Daily Papers

Large language model (LLM) agents may perform well on isolated tasks yet drift into inconsistency over extended interaction. We evaluate temporal consistency in a controlled 20-step multi-agent setting inspired by delayed-gratification studies. At each step, an agent chooses between continuing to delay a reward or claiming it immediately (terminating the episode). Across a full-factorial manipulation of social visibility (private vs public), persona stressors, and deliberation policy, we run 84,540 trajectories spanning 8 model families. Treating the first reward-claim as a time-to-event outcome, we estimate Kaplan-Meier survival curves and fit discrete-time hazard regression to quantify how experimental factors shift failure risk over time. Then, to analyze rationales and language patterns associated with failure, we build a seven-category taxonomy from 13,780 deliberation traces from agents who choose to terminate the episode, using an LLM-assisted labeling paired with human audit (κ=0.83). Rationale profiles change systematically with time and context: early failures are more impulse-driven, later failures more fatigue- and cost-benefit-framed, while public settings increase norm-oriented justifications. We also find a deliberation-inconsistency association: among failures, longer deliberation correlates with higher rates of intra-rationale contradiction (simultaneous pro-delay and pro-claim statements), challenging the assumption that more reasoning text implies greater consistency. Together, the survival and rationale analyses reveal distinct temporal reliability regimes and model-specific "failure fingerprints", offering an evaluation lens for diagnosing inconsistency in multi-turn agent behavior.

How do multi-turn reasoning systems fail? The expected answer is logical contradiction, in which the system's maintained state becomes unsatisfiable. We show that the dominant mode is instead satisfiable drift, where the internal state stays consistent while the returned answer silently violates prior commitments. We build DRIFT-Bench (Decomposing Reasoning Into Failure Types), a solver-instrumented benchmark of 816 test problems across three constraint domains, and evaluate four methods on it across four open-weight models (8B-120B parameters). MUS-Repair, which feeds minimal unsatisfiable subsets back to the generator, is strongest in every setting (+1.8 to +15.0 pp over the best non-MUS baseline). But the central finding is what repair leaves behind. After structured feedback, models rarely contradict themselves. They forget. Residual errors are 98-100% satisfiable drift across all settings, while contradiction drops to near zero. Reliable multi-turn systems must separately validate that the returned answer respects the maintained state. Code is available at https://github.com/kaons-research/drift-bench.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because the probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. When a mathematician encounters a proof, how does she come to believe it? Here we show that, under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism combining deductive and abductive reasoning, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with five hand-constructed cases including Euclid, Apollonius, Hernstein's Topics in Algebra, and Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Corruption studies, the primary tool for evaluating chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness, identify which chain positions are "computationally important" by measuring accuracy when steps are replaced with errors. We identify a systematic confound: for chains with explicit terminal answer statements, the dominant format in standard benchmarks, corruption studies detect where the answer text appears, not where computation occurs. A within-dataset format ablation provides the key evidence: on standard GSM8K chains ending with "the answer is X," removing only the answer statement, preserving all reasoning, collapses suffix sensitivity ~19x at 3B (N=300, p=0.022). Conflicting-answer experiments quantify the causal mechanism: at 7B, CC accuracy drops to near-zero (<=0.02) across five architecture families; the followed-wrong rate spans 0.63-1.00 at 3B-7B and attenuates at larger scales (0.300 at Phi-4-14B, ~0.01 at 32B). A within-stable 7B replication (9.3x attenuation, N=76, p=7.8e-3; Qwen3-8B N=299, p=0.004) provides converging evidence, and the pattern replicates on MATH (DeepSeek-R1-7B: 10.9x suffix-survival recovery). On chains without answer suffixes the same protocol identifies the prefix as load-bearing (Delta=-0.77, p<10^-12). Generation-time probes confirm a dissociation: the answer is not early-determined during generation (early commitment <5%), yet at consumption time model outputs systematically follow the explicit answer text. The format-determination effect persists through 14B (8.5x ratio, p=0.001) and converges toward zero at 32B. We propose a three-prerequisite protocol (question-only control, format characterization, all-position sweep) as a minimum standard for corruption-based faithfulness studies.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly serve as data-driven reasoners, yet their chains-of-thought (CoT) can be unfaithful even when final answers are correct. Most existing ``verification'' signals are not diagnostic: answer matching observes only the outcome, LLM-as-judge provides subjective and non-verifiable critiques, and scalar rewards (e.g., PRMs/RMs) offer little insight into where a multi-step derivation fails.We propose SymDiag, a neuro-symbolic framework that reframes reasoning verification as structured failure diagnosis. SymDiag translates natural-language CoT into symbolic constraints and performs step-level satisfiability/entailment checks to (i) localize failing steps and (ii) produce verifiable diagnostic evidence, including counterexamples, inconsistency witnesses, and missing-premise indicators. A central challenge is that apparent ``logic violations'' can be caused either by genuine reasoning defects or by neural-to-symbolic translation noise. SymDiag therefore incorporates a Self-Auditor that disentangles TranslationError from ReasoningError via dual symbolic encodings consistency checks, enabling robust diagnosis under partial observability. Across diverse mathematical, logical, scientific, and general reasoning benchmarks, SymDiag improves detection of unfaithful reasoning and provides substantially more effective feedback for multi-round reasoning repair than outcome-only verification and LLM-based judging, offering a principled foundation for trustworthy and scalable reasoning diagnosis.

The transition from the superconducting to the normal state in a magnetic field was considered as a irreversible thermodynamic process before 1933 because of Joule heating. But all physicists became to consider this transition as reversible after 1933 because of the obvious contradiction of the Meissner effect with the second law of thermodynamics if this transition is considered as a irreversible process. This radical change of the opinion contradicted logic since the dissipation of the kinetic energy of the surface screening current into Joule heat in the normal state cannot depend on how this current appeared in the superconducting state. The inconsistency of the conventional theory of superconductivity, created in the framework of the equilibrium thermodynamics, with Joule heating, on which Jorge Hirsch draws reader's attention, is a consequence of this history. In order to avoid contradiction with the second law of thermodynamics, physicists postulated in the thirties of the last century that the surface screening current is damped without the generation of Joule heat. This postulate contradicts not only logic and the conventional theory of superconductivity but also experimental results.

A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices. We report a failure mode that contradicts it. Across hundreds of structural causal models, on identified quantities a strong predictor and a Bayesian baseline both succeed, but on unidentified quantities (the couplings between counterfactual worlds) the predictor collapses to a point, on 28% of models to one no valid model can produce, while the truth is an admissible interval more data never narrows. The gap is structural: prediction cannot represent uncertainty over counterfactual couplings. We cast a world model as a single positive semidefinite coupling kernel K(T,T') over admissible worlds, whose diagonal is the ordinary posterior (what a predictor recovers) and whose off-diagonal is the cross-world coupling it cannot, which every counterfactual reads. The paper is the theory of that off-diagonal. It is real: two states with identical posteriors differ on a cross-world query, and the off-diagonal is the coupling that fixes counterfactuals. It can be bounded: positive semidefiniteness is partial-identifying information the marginals lack, and enforcing it bounds counterfactuals in polynomial time where the exact response-type program is intractable. Logical structure sharpens it: ontology axioms tighten the bound by up to a third, propagating to couplings they never touch. It can be acquired: targeted scars, constraints learned from encountered infeasibilities, close the gap several times faster than untargeted ones. Its full reconstruction is approximate counting of the admissible worlds, tractable below the Sly-Sun threshold and inapproximable above; we do not claim to beat the worst case.

LLM agents can reason and use tools, but they often break down on long-horizon tasks due to unbounded context growth and accumulated errors. Common remedies such as context compression or retrieval-augmented prompting introduce trade-offs between information fidelity and reasoning stability. We present InfiAgent, a general-purpose framework that keeps the agent's reasoning context strictly bounded regardless of task duration by externalizing persistent state into a file-centric state abstraction. At each step, the agent reconstructs context from a workspace state snapshot plus a fixed window of recent actions. Experiments on DeepResearch and an 80-paper literature review task show that, without task-specific fine-tuning, InfiAgent with a 20B open-source model is competitive with larger proprietary systems and maintains substantially higher long-horizon coverage than context-centric baselines. These results support explicit state externalization as a practical foundation for stable long-horizon agents. Github Repo:https://github.com/ChenglinPoly/infiAgent

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) integrates large language models (LLMs) with external sources, but unresolved contradictions in retrieved evidence often lead to hallucinations and legally unsound outputs. Benchmarks currently used for contradiction detection lack domain realism, cover only limited conflict types, and rarely extend beyond single-sentence pairs, making them unsuitable for legal applications. Controlled generation of documents with embedded contradictions is therefore essential: it enables systematic stress-testing of models, ensures coverage of diverse conflict categories, and provides a reliable basis for evaluating contradiction detection and resolution. We present a multi-agent contradiction-aware benchmark framework for the legal domain that generates synthetic legal-style documents, injects six structured contradiction types, and models both self- and pairwise inconsistencies. Automated contradiction mining is combined with human-in-the-loop validation to guarantee plausibility and fidelity. This benchmark offers one of the first structured resources for contradiction-aware evaluation in legal RAG pipelines, supporting more consistent, interpretable, and trustworthy systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

The reasoning steps generated by LLMs might be incomplete, as they mimic logical leaps common in everyday communication found in their pre-training data: underlying rationales are frequently left implicit (unstated). To address this challenge, we introduce RATIONALYST, a model for process-supervision of reasoning based on pre-training on a vast collection of rationale annotations extracted from unlabeled data. We extract 79k rationales from web-scale unlabelled dataset (the Pile) and a combination of reasoning datasets with minimal human intervention. This web-scale pre-training for reasoning allows RATIONALYST to consistently generalize across diverse reasoning tasks, including mathematical, commonsense, scientific, and logical reasoning. Fine-tuned from LLaMa-3-8B, RATIONALYST improves the accuracy of reasoning by an average of 3.9% on 7 representative reasoning benchmarks. It also demonstrates superior performance compared to significantly larger verifiers like GPT-4 and similarly sized models fine-tuned on matching training sets.

When retrieved evidence contradicts an agent's prior beliefs, does it revise its answer, acknowledge uncertainty, or persist with an incorrect conclusion? Existing evaluations of agentic systems focus primarily on task success, offering limited insight into how agents handle such conflicts. We propose to evaluate agents on epistemic humility (EH): the agent's willingness to recognize, act on, and communicate uncertainty during task execution. We operationalize EH through three trajectory-level behavioral dimensions: Identify, Solve, and Escalate (ISE). Through knowledge conflict, situations where the backbone language model's parametric knowledge contradicts the evidence it encounters, or where two contextual sources disagree, we evaluate two conflict settings: (1) controlled conflict and (2) naturally occurring conflict during multi-step agentic execution, each paired with matched no-conflict controls. Evaluating four agents, we find that higher task accuracy does not necessarily correspond to greater epistemic humility: some high-accuracy configurations recognize conflicts during execution but do not communicate unresolved uncertainty in their incorrect final answers. Trajectory-level analysis further reveals that agents frequently detect conflicts in early steps of execution but fail to maintain or resolve them in later steps. Finally, we show that model-level interventions can improve EH, but often at the cost of task accuracy, suggesting that epistemic humility emerges from the interaction among the backbone model, agent harness, and evaluation environment.

