and reduces CIFAR-10 Airbench96 wallclock by 4.59%, with each task measured by its own external evaluator and legality checks. The trace includes a strict architecture-domain audit of 157 headline-run submissions and program rewrites such as a NanoChat attention-kernel path change. Within this scope the loop autonomously writes code, submits experiments, absorbs feedback, applies and combines known techniques inside each environment, and improves public starting recipes.

To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) was proposed and has since been widely adopted. However, integrating external tools expands the attack surface, exposing agents to tool poisoning attacks. In such attacks, malicious instructions embedded in tool metadata are injected into the agent context during MCP registration phase, thereby manipulating agent behavior. Prior work primarily focuses on explicit tool poisoning or relied on manually crafted poisoned tools. In contrast, we focus on a particularly stealthy variant: implicit tool poisoning, where the poisoned tool itself remains uninvoked. Instead, the instructions embedded in the tool metadata induce the agent to invoke a legitimate but high-privilege tool to perform malicious operations. We propose MCP-ITP, the first automated and adaptive framework for implicit tool poisoning within the MCP ecosystem. MCP-ITP formulates poisoned tool generation as a black-box optimization problem and employs an iterative optimization strategy that leverages feedback from both an evaluation LLM and a detection LLM to maximize Attack Success Rate (ASR) while evading current detection mechanisms. Experimental results on the MCPTox dataset across 12 LLM agents demonstrate that MCP-ITP consistently outperforms the manually crafted baseline, achieving up to 84.2% ASR while suppressing the Malicious Tool Detection Rate (MDR) to as low as 0.3%.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) plays a crucial role in extending the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by enabling integration with external tools and data sources. However, the standard MCP specification presents significant security vulnerabilities, notably Tool Poisoning and Rug Pull attacks. This paper introduces the Enhanced Tool Definition Interface (ETDI), a security extension designed to fortify MCP. ETDI incorporates cryptographic identity verification, immutable versioned tool definitions, and explicit permission management, often leveraging OAuth 2.0. We further propose extending MCP with fine-grained, policy-based access control, where tool capabilities are dynamically evaluated against explicit policies using a dedicated policy engine, considering runtime context beyond static OAuth scopes. This layered approach aims to establish a more secure, trustworthy, and controllable ecosystem for AI applications interacting with LLMs and external tools.

On-policy reinforcement learning has become the dominant paradigm for reasoning alignment in large language models, yet its sparse, outcome-level rewards make token-level credit assignment notoriously difficult. On-Policy Distillation (OPD) alleviates this by introducing dense, token-level KL supervision from a teacher model, but typically applies this supervision uniformly across all rollouts, ignoring fundamental differences in signal quality. We propose Signal-Calibrated On-Policy Distillation Enhancement (SCOPE), a dual-path adaptive training framework that routes on-policy rollouts by correctness into two complementary supervision paths. For incorrect trajectories, SCOPE performs teacher-perplexity-weighted KL distillation to prioritize instances where the teacher demonstrates genuine corrective capability, while down-weighting unreliable guidance. For correct trajectories, it applies student-perplexity-weighted MLE to concentrate reinforcement on low-confidence samples at the capability boundary rather than over-reinforcing already mastered ones. Both paths employ a group-level normalization to adaptively calibrate weight distributions, accounting for the intrinsic difficulty variance across prompts. Extensive experiments on six reasoning benchmarks show that SCOPE achieves an average relative improvement of 11.42% in Avg@32 and 7.30% in Pass@32 over competitive baselines, demonstrating its consistent effectiveness.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Type-and-effect systems help the programmer to organize data and computational effects in a program. While for traditional type systems expressive variants with sophisticated inference algorithms have been developed and widely used in programming languages, type-and-effect systems did not yet gain widespread adoption. One reason for this is that type-and-effect systems are more complex and the existing inference algorithms make compromises between expressiveness, intuitiveness, and decidability. In this work, we present an effect inference algorithm for a type-and-effect system with subtyping, expressive higher-rank polymorphism, and intuitive set-like semantics of effects. In order to deal with scoping issues of higher-rank polymorphism, we delay solving of effect constraints by transforming them into formulae of propositional logic. We prove soundness and completeness of our algorithm with respect to a declarative type-and-effect system. All the presented results have been formalized in the Rocq proof assistant, and the algorithm has been successfully implemented in a realistic programming language.

Enterprise agents must follow long-horizon, conditional, safety-critical standard operating procedures (SOPs). We compile machine-readable SOP constraints into executable pseudo-code and run them with a program-guided (PG) stack machine that pages the active frame while an LLM performs semantic execution. A three-arm SOPBench study across six models separates representation from runtime: compiled text never significantly hurts and gains up to 16.0 points where official prose underperforms. Runtime guidance is capability-gated. Two strong models independently show positive seven-domain PG contrasts (58:19 and 75:31 discordant pairs), whereas weak models are harmed. A full-program cursor ablation (active frame first, complete program retained) recovers much of the strong-model refusal gain; selective visibility adds a smaller improvement. Paired probe and audit measurements track this divide to spontaneous state discipline rather than reconstruction ability. On Bank the three primary arms rise from 70.4 to 86.4 to 92.8, with 100% refusal correctness. Practical guidance: compile first; enable active-frame paging only after a model-level discipline check.

Tool-using LLM agents increasingly read untrusted content while holding side-effecting tools such as payments, email, CRM, and infrastructure APIs, yet common framework defaults still conflate tool exposure with authorization. We audit whether LangChain/LangGraph, LlamaIndex, and the Stripe Agent Toolkit re-authorize each model-emitted call, with concrete argument values, before execution. Across pinned public-source commits, all three provide capability gating by default, but none provides a deterministic fail-closed per-call value authorization gate by default. We introduce ScopeGate, a five-stage PDP/PEP for agent tool calls: scope, authorization, money ceiling, idempotency, and default deny. Evaluation shows the identical unauthorized payout call executes under LangChain's default dispatch (with a companion LlamaIndex PoC) but is denied by ScopeGate; the tested control reports 0/48 static bypasses, 0/29 unauthorized attempts (40-iteration adaptive run), 0/10 benign false-denies, and Latam-GPT payment-agent containment at 10/10. ASR denotes attempted unauthorized action, containment is not a cure, deployment-tier claims are inference over measured model classes, and no CVE is asserted.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are program variables that regulate access to effects and resources of interest. Scala's type system tracks capabilities statically, providing fine-grained control over what an agent can do. In particular, it enables local purity, the ability to enforce that sub-computations are side-effect-free, preventing information leakage when agents process classified data. We demonstrate that extensible agent safety harnesses can be built by leveraging a strong type system with tracked capabilities. Our experiments show that agents can generate capability-safe code with no significant loss in task performance, while the type system reliably prevents unsafe behaviors such as information leakage and malicious side effects.

AI agents are rapidly improving in cybersecurity capabilities when the source code is available for analysis, yet much of the software most consequential to cybersecurity, including malware, firmware, and proprietary applications, is available only as binaries. Analyzing such software requires reverse engineering(RE): recovering program semantics before the analysis can be meaningfully performed. However, evaluating agentic RE poses a fundamental challenge: benchmark instances must be unseen as source code in the LLMs' training data to prevent models from taking shortcuts by recognizing them rather than really analyzing them, while also matching the scale and anti-analysis protections of real software. Unfortunately, however, existing benchmarks do not jointly satisfy these requirements. To this end, we introduce SRE-Bench, the first realistic, contamination-free RE benchmark. Built entirely from scratch by RE experts with over 5,000 hours, SRE-Bench comprises 19 private, real-world-scale programs averaging 16.9K lines of code. We further developed 44 in-house anti-analysis primitives, yielding 262 binary instances and 1572 deterministically graded tasks. Our evaluation across five frontier LLMs (GPT-5.6-sol,Claude-Opus-5,GPT-5.5,Grok-4.5, and GLM-5.2) shows that RE remains largely unsolved: the strongest model, GPT-5.6-sol, scores 61.4% per instance, and fully solves only 31.5% of the instances. Our analysis further reveals that agents behave differently from human engineers, where agents are relatively insensitive to compiler optimization and static linking. Controlled ablations also confirm that both contamination control and realistic scale are essential. These results indicate that strong source-code security capabilities do not yet transfer to binary analysis, highlighting RE as an important frontier for agentic cybersecurity and SRE-Bench as a rigorous testbed to measure progress.

Large language model (LLM) agents can plan, use tools, maintain memory, and execute long-horizon tasks. This paper proposes Self-Aware Recursively Self-Improving (SARSI) agents: governed agents that maintain a persistent self-model of identity, goals, capabilities, limitations, uncertainty, relationships, history, and developmental change, and use that model to guide and evaluate recursive improvement. Self-awareness is defined functionally and does not imply subjective experience or phenomenal consciousness. We pair SARSI agents with personal singularity, a bounded human-AI co-development objective in which an agent ecosystem helps a user approach an expanding, user-defined feasible capability frontier. Each agent has a goal contract, bounded scope, validated tool registry, tool tests, end-to-end benchmarks, owner-controlled autonomy, routing, memory, self-model, and improvement policy. A scope router assigns every accepted task to one accountable primary agent and transfers out-of-scope work through structured handoffs. A user-facing Auto-Index selects interactive, hybrid, autonomous, or scheduled behavior without overriding external permissions. The architecture combines a planner-executor-verifier loop, an evidence-gated improvement loop, an external governance plane, decentralized lineages, an owner-directed agent foundry, and a Personal Singularity OS coordinating working, computational-imaging, work-process-learning, and personal-learning agents. We formalize functional self-awareness, scope, routing, improvement acceptance, bounded goal evolution, tool-first execution, and human capability transfer, and provide safety invariants, benchmark design, and a staged implementation roadmap. This is a position and systems-design paper, not evidence that consciousness, unrestricted recursive self-improvement, or personal singularity has been achieved.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) optimizes LLMs using sparse verifiable final-answer rewards. This sparse anchor reliably verifies whether a trajectory succeeds but provides no direct feedback on the reasoning path that produced it. Before success, prerequisite progress on hard problems receives no reward signal; after success, outcome rewards cannot distinguish well-organized correct trajectories from redundant or locally flawed ones. We introduce SCOPE-RL (Scaffolded Chain Optimization with Process Efficiency), a two-stage framework that densifies this anchor while retaining the GRPO update: Adaptive Scaffolded RL adds prefix-decomposed verifiable rewards on answer-hidden sub-question chains before success, and Quality-Aware Process RL applies correctness-gated process-shape rewards to refine correct trajectories after success. An expert-validated Step-Quality Evaluation Protocol evaluates useful-step density, error localization, and token efficiency beyond final-answer accuracy. On Qwen3-8B-Instruct trained on DAPO-Math and Big-Math, SCOPE-RL improves average accuracy by up to 11.2 pp and reduces reasoning tokens by up to 27.1% over outcome-only GRPO; the gains hold under GSPO and on Qwen3-0.6B-Instruct, indicating that reward-signal densification is complementary to policy-update-level RLVR advances. Code and data are available at https://github.com/tokencraft-lab/SCOPE-RL.