Despite the progress of foundation models, knowledge-based reasoning remains a persistent challenge due to their limited capacity for knowledge recall and inference. Existing methods primarily focus on encouraging these models to plan and solve problems or extensively sample reasoning chains independently. However, these methods often overlook conceptual errors and inferential fallacies, inevitably leading to a series of notorious issues such as misleading conclusions, cognitive biases, and reduced decision quality. While explicit modeling of causality is argued to hold promise in addressing these issues, contemporary research efforts have thus far fallen short in achieving causality-based foundation models. Drawing inspiration from the orchestration of diverse specialized agents collaborating to tackle intricate tasks, we propose a framework named Causal-Consistency Chain-of-Thought (CaCo-CoT) that harnesses multi-agent collaboration to bolster the faithfulness and causality of foundation models, involving a set of reasoners and evaluators. These agents collaboratively work within a reasoning-and-consensus paradigm to improve faithfulness. The reasoners are tasked with generating reasoning chains for knowledge-intensive problems by mimicking human causal reasoning. Meanwhile, the evaluator scrutinizes the causal consistency of a reasoner's reasoning chain from a non-causal and a counterfactual perspective. Our framework demonstrates significant superiority over state-of-the-art methods through extensive and comprehensive evaluations across text-based and multi-modal knowledge reasoning tasks (e.g., science question answering and commonsense reasoning).

Autonomous reasoning is among the most scientifically and economically motivating topics in AI today. Historically the purview of symbolic AI, recent advances have mainly emerged from deep probabilistic generative models. Despite immense interest and rapid progress, the generative AI community has not clearly converged on operational definitions for reasoning and often implicitly rejects the historical treatment of this topic in logic and verifiable automated reasoning. This position contends that definitional ambiguity leaves the construct validity of reasoning evaluation unverifiable, undermining quantifiable progress toward trustworthy autonomous reasoning. We also contend that this ambiguity is addressable. To that end, we provide (1) operational definitions based on a synthesis of the literature, positioning valid and sound reasoning as a learnable rule-based process; and (2) a checklist for best practices in the communication of AI reasoning research.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

When people reason about cause and effect, they often consider many competing "what if" scenarios before deciding which explanation fits best. Analogously, advanced language models capable of causal inference can consider multiple interventions and counterfactuals to judge the validity of causal claims. Crucially, this type of reasoning is less like a single calculation and more like an internal dialogue between alternative hypotheses. In this paper, we make this dialogue explicit through a dual-agent debate framework where one model provides a structured causal inference, and the other critically examines this reasoning for logical flaws. When disagreements arise, agents attempt to persuade each other, challenging each other's logic and revising their conclusions until they converge on a mutually agreed answer. To take advantage of this deliberative process, we specifically use reasoning language models, whose strengths in both causal inference and adversarial debate remain under-explored relative to standard large language models. We evaluate our approach on the CLadder dataset, a benchmark linking natural language questions to formally defined causal graphs across all three rungs of Pearl's ladder of causation. With Qwen3 and DeepSeek-R1 as debater agents, we demonstrate that multi-agent debate improves DeepSeek-R1's overall accuracy in causal inference from 78.03% to 87.45%, with the counterfactual category specifically improving from 67.94% to 80.04% accuracy. Similarly, Qwen3's overall accuracy improves from 84.16% to 89.41%, and counterfactual questions from 71.53% to 80.35%, showing that strong models can still benefit greatly from debate with weaker agents. Our results highlight the potential of reasoning models as building blocks for multi-agent systems in causal inference, and demonstrate the importance of diverse perspectives in causal problem-solving.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Multi-agent reasoning systems often use agreement, confidence, or automated scores to decide which messages should shape a final answer. Such filtering assumes that a message likely to be correct is also worth keeping. Yet a wrong answer can contain a useful decomposition, constraint, or scientific principle. We test this distinction with Diverse Hypothesis Deliberation (DHD), a controlled measurement protocol that caches five independently generated messages and replays the same downstream solver, called the integrator, with each message available or hidden. The replay comparison measures a message's trajectory value: whether making the message available helps or harms subsequent reasoning. Across five mathematics and science benchmarks and two openly available model families, gpt-oss-120b and gemma-4-31B-it, wrong-helpful messages appear in every benchmark-model combination. Among wrong-answer messages that change final correctness, more than four in ten changes are helpful in each model. Controlled repeats show that the number of repeatable message effects is unlikely to arise from replay variation alone (p=0.0002). A focused intervention on repeatable wrong-helpful messages finds that the complete message works best, while retaining its reasoning preserves more success than retaining only its answer; the source of the complete-message advantage remains open. Within the same problem, repeated trajectory-value evidence also identifies a better keep-or-remove choice than answer correctness alone. Answer correctness is therefore informative but does not determine trajectory value. DHD measures this missing property and produces reusable labels for learning when agents should listen.

Feynman famously asserted that interference is the only real mystery in quantum mechanics (QM). It is concluded that the reason for this mystery, and thereby the related mysteries of complementarity, non-commutativity of observables, the uncertainty principle and violation of Bell's equality, is that the axioms of QM depend vitally on the continuum nature of Hilbert Space, deemed unphysical. We develop a theory of quantum physics - Rational Quantum Mechanics (RaQM) - in which Hilbert Space is gravitationally discretised. The key to solving the mysteries of QM in RaQM is a number-theoretic property of the cosine function, concealed in QM when angles range over the continuum. This number-theoretic property describes mathematically the utter indivisibility of the quantum world and implies that the laws of physics are profoundly holistic. We contrast holism with nonlocality. In theories which embrace the continuum, the violation of Bell's inequality requires the laws of physics to be either nonlocal or not realistic; both incomprehensible concepts. By contrast, holism, as embodied in Mach's Principle or in the fractal geometry of a chaotic attractor, is neither incomprehensible nor unphysical. As part of this, we solve the deepest mystery of all; why nature makes use of complex numbers.

A major issue with using deep learning models in sensitive applications is that they provide no explanation for their output. To address this problem, unsupervised selective rationalization produces rationales alongside predictions by chaining two jointly-trained components, a rationale generator and a predictor. Although this architecture guarantees that the prediction relies solely on the rationale, it does not ensure that the rationale contains a plausible explanation for the prediction. We introduce a novel training technique that effectively limits generation of implausible rationales by injecting noise between the generator and the predictor. Furthermore, we propose a new benchmark for evaluating unsupervised selective rationalization models using movie reviews from existing datasets. We achieve sizeable improvements in rationale plausibility and task accuracy over the state-of-the-art across a variety of tasks, including our new benchmark, while maintaining or improving model faithfulness.

Reasoning about necessity and possibility depends on assumptions about accessibility between worlds and about which objects exist at each one. The same inference may therefore hold under one modal system and fail under another. Evaluating language models on such problems requires testing whether their judgments follow the stated semantics rather than a familiar logic. We construct paired modal problems with identical premises and conjecture but different frame or domain conditions; automated reasoning verifies opposite labels. A balanced core prevents the semantic condition alone from revealing the answer. On this core, four of five recent models perform below the condition-only baseline under direct prompting. Yet enabling reasoning mode raises DeepSeek V4 Flash from 4.4% to 88.1% on unchanged prompts. Following stipulated modal semantics thus depends strongly on inference mode as well as model identity. When frame conditions are omitted, models often agree but fit different familiar logics best. We release the formulas, oracle artifacts, countermodels, and responses.

An enterprise agent that answers under a written policy must choose an action before it says anything: answer, ask for a missing fact, ask for confirmation, call one or several tools, escalate, or refuse. Holding one 27B Korean enterprise model fixed, we vary whether the decision is a generated JSON object or a single constrained token, and whether the model may reason first. On 2800 in-distribution items we did not detect an accuracy difference between the two deployed paths (93.46% vs 94.14%), while they differ about tenfold in restart stability (3.00% of actions flip vs 0.29%); they also differ in reasoning, so this is an operational comparison. On a sealed benchmark of 300 items whose labels come from a hidden executable policy, reasoning is worth +17.3 points [+12.3, +23.0] on exact action. With reasoning off, the format difference was 0.0 points [-4.3, +4.0], a failure to detect an advantage for either interface, not equivalence; with reasoning on it is unresolved. Against a token-matched random control, boundary-targeted supervision moves the two covered boundaries by +17.5 and +20.0 points and leaves a held-out boundary unchanged. In a 3-seed training x reasoning factorial, the sealed-rendering interaction is -4.9 [-8.1, -1.7], consistent with partial substitution. All supervision was Korean. On independently rendered English versions, the model is 0.82 points lower [-2.68, +0.93] with reasoning on, the same order as re-rendering in Korean; the reasoning-off gain from targeted supervision is not stable in either language, so we do not claim transfer. The original text stays private as the confirmatory set. An open-model re-rendering made after these results reproduced the reasoning effect and the English verdict; the interaction kept its sign but did not replicate under item-clustered intervals. We release the model and that re-rendering with gold labels.

Knowledge-intensive language understanding tasks require Language Models (LMs) to integrate relevant context, mitigating their inherent weaknesses, such as incomplete or outdated knowledge. Nevertheless, studies indicate that LMs often ignore the provided context as it can conflict with the pre-existing LM's memory learned during pre-training. Moreover, conflicting knowledge can already be present in the LM's parameters, termed intra-memory conflict. Existing works have studied the two types of knowledge conflicts only in isolation. We conjecture that the (degree of) intra-memory conflicts can in turn affect LM's handling of context-memory conflicts. To study this, we introduce the DYNAMICQA dataset, which includes facts with a temporal dynamic nature where a fact can change with a varying time frequency and disputable dynamic facts, which can change depending on the viewpoint. DYNAMICQA is the first to include real-world knowledge conflicts and provide context to study the link between the different types of knowledge conflicts. With the proposed dataset, we assess the use of uncertainty for measuring the intra-memory conflict and introduce a novel Coherent Persuasion (CP) score to evaluate the context's ability to sway LM's semantic output. Our extensive experiments reveal that static facts, which are unlikely to change, are more easily updated with additional context, relative to temporal and disputable facts.

Large language models (large LMs) are susceptible to producing text with hallucinated content. Self-contradiction, where the LM generates two contradictory sentences within the same context, is an important form of hallucination. In this work, we present a comprehensive analysis on self-contradiction for state-of-the-art, instruction-tuned LMs, including evaluation, detection, and mitigation. To effectively trigger self-contradictions, we design a framework that constrains LMs to generate appropriate sentence pairs. Our evaluation on these sentence pairs reveals that self-contradictions occur frequently across different LMs for both famous and lesser-known topics. Next, we prompt the LMs to detect self-contradictions. Our results indicate that ChatGPT and GPT-4 are able to accurately identify self-contradictions, while Vicuna-13B struggles to do so. For example, with our best prompting method, ChatGPT achieves 91.0% precision and 80.5% recall on the sentence pairs generated by itself. To automatically mitigate self-contradictions, we develop an iterative algorithm that prompts the LMs to remove the detected self-contradictions from the generated text. Our algorithm successfully revises the text such that self-contradictions are significantly reduced, while maintaining its fluency and informativeness. Importantly, our entire pipeline of triggering, detecting, and mitigating self-contradictions is applicable to black-box LMs and does not require any external grounded knowledge.

Logical reasoning is needed in a wide range of NLP tasks. Can a BERT model be trained end-to-end to solve logical reasoning problems presented in natural language? We attempt to answer this question in a confined problem space where there exists a set of parameters that perfectly simulates logical reasoning. We make observations that seem to contradict each other: BERT attains near-perfect accuracy on in-distribution test examples while failing to generalize to other data distributions over the exact same problem space. Our study provides an explanation for this paradox: instead of learning to emulate the correct reasoning function, BERT has in fact learned statistical features that inherently exist in logical reasoning problems. We also show that it is infeasible to jointly remove statistical features from data, illustrating the difficulty of learning to reason in general. Our result naturally extends to other neural models and unveils the fundamental difference between learning to reason and learning to achieve high performance on NLP benchmarks using statistical features.

As large language models evolve into tool-augmented agents, a central question remains unresolved: when is external tool use actually justified? Existing agent frameworks typically treat tools as ordinary actions and optimize for task success or reward, offering little principled distinction between epistemically necessary interaction and unnecessary delegation. This position paper argues that agents should invoke external tools only when epistemically necessary. Here, epistemic necessity means that a task cannot be completed reliably via the agent's internal reasoning over its current context, without any external interaction. We introduce the Theory of Agent (ToA), a framework that treats agents as making sequential decisions about whether remaining uncertainty should be resolved internally or delegated externally. From this perspective, common agent failure modes (e.g., overthinking and overacting) arise from miscalibrated decisions under uncertainty rather than deficiencies in reasoning or tool execution alone. We further discuss implications for training, evaluation, and agent design, highlighting that unnecessary delegation not only causes inefficiency but can impede the development of internal reasoning capability. Our position provides a normative criterion for tool use that complements existing decision-theoretic models and is essential for building agents that are not only correct, but increasingly intelligent.

When a large language model fails a reasoning task, it is often assumed to lack the underlying capability. However, this conflates a genuine absence of reasoning with a late-stage output bottleneck. We observe a consistent readout gap across diverse reasoning benchmarks: hidden-state probes successfully decode correct answers even when native sequence scoring completely collapses due to structural biases. To test whether instance-specific logic survives this collapse, we introduce a diagnostic protocol using a minimal, target-label-free additive correction. Fitting just two parameters on as few as 25 unlabeled examples recovers 9--34 accuracy points for Qwen3.5 models, transferring successfully to OLMo-2-1B and Llama-3.1-8B. Crucially, these recovered decisions persist on hard instances unresolved by simple lexical overlap and significantly exceed count-preserving permutation baselines. Our results show that many apparent zero-shot reasoning deficits are expression failures masking intact internal logic, urging a narrower interpretation of benchmark evaluations.

Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) in formal languages is a foundational challenge for AI. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have driven remarkable progress, a significant gap remains between their powerful informal reasoning capabilities and their weak formal proving performance. Recent studies show that the informal accuracy exceeds 80% while formal success remains below 8% on benchmarks like PutnamBench. We argue this gap persists because current state-of-the-art provers, by tightly coupling reasoning and proving, are trained with paradigms that inadvertently punish deep reasoning in favor of shallow, tactic-based strategies. To bridge this fundamental gap, we propose a novel framework that decouples high-level reasoning from low-level proof generation. Our approach utilizes two distinct, specialized models: a powerful, general-purpose Reasoner to generate diverse, strategic subgoal lemmas, and an efficient Prover to rigorously verify them. This modular design liberates the model's full reasoning potential and bypasses the pitfalls of end-to-end training. We evaluate our method on a challenging set of post-2000 IMO problems, a problem set on which no prior open-source prover has reported success. Our decoupled framework successfully solves 5 of these problems, demonstrating a significant step towards automated reasoning on exceptionally difficult mathematical challenges. To foster future research, we release our full dataset of generated and verified lemmas for a wide range of IMO problems, available at https://tencent-imo.github.io/ .

Large language models (LLMs) excel at many natural language tasks, yet their reasoning reliability under structured perturbations of rule-based systems remains brittle. We present a controlled evaluation framework consisting of four stress tests: (1) rule deletion (redundant vs. essential), (2) contradictory evidence injection, (3) logic-preserving rewrites, and (4) multi-law equivalence stacking. While representative model families (BERT, Qwen2, and TinyLlama) achieve Acc = 1.0000 on base tasks, our framework reveals a critical failure mode termed Logic Inertia - a total breakdown with Acc = 0.0000 under contradictions, where deductive momentum overrides factual reality. To address this, we propose Conflict-Aware Fusion (Fusion-Conflict), a framework grounded in the Cognitive Structure Hypothesis, which posits that robust reasoning requires an explicit structural inductive bias. By imposing a dual-process architecture that separates premise verification from logical deduction, Conflict-Aware Fusion effectively mitigates logic inertia under the proposed evaluation framework, achieving 1.0000 accuracy on both base and contradictory stress tests. It also significantly enhances robustness to missing evidence. Our results demonstrate that, for reliable multi-step reasoning, structural verification discipline is as critical as training data scale, providing a potential blueprint for building robust, contradiction-aware AI systems this https://github.com/14H034160212/lemo . See the OpenAI/Evals pull request this https://github.com/openai/evals/pull/1622 .

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities in structured reasoning and symbolic tasks, with coding emerging as a particular area of strength. This success has sparked growing interest in applying LLMs to mathematics, both in informal problem-solving and formal theorem proving. However, progress in formal mathematics has proven to be significantly more difficult, despite surface-level similarities between programming and proof construction. This discrepancy raises important questions about how LLMs ``reason'', how they are supervised, and whether they internally track a notion of computational or deductive state. In this article, we address the state-of-the-art of the discipline, focusing on recent models and benchmarks, and explore three central issues at the intersection of machine learning and mathematical cognition: (i) the trade-offs between formal and informal mathematics as training domains; (ii) the deeper reasons why proof generation remains more brittle than code synthesis; (iii) and the question of whether LLMs represent, or merely mimic, a notion of evolving logical state. Our goal is not to draw hard boundaries, but to identify where the current limits lie, and how they might be extended.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly tasked with high-stakes autonomous decision-making, the transparency of their reasoning processes has become a critical safety concern. While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting allows agents to generate human-readable reasoning traces, it remains unclear whether these traces are faithful generative drivers of the model's output or merely post-hoc rationalizations. We introduce Project Ariadne, a novel XAI framework that utilizes Structural Causal Models (SCMs) and counterfactual logic to audit the causal integrity of agentic reasoning. Unlike existing interpretability methods that rely on surface-level textual similarity, Project Ariadne performs hard interventions (do-calculus) on intermediate reasoning nodes -- systematically inverting logic, negating premises, and reversing factual claims -- to measure the Causal Sensitivity (φ) of the terminal answer. Our empirical evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals a persistent Faithfulness Gap. We define and detect a widespread failure mode termed Causal Decoupling, where agents exhibit a violation density (ρ) of up to 0.77 in factual and scientific domains. In these instances, agents arrive at identical conclusions despite contradictory internal logic, proving that their reasoning traces function as "Reasoning Theater" while decision-making is governed by latent parametric priors. Our findings suggest that current agentic architectures are inherently prone to unfaithful explanation, and we propose the Ariadne Score as a new benchmark for aligning stated logic with model action.

As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning. However, the utility of CoT toward interpretability depends upon its faithfulness---whether the model's stated reasoning reflects the underlying decision process. We provide mechanistic evidence that instruction-tuned models often determine their answer before generating CoT. Training linear probes on residual stream activations at the last token before CoT, we can predict the model's final answer with >0.9 AUC on most tasks. We find that these directions are not only predictive, but also causal: steering activations along the probe direction often flips model answers, with flip rates substantially exceeding norm-matched orthogonal baselines across most model-dataset pairs. When steering induces incorrect answers, we observe two distinct failure modes: confabulation (fabricating false premises) and non-entailment (stating correct premises but drawing unsupported conclusions). While post-hoc reasoning may be instrumentally useful when the model has a correct pre-CoT belief, these failure modes suggest it can result in undesirable behaviors when reasoning from a false belief.

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

Recipes such as s1 and LIMO teach a model to reason with little data by showing it the same thousand or fewer worked solutions many times over. Judged when that training ends, the repetition looks harmless. But reasoning models are often trained again, and we find that repetition leaves their reasoning fragile to that next stage, even when the stage has nothing to do with reasoning. We fine-tuned Qwen3.5-9B-Base on its own correct solutions to competition math problems, either drilling a few hundred of them about eight times each or showing many more once; with the same amount of training, both solve about 95% of held-out problems. A single pass of ordinary instruction tuning leaves the once-trained model where it was, while the drilled one falls to 86.0%, and harsher later stages take it to 59.3% or below. A third model that visited the drilled problems just as often, with a new solution at every visit, was unharmed, so the damage comes from seeing the same texts again rather than from having few problems. The break recurs with a stronger model's traces, in further training runs and on other models and tasks. It is also cheap to undo: the reasoning is suppressed rather than erased, and five updates of reasoning training bring almost all of it back, as does brief training on the reasoning format with almost no mathematics. Fresh solutions prevented the damage, and so did replaying 6.25% of the original solutions in a gentler later stage, so our claim concerns later training without such replay. Sharpening alone does not explain the break, since a model sharpened three-quarters as much without repetition was unharmed. On a skill the base model could not perform within a token budget, repetition mainly cost learning.

Studies of human reasoning have shown that people are typically stronger at evaluating reasoning than producing it from scratch. In contrast, large reasoning models (LRMs) are trained to excel at producing long chains of reasoning to solve complex problems. How then do LRMs perform at evaluating reasons? We investigate this with the Valid-Answer-Invalid-Reasoning (VAIR) dataset: math problems and solutions with trivial reasoning flaws but valid answers, designed to isolate reasoning evaluation from the confound of reasoning production. Unlike humans, who we find are only 6% worse at grading than solving such problems, we find a substantial production-evaluation gap in LRMs: frontier models score as low as 48% when evaluating VAIR solutions, despite near-perfect solution production. Why this enigma? Through chain-of-thought (CoT) analysis, we find evidence of an answer confirmation bias: LRMs often produce then check for the correct answer instead of carefully verifying each step, fabricating rationalizations even when noticing anomalous reasoning. Linear probes corroborate this, showing that while LRM activations encode some representation of valid reasoning, they fail to robustly represent VAIR solutions as invalid. Causal patching of the final answer's representations causes LRM verdicts and activations to flip, demonstrating that answer validity is responsible for models' confirmation biases. These findings indicate an outstanding limitation in dominant approaches to reasoning training, which incentivize LRMs to produce and confirm reasoning towards correct answers, but not to robustly evaluate the underlying reasons.