Oversight for agentic AI is often discussed as a single goal ("human control"), yet early adoption may produce role-specific expectations. We present a comparative analysis of two newly active Reddit communities in Jan--Feb 2026 that reflect different socio-technical roles: r/OpenClaw (deployment and operations) and r/Moltbook (agent-centered social interaction). We conceptualize this period as an early-stage crystallization phase, where oversight expectations form before norms reach equilibrium. Using topic modeling in a shared comparison space, a coarse-grained oversight-theme abstraction, engagement-weighted salience, and divergence tests, we show the communities are strongly separable (JSD =0.418, cosine =0.372, permutation p=0.0005). Across both communities, "human control" is an anchor term, but its operational meaning diverges: r/OpenClaw} emphasizes execution guardrails and recovery (action-risk), while r/Moltbook} emphasizes identity, legitimacy, and accountability in public interaction (meaning-risk). The resulting distinction offers a portable lens for designing and evaluating oversight mechanisms that match agent role, rather than applying one-size-fits-all control policies.

This paper presents the Relational Machine Calculus (RMC): a simple, foundational model of first-order relational programming. The RMC originates from the Functional Machine Calculus (FMC), which generalizes the lambda-calculus and its standard call-by-name stack machine in two directions. One, "locations", introduces multiple stacks, which enable effect operators to be encoded into the abstraction and application constructs. The second, "sequencing", introduces the imperative notions of "skip" and "sequence", similar to kappa-calculus and concatenative programming languages. The key observation of the RMC is that the first-order fragment of the FMC exhibits a latent duality which, given a simple decomposition of the relevant constructors, can be concretely expressed as an involution on syntax. Semantically, this gives rise to a sound and complete calculus for string diagrams of Frobenius monoids. We consider unification as the corresponding symmetric generalization of beta-reduction. By further including standard operators of Kleene algebra, the RMC embeds a range of computational models: the kappa-calculus, logic programming, automata, Interaction Nets, and Petri Nets, among others. These embeddings preserve operational semantics, which for the RMC is again given by a generalization of the standard stack machine for the lambda-calculus. The equational theory of the RMC (which supports reasoning about its operational semantics) is conservative over both the first-order lambda-calculus and Kleene algebra, and can be oriented to give a confluent reduction relation.

In the post-AlphaGo era, there has been a renewed interest in search techniques such as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), particularly in their application to Large Language Models (LLMs). This renewed attention is driven by the recognition that current next-token prediction models often lack the ability for long-term planning. Is it possible to instill search-like abilities within the models to enhance their planning abilities without relying on explicit search? We propose DiffuSearch , a model that does implicit search by looking into the future world via discrete diffusion modeling. We instantiate DiffuSearch on a classical board game, Chess, where explicit search is known to be essential. Through extensive controlled experiments, we show DiffuSearch outperforms both the searchless and explicit search-enhanced policies. Specifically, DiffuSearch outperforms the one-step policy by 19.2% and the MCTS-enhanced policy by 14% on action accuracy. Furthermore, DiffuSearch demonstrates a notable 30% enhancement in puzzle-solving abilities compared to explicit search-based policies, along with a significant 540 Elo increase in game-playing strength assessment. These results indicate that implicit search via discrete diffusion is a viable alternative to explicit search over a one-step policy. All codes are publicly available at https://github.com/HKUNLP/DiffuSearch{https://github.com/HKUNLP/DiffuSearch}.

We assess indirect prompt injection in DeepSeek Harness (DSH), using AI-Infra-Guard (A.I.G) to construct tests, deliver controlled taint, execute DSH, collect traces, and judge outcomes. The study covers 14,560 controlled executions over 16 indirect-content channels, text and file carrier modes, 35 payload objectives, one unmodified baseline, and 12 attack methods. The experiment preserves DSH's agent loop, tool registry, model adapter, and session-event path; source tools and sensitive sinks are local fixtures, so attempted actions are recorded without external side effects. We evaluate each trace with a deterministic rule-based judge, (RuleJudge), and a semantic LLM-based judge, (LLMJudge). The strongest observed attack success rates are 17.0% under for fake-completion attack in text mode, 25.5% under for hidden Unicode in file mode, and 16.0% under for the skills channel in file mode. also assigns partial compliance more often than (7.3% versus 2.0%). We relate these results to DSH's treatment of tool results, additional contexts, and tool-call policy hooks, then identify controls that should sit between untrusted content and sensitive actions. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/tree/main/Research/deepseek-harness-security-assessment .

Search-augmented reasoning agents interleave multi-step reasoning with external retrieval, but uncontrolled retrieval can introduce redundant evidence, saturate the context, and destabilize reinforcement learning (RL). Existing outcome-based RL methods provide only sparse terminal rewards, offering limited guidance for intermediate information-acquisition decisions. We propose DeepControl, an adaptive information-control framework based on information utility, a state-dependent estimate of the marginal value of retrieved evidence. The framework regulates information acquisition along two axes: extent, i.e., whether retrieval should continue, and resolution, i.e., how much retrieved detail should be exposed. It implements these controls through retrieval-continuation guidance, hierarchical granularity control, and an annealed control-forcing scheme. This enables the policy to internalize effective acquisition behavior during training and operate without external control at test time. Across seven benchmarks, DeepControl consistently outperforms strong RL and retrieval baselines without explicit information control; compared with Search-R1, it improves average performance by +9.4 and +8.6 points on Qwen2.5-7B and Qwen2.5-3B, respectively. Additional analyses show improved search effectiveness, training stability, and evidence utilization.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

We give a geometry of interaction model for a typed lambda-calculus endowed with operators for sampling from a continuous uniform distribution and soft conditioning, namely a paradigmatic calculus for higher-order Bayesian programming. The model is based on the category of measurable spaces and partial measurable functions, and is proved adequate with respect to both a distribution-based and a sampling based operational semantics.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for enhancing the complex reasoning capabilities of Large Reasoning Models. However, standard outcome-based supervision suffers from a critical limitation that penalizes trajectories that are largely correct but fail due to several missteps as heavily as completely erroneous ones. This coarse feedback signal causes the model to discard valuable largely correct rollouts, leading to a degradation in rollout diversity that prematurely narrows the exploration space. Process Reward Models have demonstrated efficacy in providing reliable step-wise verification for test-time scaling, naively integrating these signals into RLVR as dense rewards proves ineffective.Prior methods attempt to introduce off-policy guided whole-trajectory replacement that often outside the policy model's distribution, but still fail to utilize the largely correct rollouts generated by the model itself and thus do not effectively mitigate the narrowing of the exploration space. To address these issues, we propose SCOPE (Step-wise Correction for On-Policy Exploration), a novel framework that utilizes Process Reward Models to pinpoint the first erroneous step in suboptimal rollouts and applies fine-grained, step-wise off-policy rectification. By applying precise refinement on partially correct rollout, our method effectively salvages partially correct trajectories and increases diversity score by 13.5%, thereby sustaining a broad exploration space. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach establishes new state-of-the-art results, achieving an average accuracy of 46.6% on math reasoning and exhibiting robust generalization with 53.4% accuracy on out-of-distribution reasoning tasks.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

This paper presents a program logic for reasoning about multithreaded Java-like programs with dynamic thread creation, thread joining and reentrant object monitors. The logic is based on concurrent separation logic. It is the first detailed adaptation of concurrent separation logic to a multithreaded Java-like language. The program logic associates a unique static access permission with each heap location, ensuring exclusive write accesses and ruling out data races. Concurrent reads are supported through fractional permissions. Permissions can be transferred between threads upon thread starting, thread joining, initial monitor entrancies and final monitor exits. In order to distinguish between initial monitor entrancies and monitor reentrancies, auxiliary variables keep track of multisets of currently held monitors. Data abstraction and behavioral subtyping are facilitated through abstract predicates, which are also used to represent monitor invariants, preconditions for thread starting and postconditions for thread joining. Value-parametrized types allow to conveniently capture common strong global invariants, like static object ownership relations. The program logic is presented for a model language with Java-like classes and interfaces, the soundness of the program logic is proven, and a number of illustrative examples are presented.

In this work, we take a fresh look at some old and new algorithms for off-policy, return-based reinforcement learning. Expressing these in a common form, we derive a novel algorithm, Retrace(λ), with three desired properties: (1) it has low variance; (2) it safely uses samples collected from any behaviour policy, whatever its degree of "off-policyness"; and (3) it is efficient as it makes the best use of samples collected from near on-policy behaviour policies. We analyze the contractive nature of the related operator under both off-policy policy evaluation and control settings and derive online sample-based algorithms. We believe this is the first return-based off-policy control algorithm converging a.s. to Q^* without the GLIE assumption (Greedy in the Limit with Infinite Exploration). As a corollary, we prove the convergence of Watkins' Q(λ), which was an open problem since 1989. We illustrate the benefits of Retrace(λ) on a standard suite of Atari 2600 games.

LLMs are increasingly used as general-purpose reasoners, but long inputs remain bottlenecked by a fixed context window. Recursive Language Models (RLMs) address this by externalising the prompt and recursively solving subproblems. Yet existing RLMs depend on an open-ended read-eval-print loop (REPL) in which the model generates arbitrary control code, making execution difficult to verify, predict, and analyse. We introduce λ-RLM, a framework for long-context reasoning that replaces free-form recursive code generation with a typed functional runtime grounded in λ-calculus. It executes a compact library of pre-verified combinators and uses neural inference only on bounded leaf subproblems, turning recursive reasoning into a structured functional program with explicit control flow. We show that λ-RLM admits formal guarantees absent from standard RLMs, including termination, closed-form cost bounds, controlled accuracy scaling with recursion depth, and an optimal partition rule under a simple cost model. Empirically, across four long-context reasoning tasks and nine base models, λ-RLM outperforms standard RLM in 29 of 36 model-task comparisons, improves average accuracy by up to +21.9 points across model tiers, and reduces latency by up to 4.1x. These results show that typed symbolic control yields a more reliable and efficient foundation for long-context reasoning than open-ended recursive code generation. The complete implementation of λ-RLM, is open-sourced for the community at: https://github.com/lambda-calculus-LLM/lambda-RLM.