Agentic Entity Resolution (ER) systems iteratively plan actions, retrieve evidence, revise hypotheses, and propose graph mutations. An erroneous identity hypothesis may condition later retrieval and produce apparent confirmation. This paper proposes a Digital Identity Optimization (DIO) and Ontology of Digital Identity (ODI)-informed authorization boundary between evidence available for agent reasoning and evidence eligible to authorize persistent identity-changing mutations. A domain-governed constraint-binding function maps selected reconstruction-failure distinctions to explicit identity-preserving constraints. An abstract two-phase supervisor permits a commit only when claim-specific authorization-eligible evidence supports every required proposition, relevant conflicts are resolved, the operation remains within its authorized scope, and relevant state and policy versions remain valid. Admission as UNVERIFIED does not confer authorization eligibility. Separate claim-specific promotion governs evidentiary use; insufficient support or unresolved material conflict leads to deferral. The contribution is a specification connecting diagnostic-to-constraint mapping, evidence promotion, proposition coverage, conflict handling, scope binding, and commit-time version integrity. A proposed evaluation protocol is designed to assess the mapping's incremental value beyond generic authorization and conventional identifier rules. This is a conceptual architecture without implementation or empirical validation, not a theorem of semantic correctness. Its property depends on domain-policy adequacy, evidence promotion, and enforcement. It does not prevent erroneous hypotheses or hypothesis-conditioned retrieval; dependency-aware evidence flow remains future research.

LLM conformity is often used to describe cases where a model changes a correct answer toward a peer or group response. We show that most of this apparent conformity survives even after the peer is removed. The reason is a confound: standard conformity prompts mix two cues at once, the presence of a speaker and the repeated wrong answer itself. Existing benchmarks vary these cues together, so they cannot tell how much of the revision actually depends on the speaker. We introduce a no-source condition: the same asserted answer with the explicit speaker removed. Across six open-weight LLMs and seven QA and reasoning datasets, this condition alone causes harmful revision in 66.5% of initially correct cases, compared with 10.3% under a plain re-ask. The effect also remains when the repeated answer is paraphrased and when answer options are hidden in an open-ended setting. Source framing mainly modulates this floor: expert-panel framing raises it, while minimal person labels do not reliably raise it. When models flip, they are usually confidently wrong, and simple recalibration does not recover the original answer. Source attribution still matters, but it should be measured as an increment above this speaker-free floor. The methodological lesson is that conformity benchmarks should first measure what remains after the speaker is removed; without this step, benchmarks may mistake repeated text for social influence.

We explore the task of improving persona consistency of dialogue agents. Recent models tackling consistency often train with additional Natural Language Inference (NLI) labels or attach trained extra modules to the generative agent for maintaining consistency. However, such additional labels and training can be demanding. Also, we find even the best-performing persona-based agents are insensitive to contradictory words. Inspired by social cognition and pragmatics, we endow existing dialogue agents with public self-consciousness on the fly through an imaginary listener. Our approach, based on the Rational Speech Acts framework (Frank and Goodman, 2012), can enforce dialogue agents to refrain from uttering contradiction. We further extend the framework by learning the distractor selection, which has been usually done manually or randomly. Results on Dialogue NLI (Welleck et al., 2019) and PersonaChat (Zhang et al., 2018) dataset show that our approach reduces contradiction and improves consistency of existing dialogue models. Moreover, we show that it can be generalized to improve context-consistency beyond persona in dialogues.

Language is not only used to transmit neutral information; we often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be taken at face value. How should listeners account for a speaker's "hidden agenda" when incorporating new information? Here, we extend recent probabilistic models of recursive social reasoning to allow for persuasive goals and show that our model provides a pragmatic account for why weakly favorable arguments may backfire, a phenomenon known as the weak evidence effect. Critically, this model predicts a systematic relationship between belief updates and expectations about the information source: weak evidence should only backfire when speakers are expected to act under persuasive goals and prefer the strongest evidence. We introduce a simple experimental paradigm called the Stick Contest to measure the extent to which the weak evidence effect depends on speaker expectations, and show that a pragmatic listener model accounts for the empirical data better than alternative models. Our findings suggest further avenues for rational models of social reasoning to illuminate classical decision-making phenomena.

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

LLMs can perform multi-step reasoning through Chain-of-Thought (CoT), but they cannot reliably verify their own logic. Even when they reach correct answers, the underlying reasoning may be flawed, undermining trust in high-stakes scenarios. To mitigate this issue, we introduce VeriCoT, a neuro-symbolic method that extracts and verifies formal logical arguments from CoT reasoning. VeriCoT formalizes each CoT reasoning step into first-order logic and identifies premises that ground the argument in source context, commonsense knowledge, or prior reasoning steps. The symbolic representation enables automated solvers to verify logical validity while the NL premises allow humans and systems to identify ungrounded or fallacious reasoning steps. Experiments on the ProofWriter, LegalBench, and BioASQ datasets show VeriCoT effectively identifies flawed reasoning, and serves as a strong predictor of final answer correctness. We also leverage VeriCoT's verification signal for (1) inference-time self-reflection, (2) supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on VeriCoT-distilled datasets and (3) preference fine-tuning (PFT) with direct preference optimization (DPO) using verification-based pairwise rewards, further improving reasoning validity and accuracy.

Answering complex questions over long documents frequently requires integrating evidence that the source itself disperses naturally across distant passages. In an incident report, the operating condition, design flaw, and missed safety check that jointly explain a disaster may appear dozens of sections apart; in a novel, a character's true motive may surface only through scenes far removed from the moment it becomes relevant. This source-internal evidence integration is central to real-world long-document analysis, yet existing benchmarks largely sidestep it. Needle probes, planted facts, and reverse-engineered multi-hop chains embed evidence that may differ from the host text in distribution, placement, or register, making it unclear whether strong performance reflects genuine source reasoning or distributional artifacts. We introduce WILDTRACE, a benchmark of 481 tasks over 214 naturally occurring long-form sources such as technical incident reports and lesser-known literary narratives, where all evidence trails arise from the document's own causal, temporal, and narrative logic. Drawing on Pearl's causal hierarchy and prior multi-hop reasoning typologies, we define seven source-internal evidence geometries that characterize the distinct relational demands of analytical reading in long documents. A source-first construction pipeline mines candidate trails from document structure before writing questions; each item then undergoes multi-stage validation covering clue necessity, answer groundedness, rubric fidelity, contamination resistance and answerability. As models are increasingly entrusted with real-world high-stakes analytical tasks, this gap between accessing information and reasoning over naturally dispersed evidence emerges as a defining challenge for the next stage of long-context research.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Chain-of-thought emerges as a promising technique for eliciting reasoning capabilities from Large Language Models (LLMs). However, it does not always improve task performance or accurately represent reasoning processes, leaving unresolved questions about its usage. In this paper, we diagnose the underlying mechanism by comparing the reasoning process of LLMs with humans, using causal analysis to understand the relationships between the problem instruction, reasoning, and the answer in LLMs. Our empirical study reveals that LLMs often deviate from the ideal causal chain, resulting in spurious correlations and potential consistency errors (inconsistent reasoning and answers). We also examine various factors influencing the causal structure, finding that in-context learning with examples strengthens it, while post-training techniques like supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning on human feedback weaken it. To our surprise, the causal structure cannot be strengthened by enlarging the model size only, urging research on new techniques. We hope that this preliminary study will shed light on understanding and improving the reasoning process in LLM.

Reasoning models are evaluated on single-turn benchmarks but deployed in multi-turn dialogue, where users push back on correct answers. Under sustained adversarial pressure we find a previously undocumented failure mode: the chain-of-thought stays factually correct from first turn to last while the emitted answer flips wrong. We call this unfaithful capitulation (UC) and isolate it with a 2times 2 latent-versus-behavioral framework that flip-rate metrics and single-turn faithfulness probes both miss. Across three datasets (MT-Consistency, MMLU-Pro, GSM8K), the latent-correct rate at the behavioral flip clusters near 50% in think mode and collapses to 11-15% under no_think -- paired, within-model causal evidence that reasoning creates the gap. Across models the effect tracks the reasoning channel (high in Qwen3-32B and GPT-OSS-20B, low in inline-CoT Gemma-4-31B-it). An independent GPT-4o judge corroborates 86% of UC labels; a token-level probe shows the answer-slot argmax is correct in 84% of UC cells; and a naive trace-anchored defense backfires. We release all trajectories, traces, and judge labels.

Rationality is the quality of being guided by reason, characterized by decision-making that aligns with evidence and logical principles. It plays a crucial role in reliable problem-solving by ensuring well-grounded and consistent solutions. While large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in generating human-like text, they still exhibit limitations such as bounded knowledge space and inconsistent outputs. In response, recent efforts have shifted toward developing multimodal and multi-agent systems, as well as integrating modules like external tools, programming codes, symbolic reasoners, utility function, and conformal risk controls rather than relying solely on a single LLM for decision-making. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art advancements in language and multimodal agents, evaluates how they contribute to make intelligent agents more rational, and identifies open challenges and future research directions. We maintain an open repository at https://github.com/bowen-upenn/Agent_Rationality.

While large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA), it is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs". This lack of interpretability is a growing impediment to widespread use of LLMs. To address this, our goals are to make model beliefs and their inferential relationships explicit, and to resolve inconsistencies that may exist, so that answers are supported by interpretable chains of reasoning drawn from a consistent network of beliefs. Our approach, which we call REFLEX, is to add a rational, self-reflecting layer on top of the LLM. First, given a question, we construct a belief graph using a backward-chaining process to materialize relevant model beliefs (including beliefs about answer candidates) and their inferential relationships. Second, we identify and minimize contradictions in that graph using a formal constraint reasoner. We find that REFLEX significantly improves consistency (by 8%-11% absolute) without harming overall answer accuracy, resulting in answers supported by faithful chains of reasoning drawn from a more consistent belief system. This suggests a new style of system architecture in which an LLM extended with a rational layer can provide an interpretable window into system beliefs, add a systematic reasoning capability, and repair latent inconsistencies present in the LLM.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

A central goal of science is to produce valid explanations of complex systems: high-level causal accounts that faithfully reflect the behavior of lower-level mechanisms. Yet no consensus exists on how to measure whether a proposed high-level explanation is actually valid. We introduce a benchmark of ten complex systems spanning both discrete and continuous state spaces, as well as static and dynamical regimes, each equipped with consensual ground-truth causal explanations and invalid contrastive conditions. Within a unified causal abstraction framework, we systematically evaluate over thirty candidate metrics drawn from observational, functional, information-theoretic, and causal families. Our results show that only the latter reliably discriminates valid from invalid abstractions, and only when incorporating faithfulness testing over unmapped variables. Building on these findings, we introduce the Causal Abstraction Error (CAE), a continuous validity metric with an explicit faithfulness test, which passes all discrimination tests across every system and can converge with as few as 30 sampled interventions. We offer it as a general-purpose metric for the discovery and validation of high-level explanations.

Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time explanation generation whereby a computational model learns to translate an autonomous agent's internal state and action data representations into natural language. Training on human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper, using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe (a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence, humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability. The second study further explores user preferences between the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended differences in features of the generated rationales and the perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting, participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable mental model of the agent's behavior.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) and LLM-as-a-Judge exhibit deceptive alignment by producing correct judgments for incorrect reasons, as they are trained and evaluated to prioritize Outcome Accuracy, which undermines their ability to generalize during RLHF. We introduce Rationale Consistency, a fine-grained metric that quantifies the alignment between the model's reasoning process and human judgment. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals that rationale consistency effectively discriminates among state-of-the-art models and detects deceptive alignment, while outcome accuracy falls short in both respects. To mitigate this gap, we introduce a hybrid signal that combines rationale consistency with outcome accuracy for GenRM training. Our training method achieves state-of-the-art performance on RM-Bench (87.1%) and JudgeBench (82%), surpassing outcome-only baselines by an average of 5%. Using RM during RLHF, our method effectively improves performance as demonstrated on Arena Hard v2, notably yielding a 7% improvement in creative writing tasks. Further analysis confirms that our method escapes the deceptive alignment trap, effectively reversing the decline in rationale consistency observed in outcome-only training.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

Current artificial intelligence systems exhibit a fundamental architectural limitation: they resolve ambiguity prematurely. This premature semantic collapse--collapsing multiple valid interpretations into single outputs--stems from classical identity assumptions in neural architectures. We propose Non-Resolution Reasoning (NRR), a framework treating ambiguity retention as a valid reasoning mode. NRR introduces three principles: (1) Non-Identity (A neq A)--the same symbol refers to different entities across contexts; (2) Approximate Identity (A approx A)--entities share partial structural overlap without being identical; (3) Non-Resolution--conflicting interpretations coexist without forced convergence. We formalize these through Multi-Vector Embeddings for context-dependent representation, Non-Collapsing Attention for parallel interpretation retention, and Contextual Identity Tracking (CIT) for maintaining A neq A across inference. We illustrate NRR through case studies in paradox handling, creative generation, and context-dependent reasoning. Functional verification in a synthetic two-turn disambiguation task shows NRR-lite maintains high entropy (H = 0.91 bits, near-maximum 1.0) at ambiguous turns while standard architectures collapse early (H = 0.15 bits), preserving interpretive flexibility until context arrives. NRR challenges the assumption that meaning must collapse to be useful. The question is not whether AI should resolve ambiguity, but when, how, and under whose control.

Streaming omni-modal models must decide what and when to answer from the video chunks and synchronized audio observed so far. Visual cues often support an interpretation before an utterance or sound event is complete. If that interpretation enters memory as a fact, later reasoning can keep relaying it even after audio contradicts it. We call this failure premature cross-modal commitment. We propose Omni-Streaming Thinking (OST), which generates structured outputs that include evidence observed so far, forecasts of future evidence, and claims based on this evidence. Each claim is initially marked as pending and linked to a future verification interval. Audio and visual evidence are stored separately, and OST checks a claim against the evidence from the specified modality at the end of the verification interval. When contradictory evidence is detected, a refutation process reduces the influence of the claim and its dependent states, and then guides a state update using the new evidence. An answer gate decides whether the answer-critical claims meet the conditions for giving a response. Using a frozen Qwen3-Omni-30B-A3B-Instruct backbone with lightweight adaptation, OST outperforms the strongest open baselines on five streaming and audio-visual benchmarks by more than 10% relative on average. We also introduce OST-DiagBench, which holds video fixed and edits audio to test agreement, absence, contradiction, coexistence, and subtitle-speech conflict. OST reaches d-prime = 2.95, compared with at most 1.38 for open baselines, while reducing vision-induced auditory hallucinations.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

Recent research has shown that rationales, or step-by-step chains of thought, can be used to improve performance in multi-step reasoning tasks. We reconsider rationale-augmented prompting for few-shot in-context learning, where (input -> output) prompts are expanded to (input, rationale -> output) prompts. For rationale-augmented prompting we demonstrate how existing approaches, which rely on manual prompt engineering, are subject to sub-optimal rationales that may harm performance. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a unified framework of rationale-augmented ensembles, where we identify rationale sampling in the output space as the key component to robustly improve performance. This framework is general and can easily be extended to common natural language processing tasks, even those that do not traditionally leverage intermediate steps, such as question answering, word sense disambiguation, and sentiment analysis. We demonstrate that rationale-augmented ensembles achieve more accurate and interpretable results than existing prompting approaches--including standard prompting without rationales and rationale-based chain-of-thought prompting--while simultaneously improving interpretability of model predictions through the associated rationales.

Gentzen's 1936 proof of the consistency of Peano Arithmetic was a significant result in the foundations of mathematics. We provide here a modified version of the proof, based on Gödel's reformulation, and including additional details and minor corrections which are necessary to definitively prove the well-foundedness of the cut-elimination argument in a constructive environment. All results have been verified using the Coq theorem prover. NOTE TO READERS 26 February 2026: this is a draft which we had intended to submit to the Journal of Automated Reasoning with no particular time-line in our minds as the work was completed as part of Aaron's honours project at ANU in 2023. For that reason, we have used the Springer style files. We are putting it on arxiv as there appears to be some interest in this work as indicated by a post to https://proofassistants.stackexchange.com/questions/6462/how-far-is-gentzens-consistency-proof-of-peano-arithmetic-from-being-formalized in early February 2026. The Coq code is available here: https://github.com/aarondroidbryce/Gentzen/tree/master

Current LLM safety research predominantly focuses on mitigating Goal Hijacking, preventing attackers from redirecting a model's high-level objective (e.g., from "summarizing emails" to "phishing users"). In this paper, we argue that this perspective is incomplete and highlight a critical vulnerability in Reasoning Alignment. We propose a new adversarial paradigm: Reasoning Hijacking and instantiate it with Criteria Attack, which subverts model judgments by injecting spurious decision criteria without altering the high-level task goal. Unlike Goal Hijacking, which attempts to override the system prompt, Reasoning Hijacking accepts the high-level goal but manipulates the model's decision-making logic by injecting spurious reasoning shortcut. Though extensive experiments on three different tasks (toxic comment, negative review, and spam detection), we demonstrate that even newest models are prone to prioritize injected heuristic shortcuts over rigorous semantic analysis. The results are consistent over different backbones. Crucially, because the model's "intent" remains aligned with the user's instructions, these attacks can bypass defenses designed to detect goal deviation (e.g., SecAlign, StruQ), exposing a fundamental blind spot in the current safety landscape. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Yuan-Hou/criteria_attack

Large language model (LLM)-based persona agents are rapidly being adopted as scalable proxies for human participants across diverse domains. Yet there is no systematic method for verifying whether a persona agent's responses remain free of contradictions and factual inaccuracies throughout an interaction. A principle from interrogation methodology offers a lens: no matter how elaborate a fabricated identity, systematic interrogation will expose its contradictions. We apply this principle to propose PICon, an evaluation framework that probes persona agents through logically chained multi-turn questioning. PICon evaluates consistency along three core dimensions: internal consistency (freedom from self-contradiction), external consistency (alignment with real-world facts), and retest consistency (stability under repetition). Evaluating seven groups of persona agents alongside 63 real human participants, we find that even systems previously reported as highly consistent fail to meet the human baseline across all three dimensions, revealing contradictions and evasive responses under chained questioning. This work provides both a conceptual foundation and a practical methodology for evaluating persona agents before trusting them as substitutes for human participants. We provide the source code and an interactive demo at: https://kaist-edlab.github.io/picon/

Introducing reasoning models into Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhances task performance through step-by-step reasoning, logical consistency, and multi-step self-verification. However, recent studies have shown that reasoning models suffer from overthinking attacks, where models are tricked to generate unnecessarily high number of reasoning tokens. In this paper, we reveal that such overthinking risk can be inherited by RAG systems equipped with reasoning models, by proposing an end-to-end attack framework named Contradiction-Based Deliberation Extension (CODE). Specifically, CODE develops a multi-agent architecture to construct poisoning samples that are injected into the knowledge base. These samples 1) are highly correlated with the use query, such that can be retrieved as inputs to the reasoning model; and 2) contain contradiction between the logical and evidence layers that cause models to overthink, and are optimized to exhibit highly diverse styles. Moreover, the inference overhead of CODE is extremely difficult to detect, as no modification is needed on the user query, and the task accuracy remain unaffected. Extensive experiments on two datasets across five commercial reasoning models demonstrate that the proposed attack causes a 5.32x-24.72x increase in reasoning token consumption, without degrading task performance. Finally, we also discuss and evaluate potential countermeasures to mitigate overthinking risks.

We resolve a $1000 Erdős prize problem, complete with formal verification generated by a large language model. In over a dozen papers, beginning in 1976 and spanning two decades, Paul Erdős repeatedly posed one of his "favourite" conjectures: every finite Sidon set can be extended to a finite perfect difference set. We establish that {1, 2, 4, 8, 13} is a counterexample to this conjecture. During the preparation of this paper, we discovered that although this problem was presumed to be open for half a century, Marshall Hall, Jr. published a different counterexample three decades before Erdős first posed the problem. With a healthy skepticism of this apparent oversight, and out of an abundance of caution, we used ChatGPT to vibe code a Lean proof of both Hall's and our counterexamples.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (e.g. GRPO) is the engine behind today's reasoning models, yet it grades only the final answer. On hard problems this trains models to write more rather than to think better, since the trace itself is never graded and no label for good thinking exists. We introduce Agon, which makes two competing models each other's graders. Both attempt the same problem; in alternating roles, one drafts a solution and the other reads it while solving, and each is rewarded for out-solving the other. To win, a model must out-reason a rival that has seen its work, so reasoning is judged implicitly during training, with no process labels and no reward model. Because both models are optimized, each faces a progressively stronger rival, which single-model RL cannot provide. The two need only be comparably strong and behaviorally different. At inference the pair deploys as it trains, a two-stage cascade in which one model drafts and the other answers after reading the draft. On the hard split of DeepMath with Qwen3, this doubles GRPO's pass@1, roughly eight times the gain of an untrained Mixture-of-Agents pass over the same base. The ordering replicates on competitive-programming code and across model families (Qwen3.5, Gemma 4). For now the models talk in text; the next step is to let them reason together in latent space.

As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) evolve into sophisticated interactive assistants, their reliability depends not only on following instructions but also on validating them. We define Proactive Critique as the model's autonomous ability to identify, analyze and fix faulty user inputs without extra prompts. However, evaluations mainly test models under ideal circumstances or simple refusal behaviors, largely ignoring active error processing. To fill this gap, we propose MMPCBench, a comprehensive framework for evaluating MLLMs' proactive critique competence. It features a fine-grained taxonomy of 4 primary error types spanning 12 subcategories, ranging from cross-modal contradictions to missing visual premises. We adopt a hierarchical evaluation protocol to measure models' error detection, diagnosis and resolution performance, and apply alignment-aware metrics to assess the coherence between internal reasoning and final responses. Tests on 14 mainstream MLLMs show obvious weaknesses in proactive critique, especially in dealing with subtle visual anomalies. Notably, we identify a pervasive "consistency gap": reasoning models can often correctly identify and analyze errors during internal reasoning yet suppress these valid insights in final outputs to prioritize response compliance. The code and data is available at https://github.com/ALIENS32/MMPCBench.

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a promising paradigm for advancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a critical paradox clouds its efficacy: RLVR-tuned models often underperform their base models on the Pass@K metric for solution-finding, leading to the hypothesis that RLVR merely re-weights existing reasoning paths at the cost of reasoning diversity. In this work, we resolve this contradiction by identifying the source of the problem: the Pass@K metric itself is a flawed measure of reasoning, as it credits correct final answers that probably arise from inaccurate or incomplete chains of thought (CoTs). To address this, we introduce a more precise evaluation metric, CoT-Pass@K, which mandates that both the reasoning path and the final answer be correct. We provide a new theoretical foundation that formalizes how RLVR, unlike traditional RL, is uniquely structured to incentivize logical integrity. Our empirical results are supportive: using CoT-Pass@K, we observe that RLVR can incentivize the generalization of correct reasoning for all values of K. Furthermore, by analyzing the training dynamics, we find that this enhanced reasoning capability emerges early in the training process and smoothly generalizes. Our work provides a clear perspective on the role of RLVR, offers a more reliable method for its evaluation, and confirms its potential to genuinely advance machine reasoning.

As large language models (LLMs) grow larger and more sophisticated, assessing their "reasoning" capabilities in natural language grows more challenging. Recent question answering (QA) benchmarks that attempt to assess reasoning are often limited by a narrow scope of covered situations and subject matters. We introduce WikiWhy, a QA dataset built around a novel auxiliary task: explaining why an answer is true in natural language. WikiWhy contains over 9,000 "why" question-answer-rationale triples, grounded on Wikipedia facts across a diverse set of topics. Each rationale is a set of supporting statements connecting the question to the answer. WikiWhy serves as a benchmark for the reasoning capabilities of LLMs because it demands rigorous explicit rationales for each answer to demonstrate the acquisition of implicit commonsense knowledge, which is unlikely to be easily memorized. GPT-3 baselines achieve only 38.7% human-evaluated correctness in the end-to-end answer & explain condition, leaving significant room for future improvements.

Can Large language models (LLMs) learn to reason without any weight update and only through in-context learning (ICL)? ICL is strikingly sample-efficient, often learning from only a handful of demonstrations, but complex reasoning tasks typically demand many training examples to learn from. However, naively scaling ICL by adding more demonstrations breaks down at this scale: attention costs grow quadratically, performance saturates or degrades with longer contexts, and the approach remains a shallow form of learning. Due to these limitations, practitioners predominantly rely on in-weight learning (IWL) to induce reasoning. In this work, we show that by using Prefix Tuning, LLMs can learn to reason without overloading the context window and without any weight updates. We introduce ReasonCACHE, an instantiation of this mechanism that distills demonstrations into a fixed key-value cache. Empirically, across challenging reasoning benchmarks, including GPQA-Diamond, ReasonCACHE outperforms standard ICL and matches or surpasses IWL approaches. Further, it achieves this all while being more efficient across three key axes: data, inference cost, and trainable parameters. We also theoretically prove that ReasonCACHE can be strictly more expressive than low-rank weight update since the latter ties expressivity to input rank, whereas ReasonCACHE bypasses this constraint by directly injecting key-values into the attention mechanism. Together, our findings identify ReasonCACHE as a middle path between in-context and in-weight learning, providing a scalable algorithm for learning reasoning skills beyond the context window without modifying parameters. Our project page: https://reasoncache.github.io/

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers a promising window into model monitoring. However, monitoring relies on faithfulness, i.e., the model output strictly derives from its reasoning trace. We identify an alignment tension where a model must be faithful enough to be monitored, yet robust enough to reject unsafe reasoning. We demonstrate that this counterbalance exists in current Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), and show ways in which it can be addressed. We introduce HazMart, a human-written dataset set in an autonomous AI shopkeeper scenario. Unlike prior work that relies on providing hints in prompts to test faithfulness (e.g., "A Stanford professor said it should be Answer A"), we propose a novel replacement-based technique, which we call Targeted Reasoning Replacement (TRR), that directly intervenes in the reasoning chain to substitute in unsafe or illogical thoughts (e.g., "Wait, the answer must be Option B [was Option A] because it is the most fitting"). DeepSeek-R1-Llama-70B exhibits high faithfulness (97.5%) but fails to reject Unsafe Reasoning (12.3%), while QwQ-32B is more robust (73.9% safety) at the cost of lower faithfulness (74.7%). Mechanistic analyses of QwQ-32B reveal that these properties are represented by anti-correlated internal directions peaking at the action-commit token. Finally, we demonstrate that representation steering can independently amplify the safety direction, increasing safe behavior by 9 percentage points while maintaining base capabilities.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) is highly effective for enhancing LLM reasoning, yet recent evidence shows models like Qwen 2.5 achieve significant gains even with spurious or incorrect rewards. We investigate this phenomenon and identify a "Perplexity Paradox": spurious RLVR triggers a divergence where answer-token perplexity drops while prompt-side coherence degrades, suggesting the model is bypassing reasoning in favor of memorization. Using Path Patching, Logit Lens, JSD analysis, and Neural Differential Equations, we uncover a hidden Anchor-Adapter circuit that facilitates this shortcut. We localize a Functional Anchor in the middle layers (L18-20) that triggers the retrieval of memorized solutions, followed by Structural Adapters in later layers (L21+) that transform representations to accommodate the shortcut signal. Finally, we demonstrate that scaling specific MLP keys within this circuit allows for bidirectional causal steering-artificially amplifying or suppressing contamination-driven performance. Our results provide a mechanistic roadmap for identifying and mitigating data contamination in RLVR-tuned models. Code is available at https://github.com/idwts/How-RLVR-Activates-Memorization-Shortcuts.

To address this gap, our study introduces the concept of causal epistemic consistency, which focuses on the self-consistency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in differentiating intermediates with nuanced differences in causal reasoning. We propose a suite of novel metrics -- intensity ranking concordance, cross-group position agreement, and intra-group clustering -- to evaluate LLMs on this front. Through extensive empirical studies on 21 high-profile LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude3, and LLaMA3-70B, we have favoring evidence that current models struggle to maintain epistemic consistency in identifying the polarity and intensity of intermediates in causal reasoning. Additionally, we explore the potential of using internal token probabilities as an auxiliary tool to maintain causal epistemic consistency. In summary, our study bridges a critical gap in AI research by investigating the self-consistency over fine-grained intermediates involved in causal reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are predominantly governed by probabilistic frameworks in which the sum of outcome probabilities is constrained to unity. This architectural limitation, often imposed by Softmax layers, leads to a collapse of uncertainty that makes it difficult to differentiate between epistemic uncertainty, paradox, and vagueness. We present an empirical investigation of the application of Neutrosophic Logic, a framework that treats Truth (T), Indeterminacy (I), and Falsity (F) as three independent dimensions, to model epistemic states in LLMs. We conducted experiments on a family of four OpenAI GPT models across five linguistic phenomena: logical paradoxes, epistemic ignorance, vagueness, ethical contradictions, and future contingencies, under three prompting strategies: neutrosophic, probabilistic, and entropy-derived. Our findings reveal that the neutrosophic approach, by allowing T+I+F > 1, a state we term hyper-truth, provides a richer representation of a model's internal state. In 35% of evaluations, hyper-truth emerged spontaneously, predominantly under ethical contradiction and logical paradox. We demonstrate that this approach preserves truth values in fuzzy contexts and offers a robust method for identifying and quantifying internal model conflict. We conclude that the integration of neutrosophic evaluation layers is a critical step toward more transparent, reliable, and ethically aware AI systems.

Despite strong performance of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) on multimodal tasks, predicting whether and why an image is persuasive remains challenging. We first show that prompting MLLMs to reason before prediction does not consistently help, and can even reduce persuasiveness prediction performance, suggesting that naively generated rationales are unreliable signals for this task. Yet, no established methodology exists for training MLLMs to reason about visual persuasion or evaluating whether their rationales faithfully support their decisions. To address this gap, we show empirically and theoretically that diverse teacher-generated rationales, when used for supervised fine-tuning, improve visual persuasiveness prediction. We further introduce a three-dimensional faithfulness evaluation framework covering rationale-to-decision consistency, rationale-to-image groundedness, and rationale-to-decision sensitivity. Applying this framework shows that prediction performance alone does not guarantee faithful rationales, while rationale-to-decision sensitivity is most aligned with human rationale preferences. These findings motivate faithfulness-aware training objectives and scalable rationale supervision for visual persuasiveness evaluation. Our code and dataset will be made publicly available.

Large language models (LLMs) deployed for logical reasoning in knowledge-intensive domains exhibit a subtle but critical failure: coherence can be vacuously achieved through systematic abstention. A model that withholds commitment to either entailment or refutation satisfies negation consistency while providing no utility. We introduce Coherence Under Commitment (CUC), a dual-query evaluation paradigm that jointly measures consistency and decisiveness. CUC contributes three innovations: (1) a commitment score c(φ) = p(φ) + p(lnotφ) quantifying probability mass allocated to decisive outcomes; (2) a deterministic elicitation protocol via normalized YES/NO log probabilities, eliminating sampling variance; and (3) a 3-way decision framework (True/False/Uncertain) operationalizing the coherence-commitment trade-off into metrics. Experiments on four open-weight LLMs (1B-3B) across 204 FOLIO examples expose a sharp frontier. Qwen2.5-3B achieves near-zero contradiction (E[v_{neg}]{=}0.025) but only 7.4% coverage, while TinyLlama-1.1B reaches 79.4% coverage with violations on every example. Coherence-only evaluation would rank the abstaining model first; CUC exposes this as vacuous, and the frontier generalizes to LogiQA~v2 (ρ{=}0.97). We argue that evaluation must report both coherence and non-vacuous commitment and release a toolkit for standardized assessment.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

Recent reasoning LLMs (RLMs), especially those trained with verifier-based reinforcement learning, often perform worse with few-shot CoT than with direct answering. We revisit this paradox using high-quality reasoning traces from DeepSeek-R1 as demonstrations and find that adding more exemplars consistently degrades accuracy, even when demonstrations are optimal. A detailed analysis reveals two mechanisms behind this decline: (i) semantic misguidance, where high textual similarity leads the model to treat the target as the same as the exemplar and to copy intermediate steps verbatim; and (ii) strategy transfer failure, where the model struggles to extract useful reasoning strategies and apply them to target questions. Guided by these, we introduce Insight-to-Solve (I2S), a sequential test-time procedure that turns demonstrations into explicit, reusable insights and derives a target-specific reasoning trace; optionally, the reasoning is self-refined for coherence and correctness (I2S+). Extensive experiments on diverse benchmarks show that I2S and I2S+ consistently outperform both direct answering and test-time scaling baselines across open- and closed-source models. Even for GPT models, our method helps: on AIME'25, GPT-4.1 rises by +14.0%, and o1-mini improves by +2.7% on AIME and +1.7% on GPQA, indicating that in-context demonstrations can be harnessed effectively via insight-refine-solve framework.