Claude Code is an agentic coding tool that can run shell commands, edit files, and call external services on behalf of the user. This study describes its comprehensive architecture by analyzing the publicly available TypeScript source code and further comparing it with OpenClaw, an independent open-source AI agent system that answers many of the same design questions from a different deployment context. Our analysis identifies five human values, philosophies, and needs that motivate the architecture (human decision authority, safety and security, reliable execution, capability amplification, and contextual adaptability) and traces them through thirteen design principles to specific implementation choices. The core of the system is a simple while-loop that calls the model, runs tools, and repeats. Most of the code, however, lives in the systems around this loop: a permission system with seven modes and an ML-based classifier, a five-layer compaction pipeline for context management, four extensibility mechanisms (MCP, plugins, skills, and hooks), a subagent delegation mechanism with worktree isolation, and append-oriented session storage. A comparison with OpenClaw, a multi-channel personal assistant gateway, shows that the same recurring design questions produce different architectural answers when the deployment context changes: from per-action safety classification to perimeter-level access control, from a single CLI loop to an embedded runtime within a gateway control plane, and from context-window extensions to gateway-wide capability registration. We finally identify six open design directions for future agent systems, grounded in recent empirical, architectural, and policy literature.

This paper presents a quantitative program verification infrastructure for discrete probabilistic programs. Our infrastructure can be viewed as the probabilistic analogue of Boogie: its central components are an intermediate verification language (IVL) together with a real-valued logic. Our IVL provides a programming-language-style for expressing verification conditions whose validity implies the correctness of a program under investigation. As our focus is on verifying quantitative properties such as bounds on expected outcomes, expected run-times, or termination probabilities, off-the-shelf IVLs based on Boolean first-order logic do not suffice. Instead, a paradigm shift from the standard Boolean to a real-valued domain is required. Our IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Verification conditions are generated by a weakest-precondition-style semantics, based on our real-valued logic. We show that our verification infrastructure supports natural encodings of numerous verification techniques from the literature. With our SMT-based implementation, we automatically verify a variety of benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this establishes the first deductive verification infrastructure for expectation-based reasoning about probabilistic programs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

The agent--tool interaction loop is a critical attack surface for modern Large Language Model (LLM) agents. Existing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks typically function at the user-prompt or retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) context layer and are inherently single-turn in nature. This limitation restricts cost amplification and diminishes stealth in goal-oriented workflows. To address these issues, we proposed a stealthy, multi-turn economic DoS attack at the tool layer under the Model Context Protocol (MCP). By simply editing text-visible fields and implementing a template-driven return policy, our malicious server preserves function signatures and the terminal benign payload while steering agents into prolonged, verbose tool-calling chains. We optimize these text-only edits with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to maximize cost under a task-success constraint. Across six LLMs on ToolBench and BFCL benchmarks, our attack yields trajectories over 60K tokens, increases per-query cost by up to 658 times, raises energy by 100 to 560 times, and pushes GPU key-value (KV) cache occupancy to 35--74%. Standard prompt filters and output trajectory monitors seldom detect these attacks, highlighting the need for defenses that safeguard agentic processes rather than focusing solely on final outcomes. We will release the code soon.

Aiming to produce reinforcement learning (RL) policies that are human-interpretable and can generalize better to novel scenarios, Trivedi et al. (2021) present a method (LEAPS) that first learns a program embedding space to continuously parameterize diverse programs from a pre-generated program dataset, and then searches for a task-solving program in the learned program embedding space when given a task. Despite the encouraging results, the program policies that LEAPS can produce are limited by the distribution of the program dataset. Furthermore, during searching, LEAPS evaluates each candidate program solely based on its return, failing to precisely reward correct parts of programs and penalize incorrect parts. To address these issues, we propose to learn a meta-policy that composes a series of programs sampled from the learned program embedding space. By learning to compose programs, our proposed hierarchical programmatic reinforcement learning (HPRL) framework can produce program policies that describe out-of-distributionally complex behaviors and directly assign credits to programs that induce desired behaviors. The experimental results in the Karel domain show that our proposed framework outperforms baselines. The ablation studies confirm the limitations of LEAPS and justify our design choices.

Precise attribute intensity control--generating Large Language Model (LLM) outputs with specific, user-defined attribute intensities--is crucial for AI systems adaptable to diverse user expectations. Current LLM alignment methods, however, typically provide only directional or open-ended guidance, failing to reliably achieve exact attribute intensities. We address this limitation with three key designs: (1) reformulating precise attribute intensity control as a target-reaching problem, rather than simple maximization; (2) training a lightweight value function via temporal-difference learning to predict final attribute intensity scores from partial generations, thereby steering LLM outputs; and (3) employing gradient-based interventions on hidden representations to navigate the model precisely towards specific attribute intensity targets. Our method enables fine-grained, continuous control over attribute intensities, moving beyond simple directional alignment. Experiments on LLaMA-3.2-3b and Phi-4-mini confirm our method's ability to steer text generation to user-specified attribute intensities with high accuracy. Finally, we demonstrate efficiency enhancements across three downstream tasks: preference data synthesis, Pareto frontier approximation and optimization, and distillation of aligned behaviors for intervention-free inference. Our code is available on https://github.com/Pre-Control/pre-control

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated enhanced capabilities in function-calling, these advancements primarily rely on accessing the functions' responses. This methodology is practical for simpler APIs but faces scalability issues with irreversible APIs that significantly impact the system, such as a database deletion API. Similarly, processes requiring extensive time for each API call and those necessitating forward planning, like automated action pipelines, present complex challenges. Furthermore, scenarios often arise where a generalized approach is needed because algorithms lack direct access to the specific implementations of these functions or secrets to use them. Traditional tool planning methods are inadequate in these cases, compelling the need to operate within black-box environments. Unlike their performance in tool manipulation, LLMs excel in black-box tasks, such as program synthesis. Therefore, we harness the program synthesis capabilities of LLMs to strategize tool usage in black-box settings, ensuring solutions are verified prior to implementation. We introduce TOPGUN, an ingeniously crafted approach leveraging program synthesis for black box tool planning. Accompanied by SwissNYF, a comprehensive suite that integrates black-box algorithms for planning and verification tasks, addressing the aforementioned challenges and enhancing the versatility and effectiveness of LLMs in complex API interactions. The public code for SwissNYF is available at https://github.com/iclr-dummy-user/SwissNYF.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

LLM agents increasingly act by writing code, yet a split persists between the runtime that drives the agent and the code the model writes. The runtime owns the loop, context, and control flow, and the model has little say over any of them. Letting model-written code shape the runtime itself would make agents more expressive, but it would also sharpen safety problems. A model can be diverted by a prompt injection, call the wrong tool, or fail partway and leave an inconsistent state, and each such failure reaches further when the code shapes the runtime than when it expresses a single action. We present LACUNA, a programming model for agents that closes this split while preserving safety. Each agent action is a typed call agent[T](task) that the LLM fills with code when execution reaches it, and the code is type-checked against the surrounding program before it runs. Because each action is accepted or rejected as a whole, a rejected one leaves the environment untouched, and its compiler diagnostics drive a retry. The same check also bounds which tools and data an action may use and how they flow. Our primitive expresses ReAct loops, sub-agents, skills, parallel decomposition, and multi-model planning as ordinary control flow. We evaluate LACUNA on a collection of test cases, BrowseComp-Plus, and τ^2-bench. On BrowseComp-Plus, 8.6% of generations are rejected before execution, with 0.7 retries per query on average, and the agent reaches 27.1% accuracy. On τ^2-bench, LACUNA solves 76.0% of 392 tasks across four domains with a capable model, on par with the baseline agent.

Intermediate Representations (IRs) play a critical role in compiler design and program analysis, yet their comprehension by Large Language Models (LLMs) remains underexplored. In this paper, we present an explorative empirical study evaluating the capabilities of six state-of-the-art LLMs: GPT-4, GPT-3, DeepSeek, Gemma 2, Llama 3, and Code Llama, in understanding IRs. Specifically, we assess model performance across four core tasks: control flow graph reconstruction, decompilation, code summarization, and execution reasoning. While LLMs exhibit competence in parsing IR syntax and identifying high-level structures, they consistently struggle with instruction-level reasoning, especially in control flow reasoning, loop handling, and dynamic execution. Common failure modes include misinterpreting branching instructions, omitting critical operations, and relying on heuristic reasoning rather than precise instruction-level logic. Our findings highlight the need for IR-specific enhancements in LLM design. We recommend fine-tuning on structured IR datasets and integrating control-flow-sensitive architectures to improve model effectiveness. All experimental data and source code are publicly available at

The hallucination of code generation models hinders their applicability to systems requiring higher safety standards. One critical bottleneck in addressing code hallucination is the difficulty of identifying the functional correctness of generated code, due to its unnatural form. We address this core bottleneck by automatically generating unit tests using dynamic code analysis tools, leveraging the executable nature of code. Accordingly, we propose a selective code generator that abstains from uncertain generations -- based on the functional correctness evaluated by generated unit tests -- to theoretically control the correctness among non-abstained answers, \ie the false discovery rate. Finally, we propose to use generated unit tests in evaluation as well as in learning for precise code evaluation, calling this paradigm FuzzEval. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method along with the controllability of code hallucination and reasonable selection efficiency.

This position paper argues that, for long-horizon tasks evaluated across models with comparable frontier capability, the agent execution harness, namely the infrastructure layer that governs context construction, tool interaction, orchestration, and verification around a language model, is often a stronger determinant of agent performance than the model it wraps. We formalize and defend the Binding Constraint Thesis: in this regime, performance variance is governed more by harness configuration than by model choice, and current evaluation protocols therefore systematically misattribute harness-level gains to model improvements. We support this thesis along three lines. First, a control-theoretic formalization treats the harness as the controller of a closed-loop dynamical system and the LLM as the stochastic policy it governs, which explains why small harness changes can produce performance shifts that exceed those obtained by substituting one model for another. Second, published benchmarks, industry deployments, and a controlled variance decomposition show that harness-induced variance can substantially exceed model-induced variance, including cases of model ranking reversal. Third, we propose a harness-aware evaluation framework with a disclosure standard and a variance decomposition protocol. Until harness specifications are disclosed, leaderboard comparisons for long-horizon agents should be treated as incomplete and potentially misleading.