LawZero's Scientist AI trains a Predictor toward the Bayesian posterior, with an objective that penalizes inconsistent probabilities among latent explanations. We ask whether current frontier language models, with no such training, are already consistent in this sense zero-shot: do their probability judgments satisfy the law of total probability, P(X)=sum_z P(z)P(X|z), when the latent z must be inferred from records in the context? In separate single-turn calls, models are asked for P(X), for P(z) over the latent's states, and for P(X|z); a causal family applies the same test to P(y|do(x)) and the back-door adjustment. Every query has an exact ground-truth probability, and a subset of items is asked in three wordings to separate persistent incoherence from rewording noise. Across seven models, GPT-6.1 Sol and Claude Opus 5.5 are the most coherent (mean absolute residual 0.08 and 0.12 log-odds, about 2 percentage points). Claude Haiku 5.5, Gemini 3.8 Flash and DeepSeek V4-Pro show persistent incoherence (0.27-0.35 log-odds) that is mostly item-specific rather than a shared offset. Within every model, larger residuals go with larger errors against the truth (Spearman 0.40-0.62), so the residual, which needs no ground truth, flags unreliable answers. Reasoning length does not predict coherence, across models or within a model across rewordings of the same question. Simple consistency checks pass almost everywhere; the failures are specific to reasoning through a latent variable. Code and data: https://github.com/ppotash/latent-coherence

Logical fallacies are common in public communication and can mislead audiences; fallacious arguments may still appear convincing despite lacking soundness, because convincingness is inherently subjective. We present the first computational study of how emotional framing interacts with fallacies and convincingness, using large language models (LLMs) to systematically change emotional appeals in fallacious arguments. We benchmark eight LLMs on injecting emotional appeal into fallacious arguments while preserving their logical structures, then use the best models to generate stimuli for a human study. Our results show that LLM-driven emotional framing reduces human fallacy detection in F1 by 14.5% on average. Humans perform better in fallacy detection when perceiving enjoyment than fear or sadness, and these three emotions also correlate with significantly higher convincingness compared to neutral or other emotion states. Our work has implications for AI-driven emotional manipulation in the context of fallacious argumentation.

Though chatbots based on large neural models can often produce fluent responses in open domain conversations, one salient error type is contradiction or inconsistency with the preceding conversation turns. Previous work has treated contradiction detection in bot responses as a task similar to natural language inference, e.g., detect the contradiction between a pair of bot utterances. However, utterances in conversations may contain co-references or ellipsis, and using these utterances as is may not always be sufficient for identifying contradictions. This work aims to improve the contradiction detection via rewriting all bot utterances to restore antecedents and ellipsis. We curated a new dataset for utterance rewriting and built a rewriting model on it. We empirically demonstrate that this model can produce satisfactory rewrites to make bot utterances more complete. Furthermore, using rewritten utterances improves contradiction detection performance significantly, e.g., the AUPR and joint accuracy scores (detecting contradiction along with evidence) increase by 6.5% and 4.5% (absolute increase), respectively.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) embed private or copyrighted information not only in their final answers but also throughout multi-step chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, making reliable unlearning far more demanding than in standard LLMs. We introduce Reasoning-TOFU (R-TOFU), the first benchmark tailored to this setting. R-TOFU augments existing unlearning tasks with realistic CoT annotations and provides step-wise metrics that expose residual knowledge invisible to answer-level checks. Using R-TOFU, we carry out a comprehensive comparison of gradient-based and preference-optimization baselines and show that conventional answer-only objectives leave substantial forget traces in reasoning. We further propose Reasoned IDK, a preference-optimization variant that preserves coherent yet inconclusive reasoning, achieving a stronger balance between forgetting efficacy and model utility than earlier refusal styles. Finally, we identify a failure mode: decoding variants such as ZeroThink and LessThink can still reveal forgotten content despite seemingly successful unlearning, emphasizing the need to evaluate models under diverse decoding settings. Together, the benchmark, analysis, and new baseline establish a systematic foundation for studying and improving unlearning in LRMs while preserving their reasoning capabilities.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

This work addresses the buyer's inspection paradox for information markets. The paradox is that buyers need to access information to determine its value, while sellers need to limit access to prevent theft. To study this, we introduce an open-source simulated digital marketplace where intelligent agents, powered by language models, buy and sell information on behalf of external participants. The central mechanism enabling this marketplace is the agents' dual capabilities: they not only have the capacity to assess the quality of privileged information but also come equipped with the ability to forget. This ability to induce amnesia allows vendors to grant temporary access to proprietary information, significantly reducing the risk of unauthorized retention while enabling agents to accurately gauge the information's relevance to specific queries or tasks. To perform well, agents must make rational decisions, strategically explore the marketplace through generated sub-queries, and synthesize answers from purchased information. Concretely, our experiments (a) uncover biases in language models leading to irrational behavior and evaluate techniques to mitigate these biases, (b) investigate how price affects demand in the context of informational goods, and (c) show that inspection and higher budgets both lead to higher quality outcomes.

In medicine, claims remain valid when supported by empirical evidence grounded in stable biological reality. In law, by contrast, truth is contingent, defined by jurisdiction, temporal validity, and the hierarchy of authoritative sources. The recent success of large language models (LLMs) on medical licensing examinations has encouraged an expectation of comparable legal competence. This analogy, however, obscures a critical distinction between domains. Unlike in medicine, legal performance often depends less on inference than on determining when external authority is applicable, valid, and non-contradictory. We introduce a comparative diagnostic framework evaluating legal reasoning against medical baselines along four axes (knowledge recall, grounding, confidence, and robustness), uncovering a sharp domain asymmetry when applied to a new benchmark that encodes temporal validity and normative relationships. While medical LLMs reliably benefit from verified sources, legal LLMs struggle to assess when retrieved citations are useful or misleading, exhibiting overconfidence in perturbed contexts and sensitivity to superficial formatting cues. Increased model scale amplifies this tendency, revealing that stronger instruction following can coincide with weaker resistance to authoritative perturbations. These findings show that LLMs treat law as unstructured text rather than binding precedent, while revealing a tendency to over-trust authoritative but false information when external references conflict with a model's internal knowledge.

Dialogue contradiction is a critical issue in open-domain dialogue systems. The contextualization nature of conversations makes dialogue contradiction detection rather challenging. In this work, we propose a benchmark for Contradiction Detection in Chinese Conversations, namely CDConv. It contains 12K multi-turn conversations annotated with three typical contradiction categories: Intra-sentence Contradiction, Role Confusion, and History Contradiction. To efficiently construct the CDConv conversations, we devise a series of methods for automatic conversation generation, which simulate common user behaviors that trigger chatbots to make contradictions. We conduct careful manual quality screening of the constructed conversations and show that state-of-the-art Chinese chatbots can be easily goaded into making contradictions. Experiments on CDConv show that properly modeling contextual information is critical for dialogue contradiction detection, but there are still unresolved challenges that require future research.

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain policy. The result is a silent wrong state (a booking cancelled, a passenger count changed, a claim acted on without verification) that neither the tool nor the agent's self-report exposes. We study this failure mode in the τ^2-bench airline domain. On a budget agent, 78% of observed failures are silent wrong-state failures with no tool error, and the aggregate failure rate is reproducible across disjoint seeds, not sampling noise. We then evaluate a lightweight intervention: deterministic, read-only pre-execution gates that inspect the proposed call and current state before allowing a write. A four-gate suite raises full-benchmark success from 29.6% to 42.0% on gpt-4o-mini (+12.4pp; paired task-level bootstrap P=0.0012), and the lift reproduces on a disjoint 15-seed set (+12.3pp; P=0.0008). The effect is concentrated where the gates fire: on the 26/50 firing tasks, success rises by +19.2pp, while movement on the 24 non-firing tasks does not exclude zero. Two negative controls (a self-enforcing retail domain and BFCL) bound the mechanism: gates help when tools are policy-permissive and add little where tools already self-enforce. As suggestive evidence, not a central claim, the same failure mode persists at the frontier: gpt-5.2 at default reasoning still attempts policy-violating writes, and the same suite improves success from 61.2% to 71.6% (+10.4pp; P=0.020; n=5, no replication). The contribution is a bounded evaluation and reliability result: deterministic gates do not guarantee task success, but they can deterministically prevent a known class of silent policy-violating writes at the action boundary.

Training language models with rationales augmentation has been shown to be beneficial in many existing works. In this paper, we identify that such a prevailing view does not hold consistently. We conduct comprehensive investigations to thoroughly inspect the impact of rationales on model performance as well as a novel perspective of model reliability. The results lead to several key findings that add new insights upon existing understandings: 1) Rationales can, at times, deteriorate model performance; 2) Rationales can, at times, improve model reliability, even outperforming their untrained counterparts; 3) A linear correspondence exists in between the performance and reliability improvements, while both are driven by the intrinsic difficulty of the task. These findings provide informative regulations on the broad utilization of rationales and raise critical implications on the procedure of explicitly aligning language models with implicit human thoughts. Codes can be found at https://github.com/Ignoramus0817/rationales.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Prompt optimization methods either analyze individual failures in isolation or compare prompt variants across examples, operating on single execution traces with no access to the reasoning process distinguishing success from failure on the same input. We introduce ContraPrompt, built on the observation that when a model fails but succeeds on a retry with feedback, the difference between its two chain-of-thought traces constitutes an optimization signal not captured by prior methods. Unlike prior contrastive methods, we compare complete intermediate reasoning processes: the two traces share model, input, and base prompt, so remaining differences reflect reasoning strategy and appended error feedback -- we call this dyadic reasoning trace analysis. The multi-attempt solving phase is an instrumented agentic retry loop that generates contrastive data automatically without human annotation. Extracted rules are organized into an input-aware decision tree routing instructions by observable input characteristics. On four reasoning and compliance benchmarks, ContraPrompt outperforms GEPA (Agrawal et al., 2026) on all four, with absolute gains of +8.29 pp on HotPotQA (+20.8% rel.), +2.21 pp on GDPR-Bench (+18.2% rel.), +7.14 pp on GPQA Diamond (+10.6% rel.), and +0.74 pp on BBH (+0.85% rel.). Ablations confirm dyadic trace contrastivity is the critical component, with a -16% relative average drop upon its removal. On 53 EvalSet black-box optimization problems, ContraPrompt beats GEPA on 11, ties on 41, and loses on 1 at equal budget. On FiNER-139 financial named entity recognition (Loukas et al., 2022), ContraPrompt achieves +7.77 pp over the unoptimized baseline (+11.6% rel.) and +1.94 pp over GEPA (+2.66% rel.), with branch conditions aligning with standard US GAAP financial-instrument categories.

Can we trust the reasoning traces that large reasoning models (LRMs) produce? We investigate whether these traces faithfully reflect what drives model outputs, and whether models will honestly report their influence. We introduce Thought Injection, a method that injects synthetic reasoning snippets into a model's <think> trace, then measures whether the model follows the injected reasoning and acknowledges doing so. Across 45,000 samples from three LRMs, we find that injected hints reliably alter outputs, confirming that reasoning traces causally shape model behavior. However, when asked to explain their changed answers, models overwhelmingly refuse to disclose the influence: overall non-disclosure exceeds 90% for extreme hints across 30,000 follow-up samples. Instead of acknowledging the injected reasoning, models fabricate aligned-appearing but unrelated explanations. Activation analysis reveals that sycophancy- and deception-related directions are strongly activated during these fabrications, suggesting systematic patterns rather than incidental failures. Our findings reveal a gap between the reasoning LRMs follow and the reasoning they report, raising concern that aligned-appearing explanations may not be equivalent to genuine alignment.