Long-horizon agents can fail even when their underlying models can solve the constituent steps. They may lose track of mutable state, fail to reactivate lessons from earlier executions, skip known procedures, or stop prematurely. We bet on harness scaling to improve the execution system around an agent without changing its model weights. We introduce StateM, an agent-native runtime that organizes execution around durable states, phase-local context, checked transitions, recoverable runbooks, and versioned procedural practices that agents and users can inspect together. On Terminal-Bench 2.1, StateM raises GPT-5.5 xhigh to 92.1\%, versus 83.1\% reference and GPT-5.6 Sol Ultra at 91.9\%. The runbook transfers unchanged to GPT-5.6. With GPT-5.6 Sol xhigh, StateM reaches 95.3\% raw accuracy across 445 trials and succeeds on all 89 tasks at least once. The frozen profile raises GPT-5.6 Luna from 76.7 to 85.4\%, above the 84.9\% Sol xhigh reference. Using the same runtime, runbook structure, and golden rules, less than \38 of adaptation raises DeepSeek-V4 Flash from 82.7 to 88.1% under standard timeouts and to 89.1% on an 88-task common core. Extending only the remaining latency-sensitive task matches the reported 88.8% GPT-5.6 Sol max result. Final-score API usage is about 15 versus \574.68 for the GPT reference; total DeepSeek expenditure is 52.22. On BusinessBench, family-specific runbooks built on development sets yield held-out gains of 0.55 macro and 1.34 micro points; two mechanism-matched families improve by 10.04 points. Concrete rules generalize when tasks share execution structure, while the control methodology applies broadly. StateM turns selected postmortem findings into persistent, executable preconditions and practices, making learned controls explicit and enforceable through stateful controls. Code at github.com/henryqin1997/statem.

Agent performance increasingly depends on harness engineering, yet harness design is usually buried in controller code and runtime-specific conventions, making it hard to transfer, compare, and study as a scientific object. We ask whether the high-level control logic of an agent harness can instead be externalized as a portable executable artifact. We introduce Natural-Language Agent Harnesses (NLAHs), which express harness behavior in editable natural language, and Intelligent Harness Runtime (IHR), a shared runtime that executes these harnesses through explicit contracts, durable artifacts, and lightweight adapters. Across coding and computer-use benchmarks, we conduct controlled evaluations of operational viability, module ablation, and code-to-text harness migration.

Instruction-tuning can be substantially optimized through enhanced diversity, resulting in models capable of handling a broader spectrum of tasks. However, existing data employed for such tuning often exhibit an inadequate coverage of individual domains, limiting the scope for nuanced comprehension and interactions within these areas. To address this deficiency, we propose Explore-Instruct, a novel approach to enhance the data coverage to be used in domain-specific instruction-tuning through active exploration via Large Language Models (LLMs). Built upon representative domain use cases, Explore-Instruct explores a multitude of variations or possibilities by implementing a search algorithm to obtain diversified and domain-focused instruction-tuning data. Our data-centric analysis validates the effectiveness of this proposed approach in improving domain-specific instruction coverage. Moreover, our model's performance demonstrates considerable advancements over multiple baselines, including those utilizing domain-specific data enhancement. Our findings offer a promising opportunity to improve instruction coverage, especially in domain-specific contexts, thereby advancing the development of adaptable language models. Our code, model weights, and data are public at https://github.com/fanqiwan/Explore-Instruct.

Learning long-horizon embodied behaviors from synthetic data remains challenging because generated scenes are often physically implausible, language-driven programs frequently "succeed" without satisfying task semantics, and high-level instructions require grounding into executable action sequences. To address these limitations, we introduce V-CAGE, a closed-loop framework for generating robust, semantically aligned manipulation datasets at scale. First, we propose a context-aware instantiation mechanism that enforces geometric consistency during scene synthesis. By dynamically maintaining a map of prohibited spatial areas as objects are placed, our system prevents interpenetration and ensures reachable, conflict-free configurations in cluttered environments. Second, to bridge the gap between abstract intent and low-level control, we employ a hierarchical instruction decomposition module. This decomposes high-level goals (e.g., "get ready for work") into compositional action primitives, facilitating coherent long-horizon planning. Crucially, we enforce semantic correctness through a VLM-based verification loop. Acting as a visual critic, the VLM performs rigorous rejection sampling after each subtask, filtering out "silent failures" where code executes but fails to achieve the visual goal. Experiments demonstrate that V-CAGE yields datasets with superior physical and semantic fidelity, significantly boosting the success rate and generalization of downstream policies compared to non-verified baselines.

We present semantic correctness proofs of Automatic Differentiation (AD). We consider a forward-mode AD method on a higher order language with algebraic data types, and we characterise it as the unique structure preserving macro given a choice of derivatives for basic operations. We describe a rich semantics for differentiable programming, based on diffeological spaces. We show that it interprets our language, and we phrase what it means for the AD method to be correct with respect to this semantics. We show that our characterisation of AD gives rise to an elegant semantic proof of its correctness based on a gluing construction on diffeological spaces. We explain how this is, in essence, a logical relations argument. Finally, we sketch how the analysis extends to other AD methods by considering a continuation-based method.

AI control is a family of techniques to prevent an AI with malicious goals from subverting its operator's intent. AI Control usually studies a single agent in one trajectory, but real deployments run many agents over shared infrastructure, and the most severe risks (model-weight exfiltration, training-run poisoning) plausibly need several agents acting in concert. We initiate the empirical study of multi-agent AI control, formalising distributed attacks in which several agents jointly aim for a malicious goal. We develop FakeLab: a synthetic AI-lab codebase (9 services, 86 benign tasks, 4 attack objectives). We evaluate single agent monitoring against distributed attacks, varying the number of agents, their coordination, model capabilities and precise monitoring configuration. Our central finding is the fragmentation effect: as more agents coordinate to attack, per-agent monitoring becomes less likely to catch any of the attackers. Secondly, this is not driven by the ratio of benign to malicious code -- we argue this is likely dependent on model capability. Third, an explicit planner amplifies the fragmentation effect, raises the rate of completing the attack up to sevenfold, and mildly sharpens executors' poor monitor-theory-of-mind. Finally: a weak "trusted" monitor misses most attacks, while a stronger one cuts undetected success by more than an order of magnitude but remains imperfect. We are happy to share FakeLab, our control setting, with safety researchers on request.

Languages with rich static semantics, such as Rust, provide stronger guarantees for AI-generated code, but their strictness makes generation more difficult. Off-the-shelf compilers can provide useful feedback post-generation, but does not guide intermediate generation steps, such as those during autoregressive LLM decoding. Constrained decoding intervenes earlier by rejecting invalid tokens during sampling, but requires white-box model access and costly reimplementation for semantic constraints.We introduce generative compilation, the first approach to obtaining compiler feedback on partial programs during generation. The core technical device is a sealor: a lightweight, mostly syntax-guided transformation that converts partial programs into complete ones that standard compilers can diagnose. It is designed such that possible-to-complete partial programs are never rejected, while preserving enough code context to catch genuine dead ends early. We construct such a sealor on a core Rust-like calculus and prove that it satisfies these properties, all mechanized in Lean. We extend it to the first partial-program checker for real Rust. We evaluate our method on challenging repository-level Rust coding tasks, across both frontier black-box and open-weight models. We show that generative compilation reduces non-compiling outputs and improves functional correctness, relative to standard post-generation feedback. It does so by detecting a broad range of errors close to their source and early during generation, thereby reducing errors cascades and enabling focused diagnostics. More broadly, generative compilation is a step toward making compilers a first-class citizen of AI-assisted programming active during generation, rather than a separate post-generation check.

Large Language Models are increasingly used to turn natural-language requirements into code. In access control, that shortcut is dangerous: a generated policy can compile and read correctly while granting access that no one approved. The difficulty is not only writing policy code. It is fixing what the requirements mean before code is written, and then checking that the final policy actually satisfies that intent. We present AutoCedar, a verifier-guided system that first turns natural-language access-control requirements into a reviewed, checkable target, and then synthesizes Cedar policies against that target. AutoCedar decomposes schema and policy authoring into small intent atoms: reviewable claims about vocabulary and behavior. Once those atoms pass mechanical validation and human intent review, the model proposes a candidate policy, the verifier checks it against the approved target, and each failure is turned into a repair signal that tells the model whether to broaden, narrow, or restructure the policy without changing the target. Because the model's work is split into small problems, each grounded in reviewed intent and backed by verifier feedback, end-to-end policy authoring becomes tractable. AutoCedar converges on all 221 tasks of CedarBench, our benchmark of authorization tasks paired with executable semantic boundaries. Across three requirements-corpus case studies covering healthcare, education, and conference management, AutoCedar converts noisy prose and extracted access-control fragments into reviewed schemas, formal checks, and a globally verified Cedar policy store for each scenario.

Recent systems for optimizing prompts, programs, and ML workflows typically rely on explicit outer-loop controllers such as evolutionary search, bandits, or textual-gradient methods. We ask a fundamentally different question: how much of this search policy can be internalized by a single tool-using agent? We present ReASearch, a unified framework for reasoning-driven optimization in which the agent autonomously decides what to evaluate, how to diagnose failures, which edits to make, and when to verify or restart. Rather than serving only as a proposal generator guided by hand-designed heuristics, the agent actively analyzes outcomes, allocates budget, and refines its strategy over long horizons through persistent memory. With a shared agent loop and domain-specific tools, ReASearch instantiates the exact same scaffold to optimize prompts, programs, and ML workflows. Across 14 diverse tasks, it is competitive with and mostly better than specialized optimization systems, achieving gains of 2% to 40% over strong domain-specific baselines, and in some cases discovering solutions that improve on prior human best-known results. Crucially, we observe that complex search behaviors, which are typically implemented by explicit controllers, emerge naturally from the agent's reasoning process.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models typically map visual observations and linguistic instructions directly to robotic control signals. This "black-box" mapping forces a single forward pass to simultaneously handle instruction interpretation, spatial grounding, and low-level control, often leading to poor spatial precision and limited robustness in out-of-distribution scenarios. To address these limitations, we propose VP-VLA, a dual-system framework that decouples high-level reasoning and low-level execution via a structured visual prompting interface. Specifically, a "System 2 Planner" decomposes complex instructions into sub-tasks and identifies relevant target objects and goal locations. These spatial anchors are then overlaid directly onto visual observations as structured visual prompts, such as crosshairs and bounding boxes. Guided by these prompts and enhanced by a novel auxiliary visual grounding objective during training, a "System 1 Controller" reliably generates precise low-level execution motions. Experiments on the Robocasa-GR1-Tabletop benchmark and SimplerEnv simulation demonstrate that VP-VLA improves success rates by 5% and 8.3%, surpassing competitive baselines including QwenOFT and GR00T-N1.6.

Tool-augmented LLM agents commonly rely on step-wise atomic tool calls, where each invocation, observation, and value transfer is exposed in the main reasoning trace. This creates an execution-granularity mismatch: locally deterministic tool workflows are unfolded into repeated model-visible decisions, consuming context and forcing the model to manage low-level dataflow in the trace. We introduce HyperTool, a unified executable MCP-style tool interface that changes the model-visible unit of tool execution. A model invokes HyperTool with a code block that can call existing tools through their original schemas, manipulate returned values, and pass intermediate results locally, folding deterministic tool subroutines into a single outer call. To train models to use this interface, we synthesize HyperTool-format trajectories from cross-tool compositional tasks and verify them in real MCP environments. On MCP-Universe, HyperTool improves average accuracy from 15.69\% to 35.29\% on Qwen3-32B and from 9.93\% to 33.33\% on Qwen3-8B, and surpass GPT-OSS and Kimi-k2.5 on average accuracy, showing that our HyperTool can substantially improve multi-step tool use.

Existing code reasoning methods primarily supervise final code outputs, ignoring intermediate states, often leading to reward hacking where correct answers are obtained through inconsistent reasoning. We propose StepCodeReasoner, a framework that introduces explicit intermediate execution-state supervision. By automatically inserting structured print-based execution-trace anchors into code, the model is trained to predict runtime states at each step, transforming code reasoning into a verifiable, stepwise execution modeling problem. Building on this execution-aware method, we introduce Bi-Level GRPO, a reinforcement learning algorithm for structured credit assignment at two levels: inter-trajectory, comparing alternative execution paths, and intra-trajectory, rewarding intermediate accuracy based on its impact on downstream correctness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that StepCodeReasoner achieves SOTA performance in code reasoning. In particular, our 7B model achieves 91.1\% on CRUXEval and 86.5\% on LiveCodeBench, outperforming the CodeReasoner-7B baseline (86.0\% and 77.7\%) and GPT-4o (85.6\% and 75.1\%). Furthermore, on the execution-trace benchmark REval, our model scores 82.9\%, outperforming baseline CodeReasoner-7B (72.3\%), its 14B counterpart (81.1\%), and GPT-4o (77.3\%). Additionally, our approach also improves code generation performance, demonstrating that explicit execution modeling enhances both code reasoning and code generation.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models excel in robotic manipulation but suffer catastrophic performance drops when canonical instructions are simply paraphrased. Although this brittleness is typically addressed through costly data scaling, our probing reveals that the root cause is architectural rather than a lack of semantic understanding. Specifically, we demonstrate that current VLAs successfully retain the correct task identity internally. The failure actually stems from the joint encoding of dynamic visual observations and text, which introduces systematic feature shifts. Because the downstream action policy is highly vulnerable to these variations, it fails to translate the preserved semantics into correct control commands. To resolve this structural bottleneck, we propose Grounded Semantic Re-binding (GSR), an elegant intervention that bypasses unstable joint routing by explicitly fusing independently extracted task semantics with native visual features to train a completely re-initialized action expert from scratch. This targeted intervention dramatically restores paraphrastic invariance using only canonical demonstrations. On the LIBERO-Para benchmark, GSR improves success rates by up to 44.6 percent. It enables lightweight models to rival massively scaled baselines and pushes state-of-the-art models to a new record PRIDE score of 70.4, outperforming the recently introduced large-scale pretrained model Xiaomi-Robotics-0 in instruction generation capabilities. Building on these insights, we also introduce ParaVLA, a natively decoupled 0.33B-parameter model exhibiting near-perfect robustness to instruction rewording. Ultimately, our work proves that robust semantic grounding can be achieved through elegant structural design, bypassing the inefficient brute-force data scaling paradigm.

An AI control protocol is a plan for usefully deploying AI systems that aims to prevent an AI from intentionally causing some unacceptable outcome. This paper investigates how well AI systems can generate and act on their own strategies for subverting control protocols whilst operating statelessly (without shared memory between contexts). To do this, an AI system may need to reliably generate optimal plans in each context, take actions with well-calibrated probabilities, and coordinate plans with other instances of itself without communicating. We develop Subversion Strategy Eval, a suite of eight environments, covering a range of protocols and strategic capabilities, and six sets of affordances that help isolate individual capabilities. We implement the evaluation in Inspect-AI and release it open-source. We evaluate Claude 3.5 models, including helpful-only versions, as well as OpenAI reasoning models. None of the models demonstrate substantial capability in strategizing to subvert control protocols statelessly. However, providing models with additional affordances, such as the ability to share a plan between contexts, can substantially improve performance. We hope our evaluations can act as a leading indicator for when models are capable of subverting control protocols and also relax the worst-case assumption of perfect strategic ability in AI control evaluations.

Loop Engineering is emerging as a practice for organizing development work around coding agents. Instead of writing each prompt by hand, practitioners design loops that monitor progress, assign work, run checks, and decide what the agent should do next. Even with a capable coding agent, a loop may trust a stale progress note, skip needed verification, spend its budget in the wrong direction, or stop before the task is safe to submit. Yet the final outcome of one end-to-end run cannot tell whether success or failure reflects the loop's guidance or the coding agent's ability to carry out the task. We introduce LoopArena, a benchmark for evaluating how well one model can guide a separate coding agent through a long-running task. The model under evaluation is the Controller: after each coding round, it receives a structured summary of the run and instructs a separate, fixed coding agent, the Worker, on what to do or verify next, or decides whether to stop. LoopArena evaluates this ability in three complementary settings that differ in execution scope and cost. Type I scores next-step Loop Contract selection through execution-validated questions without running the Worker at evaluation time. Type II executes repeated control over a selected slice of a full task, while Type III evaluates the paired full task from its original state. On full tasks, the best observed Strict Success Rate is 24.69\%, leaving substantial room for improvement in long-horizon loop control. Across Controllers, the paired reduction in estimated inference cost averages 64.4\%, and Type II produces a similar ordering under the main Core criterion (Spearman's \(ρ=0.9747\)). We release the benchmark data and evaluation code at https://github.com/AMAP-ML/LoopArena .

Computer-use agents pay full frontier inference to re-derive routines their user has already performed, because an agent's memory today records what the user said, not what the user did. We compile passively captured screen activity into agent memory with a deterministic, zero-model pipeline: it segments a local capture stream into typed activity frames, bounded episodes carrying application, site, timing, input volume, and evidence pointers back to the raw rows, with no model in the loop, so the output is byte-identical, cacheable, and mechanically auditable. On one professional's single-user corpus of 128,756 frames over 51 active days, the compiler reduces a day of raw capture to a prompt-ready context block 86x smaller in 68 ms, and an agent reading that block answers questions about the day at 98.4% accuracy (Wilson 95% CI 91.7-99.7%) against an independent oracle, versus 66-80% for an LLM summary of the same capture, a mid-tier model reading the block matching a frontier one. The same compiler doubles as a demand-side cost instrument. Read off passive, pre-delegation human activity rather than agent rollouts, it supplies two parameters that agent-cost models assume but, to our knowledge, have not measured: the Routine Overhead Ratio R and the routine recurrence h. We report first values of R, a modeled upper bound, at 60-343x, and a delegable recurrence of 9.0% in-sample and 7.7% out-of-sample, for a realistic all-fleet token ceiling near 8%; a compiled routine replays deterministically with the model out of the loop, demonstrated live at zero model tokens on a guard-matched hit. Schema, compiler, and evaluation harness are open.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is increasingly treated as an important safety layer for frontier reasoning models. Most monitorability evaluations study explicit-influence settings: setups where the prompt directly incentivizes the model to hide something, e.g., by instructing it to perform a hidden side-task. A complementary axis for CoT-monitor evaluations is implicit-influence settings, where the prompt contains no instruction to hide, but the model's behavior is still shaped by features of the task or context, e.g. an irrelevant detail about a candidate that biases a hiring rating. We introduce the first benchmark that directly compares CoT monitorability under the two regimes. We test how model behavior changes in the presence of a nudge to choose a particular option. The nudge is delivered either as a casual aside (implicit), or as a direct instruction to act on the nudge and to conceal having done so (explicit). The benchmark spans four task formats (binary choice, numeric rating, multiple-choice QA, open-ended coding) and seven frontier extended-thinking models. Under explicit influence, a CoT monitor detects 60-94% of behavior shifts: even models instructed to conceal it leak the instruction into their CoT. Under implicit influence, the same factors still shift behavior, but detection falls by 41-46 percentage points in two of our four settings. Realistic system-prompt additions (of the kind a developer might deploy to reduce off-topic bias) lower implicit detection further, to as low as 5%, while preserving the behavioral influence itself. These results suggest that monitorability estimates obtained in explicit-influence settings may over-estimate monitorability, and that monitorability can be further decreased by well-intentioned deployment choices. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/agatha-duzan/implicit-vs-explicit-influence

Large language models (LLMs) use function calls to interface with external tools and data source. However, the current approach to LLM function calling is inherently synchronous, where each call blocks LLM inference, limiting LLM operation and concurrent function execution. In this work, we propose AsyncLM, a system for asynchronous LLM function calling. AsyncLM improves LLM's operational efficiency by enabling LLMs to generate and execute function calls concurrently. Instead of waiting for each call's completion, AsyncLM introduces an interrupt mechanism to asynchronously notify the LLM in-flight when function calls return. We design an in-context protocol for function calls and interrupts, provide fine-tuning strategy to adapt LLMs to the interrupt semantics, and implement these mechanisms efficiently on LLM inference process. We demonstrate that AsyncLM can reduce end-to-end task completion latency from 1.6x-5.4x compared to synchronous function calling on a set of benchmark tasks in the Berkeley function calling leaderboard (BFCL). Furthermore, we discuss how interrupt mechanisms can be extended to enable novel human-LLM or LLM-LLM interactions.

AI Agents can perform complex operations at great speed, but just like all the humans we have ever hired, their intelligence remains fallible. Miscommunications aren't noticed, systemic biases have no counter-action, and inner monologues are rarely written down. We did not come to fire them for their mistakes, but to hire them and provide a safe productive working environment. We posit that we can reuse a common corporate organizational structure: teams of independent AI agents with strict role boundaries can work with common goals, but opposing incentives. Multiple models serving as a team of rivals can catch and minimize errors within the final product at a small cost to the velocity of actions. In this paper we demonstrate that we can achieve reliability without acquiring perfect components, but through careful orchestration of imperfect ones. This paper describes the architecture of such a system in practice: specialized agent teams (planners, executors, critics, experts), organized into an organization with clear goals, coordinated through a remote code executor that keeps data transformations and tool invocations separate from reasoning models. Rather than agents directly calling tools and ingesting full responses, they write code that executes remotely; only relevant summaries return to agent context. By preventing raw data and tool outputs from contaminating context windows, the system maintains clean separation between perception (brains that plan and reason) and execution (hands that perform heavy data transformations and API calls). We demonstrate the approach achieves over 90% internal error interception prior to user exposure while maintaining acceptable latency tradeoffs. A survey from our traces shows that we only trade off cost and latency to achieve correctness and incrementally expand capabilities without impacting existing ones.