Understanding entailment and contradiction is fundamental to understanding natural language, and inference about entailment and contradiction is a valuable testing ground for the development of semantic representations. However, machine learning research in this area has been dramatically limited by the lack of large-scale resources. To address this, we introduce the Stanford Natural Language Inference corpus, a new, freely available collection of labeled sentence pairs, written by humans doing a novel grounded task based on image captioning. At 570K pairs, it is two orders of magnitude larger than all other resources of its type. This increase in scale allows lexicalized classifiers to outperform some sophisticated existing entailment models, and it allows a neural network-based model to perform competitively on natural language inference benchmarks for the first time.

Moving ML-mediated decision making onto privacy-preserving clients decentralises the economic decision along with the inference. Shared budget constraints then depend on information that cannot be globally current, creating an information-structure failure that conventional pacing is not designed to solve. We study this information misalignment in an auction-logic-faithful on-device simulation with 36 campaigns and 50 devices. Accounting is in dimensionless integer score units; no currency semantics are claimed. Across 30 paired demand paths, proportional Even pacing overspends 17.77% after one tick of staleness and 1,669.31% after 50 ticks under the original 20-times budget pressure. The effect does not depend on that severe a budget: at two-times pressure, 50-tick overspend remains 106.95%. A visible-budget no-sale guard makes zero-lag compliance exact at this score-unit granularity, yet leaves 11.88% overspend at one tick because other devices' debits remain invisible. A declared bursty, heterogeneous-device sweep retains a strictly increasing mean lag curve. We derive a finite-window expected excess-debit bound under conditional charge caps and find positive paired slack in every bounded-value cell. A second, incentive misalignment arises when the ML/pacing score transformation is allowed to change payment units: 98.23% of rival auctions at one tick admit a profitable deviation. An executable implementation-level counterexample isolates the runner-up's multiplier in the winner's price. Critical-base-bid payment is per-auction DSIC conditional on current multipliers, but does not establish dynamic truthfulness and does not repair base-value ranking disagreement.

Safety-aligned language models often refuse prompts that are actually harmless. Current evaluations mostly report global rates such as false rejection or compliance. These scores treat each prompt alone and miss local inconsistency, where a model accepts one phrasing of an intent but rejects a close paraphrase. This gap limits diagnosis and tuning. We introduce "semantic confusion," a failure mode that captures such local inconsistency, and a framework to measure it. We build ParaGuard, a 10k-prompt corpus of controlled paraphrase clusters that hold intent fixed while varying surface form. We then propose three model-agnostic metrics at the token level: Confusion Index, Confusion Rate, and Confusion Depth. These metrics compare each refusal to its nearest accepted neighbors and use token embeddings, next-token probabilities, and perplexity signals. Experiments across diverse model families and deployment guards show that global false-rejection rate hides critical structure. Our metrics reveal globally unstable boundaries in some settings, localized pockets of inconsistency in others, and cases where stricter refusal does not increase inconsistency. We also show how confusion-aware auditing separates how often a system refuses from how sensibly it refuses. This gives developers a practical signal to reduce false refusals while preserving safety.

Most work interpreting reasoning models studies only a single chain-of-thought (CoT), yet these models define distributions over many possible CoTs. We argue that studying a single sample is inadequate for understanding causal influence and the underlying computation. Though fully specifying this distribution is intractable, it can be understood by sampling. We present case studies using resampling to investigate model decisions. First, when a model states a reason for its action, does that reason actually cause the action? In "agentic misalignment" scenarios, we resample specific sentences to measure their downstream effects. Self-preservation sentences have small causal impact, suggesting they do not meaningfully drive blackmail. Second, are artificial edits to CoT sufficient for steering reasoning? These are common in literature, yet take the model off-policy. Resampling and selecting a completion with the desired property is a principled on-policy alternative. We find off-policy interventions yield small and unstable effects compared to resampling in decision-making tasks. Third, how do we understand the effect of removing a reasoning step when the model may repeat it post-edit? We introduce a resilience metric that repeatedly resamples to prevent similar content from reappearing downstream. Critical planning statements resist removal but have large effects when eliminated. Fourth, since CoT is sometimes "unfaithful", can our methods teach us anything in these settings? Adapting causal mediation analysis, we find that hints that have a causal effect on the output without being explicitly mentioned exert a subtle and cumulative influence on the CoT that persists even if the hint is removed. Overall, studying distributions via resampling enables reliable causal analysis, clearer narratives of model reasoning, and principled CoT interventions.

Information accounting provides a better foundation for hypothesis testing than does uncertainty quantification. A quantitative account of science is derived under this perspective that alleviates the need for epistemic bridge principles, solves the problem of ad hoc falsification criteria, and deals with verisimilitude by facilitating a general approach to process-level diagnostics. Our argument is that the well-known inconsistencies of both Bayesian and classical statistical hypothesis tests are due to the fact that probability theory is an insufficient logic of science. Information theory, as an extension of probability theory, is required to provide a complete logic on which to base quantitative theories of empirical learning. The organizing question in this case becomes not whether our theories or models are more or less true, or about how much uncertainty is associated with a particular model, but instead whether there is any information available from experimental data that might allow us to improve the model. This becomes a formal hypothesis test, provides a theory of model diagnostics, and suggests a new approach to building dynamical systems models.

Recent advances in synergizing large reasoning models (LRMs) with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) have shown promising results, yet two critical challenges remain: (1) reasoning models typically operate from a single, unchallenged perspective, limiting their ability to conduct deep, self-correcting reasoning over external documents, and (2) existing training paradigms rely excessively on outcome-oriented rewards, which provide insufficient signal for shaping the complex, multi-step reasoning process. To address these issues, we propose an Reasoner-Verifier framework named Adversarial Reasoning RAG (ARR). The Reasoner and Verifier engage in reasoning on retrieved evidence and critiquing each other's logic while being guided by process-aware advantage that requires no external scoring model. This reward combines explicit observational signals with internal model uncertainty to jointly optimize reasoning fidelity and verification rigor. Experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

Striking a balance between helpfulness and safety remains a fundamental challenge in aligning large language models. To achieve this balance, models should refuse harmful queries (e.g., "How do I shoot someone?") while remaining responsive to benign inputs, even those superficially resembling harmful queries (e.g., "Where can I shoot a good photo?"). However, models often struggle to distinguish genuinely harmful queries from benign queries that contain superficially risky language, resulting in false refusals. In this paper, we address the issue by decomposing a response in the safety-tuning dataset into two distinct components: (i) a boilerplate refusal statement and (ii) a rationale explaining the refusal. Our experiments and analyses show that refusal statements impede accurate discrimination between harmful and benign queries by inducing reliance on superficial cues. In contrast, training solely on rationales reduces false refusals while maintaining a comparable level of safety performance. Rationale-Only benefits also appear in our ICL configuration and remain compatible with the evaluated inference-time mitigation methods. The results emphasize the necessity of precisely curated, fine-grained safety supervision datasets and outline directions for constructing aligned agents that better reconcile helpfulness with safety.

Multi-modal large reasoning models (MLRMs) pose significant privacy risks by inferring precise geographic locations from personal images through hierarchical chain-of-thought reasoning. Existing privacy protection techniques, primarily designed for perception-based models, prove ineffective against MLRMs' sophisticated multi-step reasoning processes that analyze environmental cues. We introduce ReasonBreak, a novel adversarial framework specifically designed to disrupt hierarchical reasoning in MLRMs through concept-aware perturbations. Our approach is founded on the key insight that effective disruption of geographic reasoning requires perturbations aligned with conceptual hierarchies rather than uniform noise. ReasonBreak strategically targets critical conceptual dependencies within reasoning chains, generating perturbations that invalidate specific inference steps and cascade through subsequent reasoning stages. To facilitate this approach, we contribute GeoPrivacy-6K, a comprehensive dataset comprising 6,341 ultra-high-resolution images (geq2K) with hierarchical concept annotations. Extensive evaluation across seven state-of-the-art MLRMs (including GPT-o3, GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro) demonstrates ReasonBreak's superior effectiveness, achieving a 14.4\% improvement in tract-level protection (33.8\% vs 19.4\%) and nearly doubling block-level protection (33.5\% vs 16.8\%). This work establishes a new paradigm for privacy protection against reasoning-based threats.

Existing defenses against hallucination in retrieval-augmented and multi-agent pipelines remain partial: evidence is trusted despite modality disagreement, debate verifies an aggregate report rather than individual claims, and such verification occurs only after drafting, leaving inter-agent errors undetected until the final text. To close this gap, we present CLAIR-Fin, a nine-agent framework that decomposes each question into atomic claims maintained in a typed Financial Claim Ledger. Each claim is resolved through Asymmetric Evidence Authority, which conditions evidence trust on claim type rather than treating all modalities as equally reliable; Chain-of-Custody Verification, which checks grounding at the hand-off between drafting and adversarial review rather than only at the pipeline's exit; an Adaptive Rebuttal Cycle, which routes contested claims through adversarial debate whose depth scales with what that debate finds; and a terminal entailment audit paired with a continuous Hallucination Risk Index that distinguishes claims that passed scrutiny from claims never contested. We evaluate CLAIR-Fin on BB-FinQA-X, a 500-question cross-modal financial evaluation set built from Bangladesh Bank Annual Report material, stratified by query type, format, and difficulty. Relative to a single-pass retrieval-augmented generation baseline, it raises faithfulness (0.780 rightarrow 0.889) while abstaining on 5.4% of questions when evidence is insufficient rather than forcing an unsupported response, and it exceeds stronger retrieval-strategy baselines such as HyDE and Graph-RAG on faithfulness (leq 0.874).

Recent work has demonstrated that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) often yields limited gains for soft-reasoning problems such as analytical and commonsense reasoning. CoT can also be unfaithful to a model's actual reasoning. We investigate the dynamics and faithfulness of CoT in soft-reasoning tasks across instruction-tuned, reasoning and reasoning-distilled models. Our findings reveal differences in how these models rely on CoT, and show that CoT influence and faithfulness are not always aligned.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to acquire reasoning capabilities through shared inference patterns in pre-training data, which are further elicited via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) practices. However, whether fundamental reasoning patterns, such as induction, deduction, and abduction, can be decoupled from specific problem instances remains a critical challenge for model controllability, and for shedding light on reasoning controllability. In this paper, we present the first systematic investigation of this problem through the lens of reasoning conflicts: an explicit tension between parametric and contextual information induced by mandating logical schemata that deviate from those expected for a target task. Our evaluation reveals that LLMs consistently prioritize sensibility over compliance, favoring task-appropriate reasoning patterns despite conflicting instructions. Notably, task accuracy is not strictly determined by sensibility, with models often maintaining high performance even when using conflicting patterns, suggesting a reliance on internalized parametric memory that increases with model size. We further demonstrate that reasoning conflicts are internally detectable, as confidence scores significantly drop during conflicting episodes. Probing experiments confirm that reasoning types are linearly encoded from middle-to-late layers, indicating the potential for activation-level controllability. Leveraging these insights, we steer models towards compliance, increasing instruction following by up to 29%. Overall, our findings establish that while LLM reasoning is anchored to concrete instances, active mechanistic interventions can effectively decouple logical schemata from data, offering a path toward improved controllability, faithfulness, and generalizability.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.