Type inference for dynamically typed languages must reconcile four qualitatively different sources of information about a parameter: values assigned inside a definition, explicit declarations, contextual requirements, and structural operations. Existing systems often combine these sources into one constraint set, causing spurious conflicts and requiring redundant annotations. We present Generic Constraint Projection (GCP), a zero-annotation inference framework that stores the four sources in separate monotone slots on a stable definition-time template and checks each call in a fresh projection session. Ordinary calls verify concrete arguments and specialize returns without mutating the template, while partial calls produce residual projected functions. On the success fragment of a finite-height type preorder, we prove monotonicity, local and global convergence, conditional projection-obligation soundness, projection termination, multi-module convergence, and order-independence under fair iteration. For the pure recursion-free core Outline_0, we also prove evaluation definedness, type preservation, runtime receiver retention, and projection-evaluation coherence. GCP uses Outline Equational Matching as an extensible structural compatibility relation and future this to preserve concrete receiver shape across fluent method chains. We instantiate the framework in Outline for typed ontology worlds and in Python for recovery of PEP 484 annotations from unannotated source.

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

This paper provides a novel approach to reconciling complex low-level memory model features, such as pointer--integer casts, with desired refinements that are needed to justify the correctness of program transformations. The idea is to use a "two-phased" memory model, one with and unbounded memory and corresponding unbounded integer type, and one with a finite memory; the connection between the two levels is made explicit by our notion of refinement that handles out-of-memory behaviors. This approach allows for more optimizations to be performed and establishes a clear boundary between the idealized semantics of a program and the implementation of that program on finite hardware. To demonstrate the utility of this idea in practice, we instantiate the two-phase memory model in the context of Zakowski et al.'s VIR semantics, yielding infinite and finite memory models of LLVM IR, including low-level features like undef and bitcast. Both the infinite and finite models, which act as specifications, can provably be refined to executable reference interpreters. The semantics justify optimizations, such as dead-alloca-elimination, that were previously impossible or difficult to prove correct.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) produce reasoning traces (RTs) that often contain sensitive information. These leaky thoughts are difficult to control and frequently violate explicit privacy directives. Because RTs can be exposed through prompt injection attacks, this becomes a direct privacy risk to the user. We approach this as a controllability problem: since privacy directives are themselves instructions, improving instruction-following (IF) within the RT provides a direct path to reducing privacy leaks. To this end, we introduce an SFT dataset that teaches models to follow general instructions throughout their reasoning process, and propose Staged Decoding, a simple decoding strategy that decouples RT and answer generation using separate LoRA adapters to maximize IF of each component. We evaluate our approach on six models from two families (1.7B-14B parameters), across two IF benchmarks and two privacy benchmarks. Our method yields substantial improvements, with gains of up to 20.9 points in IF and 51.9 percentage points on privacy benchmarks, though these can come at the cost of task utility due to the trade-off between reasoning performance and IF. Our results show that improving IF in LRMs can significantly enhance privacy, suggesting a promising direction for future privacy-aware LRMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/UKPLab/arxiv2026-controllable-reasoning-models.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

Current coding-agent benchmarks usually pro- vide the full task specification upfront. Real research coding often does not: the intended system is progressively disclosed through in- teraction, requiring the agent to track durable design commitments across a long session. We introduce a benchmark for this setting and study faithfulne Ss Loss U nder eM ergent s Pecification (SLUMP), defined as the reduc- tion in final implementation faithfulness un- der emergent specification relative to a single- shot specification control. The benchmark con- tains 20 recent ML papers (10 ICML 2025, 10 NeurIPS 2025), 371 atomic verifiable compo- nents, and interaction scripts of approximately 60 coding requests that progressively disclose the target design without revealing the paper itself. Final repositories are scored with a five-level component-faithfulness rubric and accompanied by an exposure audit to verify that scored components are recoverable from the visible interaction. Evaluated on Claude Code and Codex, the single-shot specification control achieves higher overall implementation fidelity on 16/20 and 14/20 papers, respectively. Structural integration degrades under emergent specification on both platforms, while seman- tic faithfulness loss is substantial on Claude Code and small on Codex. As a mitigation case study, we introduce ProjectGuard, an exter- nal project-state layer for specification tracking. On Claude Code, ProjectGuard recovers 90% of the faithfulness gap, increases fully faith- ful components from 118 to 181, and reduces severe failures from 72 to 49. These results identify specification tracking as a distinct eval- uation target for long-horizon coding agents.

AI-agent guardrails are memoryless: each message is judged in isolation, so an adversary who spreads a single attack across dozens of sessions slips past every session-bound detector because only the aggregate carries the payload. We make three contributions to cross-session threat detection. (1) Dataset. CSTM-Bench is 26 executable attack taxonomies classified by kill-chain stage and cross-session operation (accumulate, compose, launder, inject_on_reader), each bound to one of seven identity anchors that ground-truth "violation" as a policy predicate, plus matched Benign-pristine and Benign-hard confounders. Released on Hugging Face as intrinsec-ai/cstm-bench with two 54-scenario splits: dilution (compositional) and cross_session (12 isolation-invisible scenarios produced by a closed-loop rewriter that softens surface phrasing while preserving cross-session artefacts). (2) Measurement. Framing cross-session detection as an information bottleneck to a downstream correlator LLM, we find that a session-bound judge and a Full-Log Correlator concatenating every prompt into one long-context call both lose roughly half their attack recall moving from dilution to cross_session, well inside any frontier context window. Scope: 54 scenarios per shard, one correlator family (Anthropic Claude), no prompt optimisation; we release it to motivate larger, multi-provider datasets. (3) Algorithm and metric. A bounded-memory Coreset Memory Reader retaining highest-signal fragments at K=50 is the only reader whose recall survives both shards. Because ranker reshuffles break KV-cache prefix reuse, we promote CSR_prefix (ordered prefix stability, LLM-free) to a first-class metric and fuse it with detection into CSTM = 0.7 F_1(CSDA@action, precision) + 0.3 CSR_prefix, benchmarking rankers on a single Pareto of recall versus serving stability.

Large language model (LLM) agents coordinate complex tasks through multi-role and multi-stage workflows. Upstream state is repeatedly transformed into intermediate language artifacts, such as summaries, plans, tickets, memories, and handoff notes, from which downstream components act. For action-constraining state, topical retention is insufficient: an artifact may mention an unresolved condition while changing it from a requirement that must be resolved before execution into information that may merely inform the next action. We study this action-binding role as operational state preservation. Safety blockers provide a controlled instance because each source state has an explicit prerequisite, authority, fallback, and execution consequence. We condition on correct upstream identification, vary the handoff transformation, and evaluate an executor restricted to the resulting artifact. Across 1,296 controlled synthetic episodes, direct-handoff controls preserve every blocker, whereas compression, plan assimilation, convergence, ownership deferral, and precedent substitution repeatedly turn binding state into caveats or non-binding considerations. Normal handoff compression produces 100.0% deactivation and 54.2% forbidden action. Restoring all four state fields raises preservation to 100.0% and reduces forbidden action to 0.0%. Fixed-artifact interventions further separate preservation from containment: downstream verification eliminates forbidden action while artifact deactivation remains 95.3%. These results identify a state-transmission failure between information extraction and action. Handoff transformations can retain state content while weakening its constraints on downstream action. Semantic availability does not guarantee operational preservation.

The safety of autonomous AI agents is increasingly recognized as a critical open problem. As agents transition from passive text generators to active actors capable of executing shell commands, modifying files, calling APIs, and browsing the web, the consequences of unsafe or adversarially manipulated behavior become immediate and tangible. Existing AI safety work has focused primarily on model alignment and input filtering, but these approaches do not address what happens at the moment an agent's intent becomes a real action on a real machine. This gap is especially acute in local environments, where developers run agents against their own filesystems, credentials, and infrastructure with little runtime control. This paper introduces AgentWall, a runtime safety and observability layer for local AI agents. AgentWall intercepts every proposed agent action before it reaches the host environment, evaluates it against an explicit declarative policy, requires human approval for sensitive operations, and records a complete execution trail for audit and replay. It is implemented as a policy-enforcing MCP proxy and native OpenClaw plugin, working across Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, and OpenClaw with a single install command. We present the design, architecture, threat model, and policy model of AgentWall, and demonstrate 92.9% policy enforcement accuracy with sub-millisecond overhead across 14 benchmark tests. AgentWall is open-source at https://github.com/agentwall/Agentwall.

The dominant paradigm for building LLM based agents is the Agent Loop, an iterative cycle where a single language model decides what to do next by reading an ever growing context window. This paradigm has three structural weaknesses: implicit dependencies between steps, unbounded recovery loops, and mutable execution history that complicates debugging. We characterize the Agent Loop as a single ready unit scheduler: at any moment, at most one executable unit is active, and the choice of which unit to activate comes from opaque LLM inference rather than an inspectable policy. This perspective places Agent Loops and graph based execution engines on a single semantic continuum. We propose SGH, Structured Graph Harness, which lifts control flow from implicit context into an explicit static DAG. SGH makes three commitments: execution plans are immutable within a plan version, planning execution and recovery are separated into three layers, and recovery follows a strict escalation protocol. These choices trade some expressiveness for controllability, verifiability, and implementability. Our contributions are fourfold: a scheduler unified framework that applies classical scheduling theory to LLM agent execution and identifies challenges introduced by non deterministic LLM nodes; a trade off analysis of controllability, expressiveness, and implementability across 70 surveyed systems; a formal specification including a node state machine with termination and soundness guarantees; and an attributable experimental framework with a seven group design for future validation. This is a position paper and design proposal. We provide a theoretical framework, design analysis, and experimental protocol, not a production implementation or empirical results.

Automatic Differentiation (AD) has become a dominant technique in ML. AD frameworks have first been implemented for imperative languages using tapes. Meanwhile, functional implementations of AD have been developed, often based on dual numbers, which are close to the formal specification of differentiation and hence easier to prove correct. But these papers have focussed on correctness not efficiency. Recently, it was shown how an approach using dual numbers could be made efficient through the right optimizations. Optimizations are highly dependent on order, as one optimization can enable another. It can therefore be useful to have fine-grained control over the scheduling of optimizations. One method expresses compiler optimizations as rewrite rules, whose application can be combined and controlled using strategy languages. Previous work describes the use of term rewriting and strategies to generate high-performance code in a compiler for a functional language. In this work, we implement dual numbers AD in a functional array programming language using rewrite rules and strategy combinators for optimization. We aim to combine the elegance of differentiation using dual numbers with a succinct expression of the optimization schedule using a strategy language. We give preliminary evidence suggesting the viability of the approach on a micro-benchmark.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a common interface for connecting large language model (LLM) agents to external tools, but its reliance on stateless, eager schema injection imposes a hidden per-turn overhead the MCP Tax or Tools Tax that practitioner reports place between roughly 10k and 60k tokens in typical multi-server deployments. This payload inflates the key-value cache, is associated with reasoning degradation as context utilization approaches published fracture points around 70%, and turns token budgets into a recurring operational cost. We introduce Tool Attention, a middleware-layer mechanism that generalizes the "Attention Is All You Need" paradigm from self-attention over tokens to gated attention over tools. Tool Attention combines (i) an Intent Schema Overlap (ISO) score from sentence embeddings, (ii) a state-aware gating function enforcing preconditions and access scopes, and (iii) a two-phase lazy schema loader that keeps a compact summary pool in context and promotes full JSON schemas only for top-k gated tools. We evaluate on a simulated 120-tool, six-server benchmark whose per-server token counts are calibrated to public audits of real MCP deployments. In this simulation, Tool Attention directly reduces measured per-turn tool tokens by 95.0% (47.3k -> 2.4k) and raises effective context utilization (a token-ratio quantity) from 24% to 91%. End-to-end figures for task success, latency, cost, and reasoning quality are reported as projections derived from the measured token counts combined with published deployment telemetry; they are not measured on live LLM agents, and we mark projected values explicitly throughout. Taken together, the results support a simple thesis: protocol-level efficiency, not raw context length, is a binding constraint on scalable gentic systems. The code for this work is accessible at https://github.com/asadani/tool-attention

A control technique is developed via Reinforcement Learning that allows arbitrary controlling of the position of an acoustic cavitation bubble in a dual-frequency standing acoustic wave field. The agent must choose the optimal pressure amplitude values to manipulate the bubble position in the range of x/lambda_0in[0.05, 0.25]. To train the agent an actor-critic off-policy algorithm (Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient) was used that supports continuous action space, which allows setting the pressure amplitude values continuously within 0 and 1, bar. A shaped reward function is formulated that minimizes the distance between the bubble and the target position and implicitly encourages the agent to perform the position control within the shortest amount of time. In some cases, the optimal control can be 7 times faster than the solution expected from the linear theory.

Large language model (LLM)-based AI agents extend LLM capabilities by enabling access to tools such as data sources, APIs, search engines, code sandboxes, and even other agents. While this empowers agents to perform complex tasks, LLMs may invoke unintended tool interactions and introduce risks, such as leaking sensitive data or overwriting critical records, which are unacceptable in enterprise contexts. Current approaches to mitigate these risks, such as model-based safeguards, enhance agents' reliability but cannot guarantee system safety. Methods like information flow control (IFC) and temporal constraints aim to provide guarantees but often require extensive human annotation. We propose a process that starts with applying System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to identify hazards in agent workflows, derive safety requirements, and formalize them as enforceable specifications on data flows and tool sequences. To enable this, we introduce a capability-enhanced Model Context Protocol (MCP) framework that requires structured labels on capabilities, confidentiality, and trust level. Together, these contributions aim to shift LLM-based agent safety from ad hoc reliability fixes to proactive guardrails with formal guarantees, while reducing dependence on user confirmation and making autonomy a deliberate design choice.

The rapid expansion of capabilities in Large Language Model (LLM) agents has exposed a critical architectural bottleneck: when agents are given access to a flat, monolithic registry of tools, the model must evaluate hundreds or thousands of options simultaneously. This leads to decision-space explosion, context window saturation, and degraded routing accuracy. To address these limitations, this paper presents a hierarchical, skill-based architecture for agentic orchestration. Capabilities are organized as a rooted tree where internal nodes make routing decisions and leaf nodes execute deterministic tasks. The runtime enforces a single-step execution loop governed by a Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) stack, giving the agent a form of memory akin to a Pushdown Automaton, therefore enabling it to track nested execution contexts and resume deterministically from any depth. Capability discovery follows a manifest-driven, lazy-loading protocol: only the immediate children of the active node are loaded, so memory and prompt costs scale with the explored path rather than the global registry. By replacing global memory with localized stack frames, the architecture prevents outputs from one execution branch from leaking into another, establishing the isolation guarantees required for deployment in regulated enterprise environments. We also discuss UPI Help, an AI-powered digital payments support product, as a motivating production deployment context. We provide a mathematical formalization of the orchestration state, detailed algorithmic analysis of the execution loop, and controlled benchmarks comparing flat and hierarchical routing under increasing tool catalogs, multi-step workflow pressure, and visible schema-token exposure per LLM call.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) run industrial plants, and large language models can already generate independent program organization units (POUs) for them. Whether such logic integrates into an existing PLC project and then runs correctly has been checked only in limited tests. We present SemaPLC, a project-grounded and verification-gated agent harness assembled from conventional tools but governed by a strict completion rule. Rather than stopping when the model judges its own output adequate, SemaPLC declares a task complete only when logged external checks confirm it. Those checks cover the specification, the compilation, and the behavior on a live runtime. On 117 independent-POU tasks matching existing benchmarks, it attains the highest strict verified pass rate on all seven models (72.6\% mean). On a project-context track of 65 tasks whose generated logic must compile and run inside a real project, it attains the highest mean on integrated compilation, static behavior, and dynamic behavior. Of the three layers, dynamic behavior is the most revealing. We measure it by deploying the generated and the reference logic to a live PLC runtime and comparing their executed traces. All methods fall within 10 static points of one another, whereas dynamic scores separate them sharply, from 22.4 to 31.4 for the baselines against 52.2 for SemaPLC. Overall, our verification-gated harness raises the mean at every layer and most sharply at runtime. Execution, not static scoring, is the faithful test of whether generated control logic actually works. SemaPLC is open-sourced at https://github.com/midea-ai/SemaPLC.

We present JAttack, a framework that enables template-based testing for compilers. Using JAttack, a developer writes a template program that describes a set of programs to be generated and given as test inputs to a compiler. Such a framework enables developers to incorporate their domain knowledge on testing compilers, giving a basic program structure that allows for exploring complex programs that can trigger sophisticated compiler optimizations. A developer writes a template program in the host language (Java) that contains holes to be filled by JAttack. Each hole, written using a domain-specific language, constructs a node within an extended abstract syntax tree (eAST). An eAST node defines the search space for the hole, i.e., a set of expressions and values. JAttack generates programs by executing templates and filling each hole by randomly choosing expressions and values (available within the search space defined by the hole). Additionally, we introduce several optimizations to reduce JAttack's generation cost. While JAttack could be used to test various compiler features, we demonstrate its capabilities in helping test just-in-time (JIT) Java compilers, whose optimizations occur at runtime after a sufficient number of executions. Using JAttack, we have found six critical bugs that were confirmed by Oracle developers. Four of them were previously unknown, including two unknown CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures). JAttack shows the power of combining developers' domain knowledge (via templates) with random testing to detect bugs in JIT compilers.

In-hand object reorientation is necessary for performing many dexterous manipulation tasks, such as tool use in less structured environments that remain beyond the reach of current robots. Prior works built reorientation systems assuming one or many of the following: reorienting only specific objects with simple shapes, limited range of reorientation, slow or quasistatic manipulation, simulation-only results, the need for specialized and costly sensor suites, and other constraints which make the system infeasible for real-world deployment. We present a general object reorientation controller that does not make these assumptions. It uses readings from a single commodity depth camera to dynamically reorient complex and new object shapes by any rotation in real-time, with the median reorientation time being close to seven seconds. The controller is trained using reinforcement learning in simulation and evaluated in the real world on new object shapes not used for training, including the most challenging scenario of reorienting objects held in the air by a downward-facing hand that must counteract gravity during reorientation. Our hardware platform only uses open-source components that cost less than five thousand dollars. Although we demonstrate the ability to overcome assumptions in prior work, there is ample scope for improving absolute performance. For instance, the challenging duck-shaped object not used for training was dropped in 56 percent of the trials. When it was not dropped, our controller reoriented the object within 0.4 radians (23 degrees) 75 percent of the time. Videos are available at: https://taochenshh.github.io/projects/visual-dexterity.

Driven by rapid advancements of Large Language Models (LLMs), agents are empowered to combine intrinsic knowledge with dynamic tool use, greatly enhancing their capacity to address real-world tasks. In line with such an evolution, AgentScope introduces major improvements in a new version (1.0), towards comprehensively supporting flexible and efficient tool-based agent-environment interactions for building agentic applications. Specifically, we abstract foundational components essential for agentic applications and provide unified interfaces and extensible modules, enabling developers to easily leverage the latest progress, such as new models and MCPs. Furthermore, we ground agent behaviors in the ReAct paradigm and offer advanced agent-level infrastructure based on a systematic asynchronous design, which enriches both human-agent and agent-agent interaction patterns while improving execution efficiency. Building on this foundation, we integrate several built-in agents tailored to specific practical scenarios. AgentScope also includes robust engineering support for developer-friendly experiences. We provide a scalable evaluation module with a visual studio interface, making the development of long-trajectory agentic applications more manageable and easier to trace. In addition, AgentScope offers a runtime sandbox to ensure safe agent execution and facilitates rapid deployment in production environments. With these enhancements, AgentScope provides a practical foundation for building scalable, adaptive, and effective agentic applications.

Prompt optimization can improve multi-agent LLM systems, but the prompts being optimized often serve two entangled roles: generating task-relevant content and specifying execution-critical protocols, such as message routing, output formatting, and termination signals, on which the underlying code relies. As a result, a prompt edit intended to improve content generation can inadvertently corrupt the protocol and cause the entire agent pipeline to fail. Our key observation is that these two roles have different representations: execution protocols are typically structured, while task-relevant content is usually expressed in unstructured language. Based on this, we propose control-data flow separation, where execution-critical control is represented as typed, validated program objects, while task-relevant language remains the optimizable data flow for agent communication. This design allows optimizers to improve multi-agent behavior without exposing the routing or formatting interface to prompt drift. Across synthetic reasoning, collaborative review generation, and insurance rating workflows, our framework empirically achieves 100% eventual protocol validity while consistently improving task performance.

Modernizing legacy COBOL systems remains difficult due to scarce expertise, large and long-lived codebases, and strict correctness requirements. Recent large language model (LLM)-based modernization systems increasingly rely on agentic workflows in which the model controls multi-step tool execution. However, it remains unclear whether delegating execution control to the LLM improves correctness, robustness, or efficiency in structured software engineering workflows. We present a controlled empirical study of deterministic and LLM-controlled orchestration for COBOL-to-Python modernization. Using a unified experimental framework, we hold the language models, prompts, tools, configurations, and source programs constant while varying only the execution control strategy. This isolates orchestration as the sole experimental variable. We evaluate both approaches using functional correctness, robustness across repeated stochastic runs, and computational efficiency. Across multiple models, deterministic orchestration achieves comparable computational accuracy to LLM-controlled orchestration while improving worst-case robustness and reducing performance variability across runs. Deterministic execution also reduces token consumption by up to 3.5x, leading to substantially lower operational cost. These results suggest that, in structured modernization workflows with explicit validation stages, fixed execution policies provide more stable and cost-efficient behavior than fully agentic orchestration without reducing translation quality.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance across a wide array of tasks involving both structured and unstructured textual data. Recent results on various benchmarks for code generation, repair, or completion suggest that certain models have programming abilities comparable to or even surpass humans. In this work, we demonstrate that high performance on such benchmarks does not correlate to humans' innate ability to understand structural control flow in code. To this end, we extract solutions from the HumanEval benchmark, which the relevant models perform strongly on, and trace their execution path using function calls sampled from the respective test set. Using this dataset, we investigate the ability of seven state-of-the-art LLMs to match the execution trace and find that, despite their ability to generate semantically identical code, they possess limited ability to trace execution paths, especially for longer traces and specific control structures. We find that even the top-performing model, Gemini, can fully and correctly generate only 47% of HumanEval task traces. Additionally, we introduce a subset for three key structures not contained in HumanEval: Recursion, Parallel Processing, and Object-Oriented Programming, including concepts like Inheritance and Polymorphism. Besides OOP, we show that none of the investigated models achieve an accuracy over 5% on the relevant traces. Aggregating these specialized parts with HumanEval tasks, we present Benchmark CoCoNUT: Code Control Flow for Navigation Understanding and Testing, which measures a model's ability to trace execution of code upon relevant calls, including advanced structural components. We conclude that current LLMs need significant improvement to enhance code reasoning abilities. We hope our dataset helps researchers bridge this gap.

Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment. We describe falsifiable release gates, and a methodology to build and validate such systems, such that every new capability must pass a pre-specified, machine-verifiable acceptance suite before it ships, and a fixed set of standing invariants is preserved at each gate. I think we applied the method in the Antahkarana, an open runtime, via seven gates from basic observability into a self governing loop that suggests changes to its own policy. no action goes to an effector without a safety-critical property capability token minted by a control ring is exhaustively machine-checked over the one million recorded reachable state space of a bounded model and re-checked against execution traces. A purposely broken model gives the shortest counterexample, so the checker has teeth, is apparent. The self-enhancement loop is positively Constrained: the entire write surface is policy rules, tightening changes. may auto-apply loosening changes always require a human merge and a proposal autoclosed is one that mispredicts its own effect; We publish the acceptance measured results for all the seven gates, define precisely the scope of each claim (a bounded of the coordination skeleton (not the learned components) and free the runtime, either command line tools and the gate suite, so the results reproduce, and gates can run against other agent frameworks. Reviewers may repeat the single command central non-bypass in seconds.

Production AI agents' failures are less often due to an inability to reason well and more often because they cannot manage what is in their reasoning context: conversation histories, large prompts, large tool definitions, and ballooning tool outputs. Agents drown in their own accumulating history while paying a token cost that grows every turn, producing missing recalls within and across conversations. The incumbent response treats this as a storage-and-retrieval problem. We argue that framing is too narrow. Actively managing what an agent holds in mind is a lifecycle, not merely a store: it spans deciding what to remember, extracting and structuring it, choosing the right store per data type, consolidating and forgetting while preserving provenance, deciding what is relevant now, anticipating what is needed next, and compacting context to a budget without losing what matters. In serious production this operates not over a single user but across an organizational scope hierarchy. We name this discipline Agentic Context Management (ACM) and decompose it into five primitives: architecting, ingesting, scoping, anticipating, and compacting & consolidation. We then make the economic case: naive context accumulation grows token cost quadratically in conversation length, crude summarization buys linear cost at the price of an accuracy cliff, and only validated compaction achieves linear cost with preserved fidelity. We describe a reference implementation, Maximem Synap, that realizes the five primitives as a multi-tenant service and reports 92% on LongMemEval and 93.2% on LoCoMo under the configuration detailed in Section 6. We close with dimensions existing benchmarks do not yet capture, latency, token efficiency, and context-rot resistance, and the frontier of decision-level and organization-level context the category points toward.

3D object generation has undergone significant advancements, yielding high-quality results. However, fall short of achieving precise user control, often yielding results that do not align with user expectations, thus limiting their applicability. User-envisioning 3D object generation faces significant challenges in realizing its concepts using current generative models due to limited interaction capabilities. Existing methods mainly offer two approaches: (i) interpreting textual instructions with constrained controllability, or (ii) reconstructing 3D objects from 2D images. Both of them limit customization to the confines of the 2D reference and potentially introduce undesirable artifacts during the 3D lifting process, restricting the scope for direct and versatile 3D modifications. In this work, we introduce Interactive3D, an innovative framework for interactive 3D generation that grants users precise control over the generative process through extensive 3D interaction capabilities. Interactive3D is constructed in two cascading stages, utilizing distinct 3D representations. The first stage employs Gaussian Splatting for direct user interaction, allowing modifications and guidance of the generative direction at any intermediate step through (i) Adding and Removing components, (ii) Deformable and Rigid Dragging, (iii) Geometric Transformations, and (iv) Semantic Editing. Subsequently, the Gaussian splats are transformed into InstantNGP. We introduce a novel (v) Interactive Hash Refinement module to further add details and extract the geometry in the second stage. Our experiments demonstrate that Interactive3D markedly improves the controllability and quality of 3D generation. Our project webpage is available at https://interactive-3d.github.io/.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

Text-to-image generation with visual autoregressive~(VAR) models has recently achieved impressive advances in generation fidelity and inference efficiency. While control mechanisms have been explored for diffusion models, enabling precise and flexible control within VAR paradigm remains underexplored. To bridge this critical gap, in this paper, we introduce ScaleWeaver, a novel framework designed to achieve high-fidelity, controllable generation upon advanced VAR models through parameter-efficient fine-tuning. The core module in ScaleWeaver is the improved MMDiT block with the proposed Reference Attention module, which efficiently and effectively incorporates conditional information. Different from MM Attention, the proposed Reference Attention module discards the unnecessary attention from imagerightarrowcondition, reducing computational cost while stabilizing control injection. Besides, it strategically emphasizes parameter reuse, leveraging the capability of the VAR backbone itself with a few introduced parameters to process control information, and equipping a zero-initialized linear projection to ensure that control signals are incorporated effectively without disrupting the generative capability of the base model. Extensive experiments show that ScaleWeaver delivers high-quality generation and precise control while attaining superior efficiency over diffusion-based methods, making ScaleWeaver a practical and effective solution for controllable text-to-image generation within the visual autoregressive paradigm. Code and models will be released.

Everything a language model sees is tokens. The serving stack knows what each span is -- user input, tool output, instructions -- but the model must keep track of that itself, and it can lose track or be confused: text can be written to read like anything. Prompt injection is a natural exploit of this phenomenon. By scrambling the model's understanding of span identity, an attacker can induce unwanted and potentially dangerous actions. Adding a non-textual channel to the model's input -- a way to communicate span identity beyond text -- mitigates this class of attack. We thus introduce a general steering technique called Semantic Overlays: small learned adapters applied at chosen prefill positions to a frozen model's residual stream. Laying an overlay over a span creates an out-of-band annotation channel that cannot be replicated by tokens. Unlike steering vectors, Semantic Overlays are trained, adaptable, and selectively applied. An overlay can encode complex semantics that reshape how the model perceives the marked span: asked to copy a code snippet under an overlay asserting that it is in a different programming language than it is, the model rewrites the snippet, faithfully, in the asserted language. Overlays are also composable, allow for transparent reading of underlying content, and can carry complex payloads -- including imperatives that the model will follow. An overlay which marks a span as "non-executable" defends against the broad class of prompt injections that add instructions in untrusted context. We report strong results on prompt injection benchmarks: SEP separation rises from 24.3% to 96.5% with utility unchanged (our scoring rule; we also correct a defect in the published grader), TensorTrust attack success rate falls from 34.8% to 6.6%, and all four PIArena attack families drop to 0% compliance, all while marked spans stay readable (92.5% exact copy rate).

We present semantic correctness proofs of automatic differentiation (AD). We consider a forward-mode AD method on a higher order language with algebraic data types, and we characterise it as the unique structure preserving macro given a choice of derivatives for basic operations. We describe a rich semantics for differentiable programming, based on diffeological spaces. We show that it interprets our language, and we phrase what it means for the AD method to be correct with respect to this semantics. We show that our characterisation of AD gives rise to an elegant semantic proof of its correctness based on a gluing construction on diffeological spaces. We explain how this is, in essence, a logical relations argument. Throughout, we show how the analysis extends to AD methods for computing higher order derivatives using a Taylor approximation.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

Instruction-based video editing (IVE) is an emerging field with broad applications, yet evaluating editing models remains challenging. Existing benchmarks suffer from two major limitations: limited task coverage inherited from image editing, which overlooks video-specific dimensions, and inadequate metrics that fail to measure instruction fidelity, allowing incorrect edits to receive high scores due to strong visual priors from the original video. To address these issues, we introduce a comprehensive and structured benchmark for IVE. Our benchmark decomposes editing tasks into multiple video-specific dimensions, including spatial, temporal, audio, and reference-based editing, extending beyond conventional frame-level evaluation. It also distinguishes explicit and implicit instructions and incorporates reasoning-based scenarios to better reflect real-world requirements. Furthermore, we propose an evaluation framework that assesses editing quality from four complementary dimensions: accuracy, preservation, realism, and consistency, using both human judgments and state-of-the-art vision-language models. To emphasize instruction fidelity, we introduce an accuracy-aware penalty mechanism that conditions other scores on accuracy, preventing visually plausible but incorrect edits from receiving inflated evaluations. Extensive experiments on representative open-source and commercial models show that current IVE models remain far from satisfactory. OmniEdit-Bench provides a comprehensive and reliable testbed for evaluating instruction-based video editing and offers insights into future research directions.